Study of stochastic and machine learning tecniques for anomaly-based Web atack detection by Torrano Giménez, Carmen
 
 
 
 
 
TESIS DOCTORAL 
 
Study of Stochastic and Machine 
Learning Techniques for             
Anomaly-based Web Attack Detection 
 
 
Autora: 
Carmen Torrano Giménez 
 
 
Director: 
Dr. Gonzalo Álvarez Marañón 
 
Tutor: 
Dr. Javier Carbó Rubiera 
 
 
ESCUELA POLITÉCNICA SUPERIOR – INGENIERÍA INFORMÁTICA  
INSTITUTO DE TECNOLOGÍAS FÍSICAS Y DE LA INFORMACIÓN 
 
Leganés, septiembre de 2015 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 
TESIS DOCTORAL 
 
Study of Stochastic and Machine Learning Techniques for 
Anomaly-based Web Attack Detection  
 
   Autora: Carmen Torrano Giménez 
 
Director: Dr. Gonzalo Álvarez Marañón    
  
 
Firma del Tribunal Calificador: 
 
                                                                                                      Firma 
Presidente:  
 
 
Vocal:  
 
 
Secretario:  
 
 
Calificación: 
   
 
Leganés,        de                         de              

Este trabajo ha sido realizado en el marco de las becas predoctorales
de la Junta de Amplicación de Estudios (JAE) de la Agencia
Estatal Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC).

A mis queridos padres y hermana
To my beloved parents and sister

“Es preciso entender la tesis como una
ocasión única para hacer algunos ejercicios
que nos servirán mientras vivamos.”
— Umberto Eco
“It is necessary to understand the PhD. thesis
as a unique occasion to do some exercises that
will be useful while we live.”
— Umberto Eco
 
Agradecimientos
Este periodo doctoral ha sido un camino de gran aprendizaje. Un camino con
sus picos, valles, aventuras, obstáculos... todos ellos merecen ser vividos. Y es
que una tesis no es sólo un gran proyecto, sino una parte importante de nuestra
vida. En esta etapa he tenido el privilegio de compartir camino con grandes
personas, a las que me gustaría expresar todo mi agradecimiento.
Comenzaré por el director de esta tesis, Gonzalo. Gracias por haberme dado
la oportunidad de hacer este doctorado y por todo lo que he podido aprender
al tenerte como director. Javier, en su papel como tutor, ha sido un puente de
unión excelente entre el CSIC y la universidad. Gracias por tu ayuda en las
las labores burocráticas y por haber sido un excelente anfitrión. También me
gustaría agradecer al programa JAE por la financiación recibida para realizar
esta tesis doctoral.
Mis compañeros del CSIC han tenido un papel fundamental para mí. No
puedo dejar de agradeceros por tantos momentos vividos y por haber crecido
juntos. Me siento afortunada de haber formado parte de un equipo que no sólo
destaca por su calidad profesional, sino por su calidad humana. Gracias a Luis,
cabeza del Instituto, por su ayuda y su gestión en el centro. A Nacho, por
arrancarnos siempre una carcajada. A Juanca, por su amabilidad y cuidado.
A Alfonso, por su autenticidad e interés. A Jesús, por tenerlo siempre todo a
punto y por su cordura. A David, por ilustrarnos con su vasto conocimiento y
las charlas de horas. A Arancha, por su eterna sonrisa. A Alejandro, compañero
de batallas; eso une. A Mari Jose, por su compañerismo y naturalidad. A
Verónica, por su amistad sin igual y por inspirarme cada día. A Fausto, por
enseñarnos con su experiencia y sabiduría. A Amalia por su ayuda y dulzura.
A Amparo, por tener siempre palabras de aliento. A Mari Carmen, por su
interés y afecto. A Ignacio, por su experiencia y cariño. A Jose, por mostrarnos
su lado más humano. A Oscar por la huella que deja su valía y por contar
siempre conmigo. A Alberto Carrasco, por los interesantes debates. A Alberto
Guerra, por ser un gran compañero. Agradezco la espontaneidad de Natalia, la
alegría de Sara, la simpatía de Marta, la compañía de Ricardo, Noemí, Víctor
Gayoso, Raúl, Luis, Víctor Fernández, Gerardo, Jaime. Y también, a Agus,
maestro en lo laboral y en lo personal. Gracias por tu inestimable ayuda y por
tantas horas compartidas juntos.
Gracias a todo el resto de personal que de alguna manera ha colaborado en
que mi trabajo fuera posible: Mari Jose, Luci, Gema, Marisa y un largo etcétera.
Gracias también a los vigilantes por abrirme la puerta a horas intempestivas.
No puedo olvidarme de las personas de los otros departamentos que me han
ayudado a ponerle sal a la vida y a hacer más cálidos los pasillos.
El CSIC ha sido como un segundo hogar para mi, lleno de imborrables
recuerdos que me llevo en el corazón. Y es que no sólo he aprendido de ciencia
en los cafés, sino también de las relaciones humanas y sobre todo, de la vida.
También me gustaría agradecer a mis compañeros de la universidad: José
Antonio, Raúl, Juan por hacerme reír hasta que me doliera el estómago.
También a Paz, Germán, Tomás, Bea, Jorge Blasco, Jorge Muñoz, Chema,
Jose María Sierra. Aprender a vuestro lado siempre es más fácil. Gracias a
Juan por haber aparecido en el momento preciso y por no escatimar en ánimos
ni ayuda. A Sergio y Agustín por haber sido unos excelentes compañeros de
trabajo, además de grandes personas. Agus, te llevo en el corazón. Gracias a
Hai, por haberme hecho sentir tan cómoda trabajando a su lado. Y a Slobodan
y Katrin por su colaboraración desde la distancia.
Durante mi periodo doctoral he tenido la oportunidad de realizar varias
estancias en el extranjero, en las que he tenido el placer de trabajar y convivir
con gente maravillosa. En mi estancia en la Universidad de Nottingham tuve
el gusto de trabajar con Uwe Aickelin, Julie Greensmith, Jan, Gianni y Rafael
Lahoz, entre otros.
Gracias por cada minuto de mi aventura en la Universidad de Munich.
Involvidables momentos que compartí con Gehard, Lothard, Andreas, Dirk,
Pia, Ralph, Tobi, Ali, Marc Fouquet, Nils, Heiko, Holgar, Andreas Müller,
Corinna, Carlas, Mayur, Vineeth. Gracias a Prof. Carle por acogerme siempre
tan bien y por su ayuda. Mis infinitas gracias a Marc (U), por lo especial de
haberte conocido.
En la visita a Eurecom tuve el placer de trabajar con personas de la altura
de Engin Kirda, Davide Balzarotti, Leila Bilge, Marco Balduzzi y Andrea Lanci.
Gracias por las horas compartidas y el enriquecimiento multicultural de Miriam,
xii
Sara, Lluis–"ciccio", Mateo, Tony. Extraordinaria experiencia a vuestro lado
allí donde el paisaje es inmejorable.
Me gustaría además recordar a mis hackers favoritos: Pablo, Red, Jhonattan,
Juanito, Juanan, Chema, Román, Alfonso, Dani, Raúl y tantos otros, por
compartir sus conocimientos y acompañarme a adentrarme en las profundidades
del mundo de la seguridad informática.
También me gustaría dar las gracias a algunas personas que, fuera del
ámbito laboral, tienen un papel fundamental en mi vida. Gracias a Paula
y Anaida por haber estado a mi lado desde hace tantos años. A Emilio y a
Natalia por enseñarme tanto con su sabiduría y por estar cerca. A Miguel y Eva,
por ayudarme a entender mejor la vida. Gracias a Blanca, por su incansable
escucha. A Edu por su humanismo y a Iser por su capacidad de improvisación.
Agradezco a Santi por su cariño y por ser un chico genial. Gracias a Álvaro
por su paciencia y apoyo, y por tanto compartido. A Adri, por enseñarme otra
visión del mundo y por los extraordinarios momentos vividos. Y a tantas otras
personas... Gracias a todos por formar parte de mi vida.
Y por supuesto, a mi familia, uno de los pilares básicos de mi vida. Gracias
a mis padres, los mejores que podía tener, por todo lo que me dáis y por vuestro
ejemplo. Gracias a mi madre, por su amor incondicional y por dar sin conocer
límite. Y a mi padre, por ilustrarme con su ejemplo y por su ayuda. Y qué
decir de mi hermana, a la que quiero con locura incluso desde antes de que
naciera. También al resto de mi familia por rebosar salero y sentido común.
Gracias por apoyarme en todo momento, es un privilegio teneros cerca.
En definitiva, gracias a todos los que habéis colaborado, de una forma u
otra, en este proyecto. Porque en él, hay un pedacito de cada uno de vosotros.
Gracias por formar parte de él, y sobre todo, por formar parte de mí.
Con todo mi agradecimiento,
Carmen
xiii
 
Acknowledgements
This doctoral period has been a path of great learning for me. A path with
peaks, valleys, adventures, obstacles... that are all worth to be lived. Because a
Ph.D. thesis is not only a large project, but also an important part of our lives.
During this time I have had the privilege of sharing this path with extraordinary
people, to whom I would like to express all my gratitude.
I will start with my supervisor, Gonzalo. Thanks for giving me the
opportunity of doing this Ph.D. and for all I have learned from having you as
a supervisor. Javier, my tutor, has been an excellent bridge between CSIC
and University. I would also like to thank the JAE program for the funding
received to carry out this Ph.D. thesis.
My colleagues at CSIC have been very important for me. I would like to
express my gratitude for sharing so many wonderful moments. I feel lucky for
being part of a team that not only stands out for its professional quality, but
also for its human value. Thanks to Luis, head of the Institute, for his help and
management labour. To Nacho, for making us laugh so much. To Juanca, for
his kindness and care. To Alfonso, for his authenticity and attention. To Jesús,
for having everything ready and for his sanity. To David, for sharing with us
some of his huge knowledge and for our long conversations. To Arancha, for
her eternal smile. To Alejandro, battle-mate, that brought us close. To Mari
Jose, for being a great mate and being so natural. To Verónica, for her unique
friendship and for inspiring me every day. To Fausto, for teaching us with his
experience and wisdom. To Amalia, for her help and sweetness. To Amparo,
for always having words of encouragement. To Mari Carmen, for her interest
and affection. To Ignacio, for his experience and care. To Jose, for showing us
his most human side. To Oscar for his immense value and for counting on me.
To Alberto Carrasco for the interesting debates. To Alberto Guerra, for being
an excellent mate. I thank Natalia’s spontaneity, Sara’s happiness, Marta’s
friendliness, and the company of Ricardo, Noemí, Víctor Gayoso, Raúl, Luis,
Víctor Fernández, Gerardo, Jaime. Also to Agus, a teacher both in professional
and personal areas. Thank you for your inestimable help and for so many hours
shared together.
Thanks to the remaining staff members who somehow have collaborated
in making my work possible, like Mari Jose, Luci, Gema, Marisa and a long
etcetera. Thanks also to the guards for always opening the door. I cannot
forget people from other departments who helped me to make life nicer and
corridors warmer.
CSIC has been like a second home for me, full of unforgettable memories
that are within my heart. I have not only learned about science in coffee times,
but also about human relationships and mostly, about life.
I would also like to thank my university colleagues: José Antonio, Raúl,
Juan for making me laugh until my stomach hurt. Also to Paz, Germán, Tomás,
Bea, Jorge Blasco, Jorge Muñoz, Chema, Jose María Sierra. Learning with
you is easier. Thanks to Juan for appearing in the right moment and not
skimping on motivation or help. To Sergio and Agustín for being extraordinary
workmates, besides great people. Agus, you are in my heart. Thanks to Hai
for making me feel so comfortable working with him. And to Slobodan and
Katrin for their collaboration through distance.
During my doctoral period I have had the opportunity to do several research
stays abroad, where I had the pleasure of working and living with wonderful
people. In my stay in Nottingham I had the chance to work with Uwe Aickelin,
Julie Greensmith, Jan, Gianni and Rafael Lahoz, among others.
Thanks for every minute of my adventure in Technische Universität München.
Unforgettable moments that I shared with Gehard, Lothard, Andreas, Dirk,
Pia, Ralph, Tobi, Ali, Marc Fouquet, Nils, Heiko, Holgar, Andreas Müller,
Corinna, Carlas, Mayur, Vineeth. Thanks to Prof. Carle for hosting me always
so nicely and for his help. My infinite thanks to Marc (U), for the special fact
of getting to know you.
In my visit to Eurecom I was honored to work with awesome experts like
Engin Kirda, Davide Balzarotti, Leila Bilge, Marco Balduzzi and Andrea Lanci.
Thanks for the hours shared and the multicultural enrichment of Miriam, Sara,
Lluis–"ciccio", Mateo, Tony. It was an extraordinary experience with a superb
landscape.
I would also like to remember my favorite hackers: Pablo, Red, Jhonattan,
Juanito, Juanan, Chema, Román, Alfonso, Dani, Raúl and many more, for
xvi
sharing their knowledge and for walking with me to the depths of the computer
security world.
I want to express my gratitude also to some people that, besides the
professional area, have an essential role in my life. Thanks to Paula and Anaida
for being with me since so many years ago. Thanks to Emilio and Natalia for
teaching me so much with their wisdom and for staying close to me. To Miguel
and Eva, for helping me understand life. Thanks to Blanca, for her constant
listening. To Edu for his humanity and to Iser for his improvisation ability.
I thank Santi for his care and for being a great boy. Thanks to Alvaro for his
patience and support, and for so much shared. To Adri, for showing me other
vision of the world and for the extraordinary moments shared. And to so many
others...Thanks to all of you for being part of my life.
And of course, to my family, one of the basic supports in my life. Thanks
to my parents, the best I could have, for all you give me and for your good
example. Thanks to my mother for her unconditional love and for giving
endlessly. Thanks to my father for being an example and for his help. And
what can I say about my sister, whom I have loved since even before she was
born. Also to the rest of my family, for their charm and common sense. Thanks
for always supporting me, it is a privilege to have you close.
In summary, thanks to all of you who have participated, in a way or another,
in this project. Because in it, there is a part of all of you. Thanks for being
part of it, and mainly, for being part of me.
With all my gratitude,
Carmen
xvii
 
Abstract
Web applications are exposed to different threats and it is necessary to
protect them. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are a solution external to the
web application that do not require the modification of the application’s code
in order to protect it. These systems are located in the network, monitoring
events and searching for signs of anomalies or threats that can compromise the
security of the information systems.
IDSs have been applied to traffic analysis of different protocols, such as TCP,
FTP or HTTP. Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) are special cases of IDSs
that are specialized in analyzing HTTP traffic with the aim of safeguarding
web applications.
The increase in the amount of data traveling through the Internet and the
growing sophistication of the attacks, make necessary protection mechanisms
that are both effective and efficient.
This thesis proposes three anomaly-based WAFs with the characteristics of
being high-speed, reaching high detection results and having a simple design.
The anomaly-based approach defines the normal behavior of web application.
Actions that deviate from it are considered anomalous. The proposed WAFs
work at the application layer analyzing the payload of HTTP requests. These
systems are designed with different detection algorithms in order to compare
their results and performance.
Two of the systems proposed are based on stochastic techniques: one of the
them is based on statistical techniques and the other one in Markov chains. The
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third WAF presented in this thesis is ML-based. Machine Learning (ML) deals
with constructing computer programs that automatically learn with experience
and can be very helpful in dealing with big amounts of data. Concretely,
this third WAF is based on decision trees given their proved effectiveness in
intrusion detection. In particular, four algorithms are employed: C4.5, CART,
Random Tree and Random Forest.
Typically, two phases are distinguished in IDSs: preprocessing and
processing. In the case of stochastic systems, preprocessing includes feature
extraction. The processing phase consists in training the system in order
to learn the normal behavior and later testing how well it classifies the
incoming requests as either normal or anomalous. The detection models of
the systems are implemented either with statistical techniques or with Markov
chains, depending on the system considered.
For the system based on decision trees, the preprocessing phase comprises
feature extraction as well as feature selection. These two phases are optimized.
On the one hand, new feature extraction methods are proposed. They combine
features extracted by means of expert knowledge and n-grams, and have the
capacity of improving the detection results of both techniques separately. For
feature selection, the Generic Feature Selection GeFS measure has been used,
which has been proven to be very effective in reducing the number of redundant
and irrelevant features.
Additionally, for the three systems, a study for establishing the minimum
number of requests required to train them in order to achieve a certain detection
result has been performed. Reducing the number of training requests can greatly
help in the optimization of the resource consumption of WAFs as well as on
the data gathering process.
Besides designing and implementing the systems, evaluating them is an
essential step. For that purpose, a dataset is necessary. Unfortunately, finding
labeled and adequate datasets is not an easy task. In fact, the study of the
most popular datasets in the intrusion detection field reveals that most of
them do not satisfy the requirements for evaluating WAFs. In order to tackle
this situation, this thesis proposes the new CSIC dataset, that satisfies the
necessary conditions to satisfactorily evaluate WAFs.
Abstract xxi
The proposed systems have been experimentally evaluated. For that, the
proposed CSIC dataset and the existing ECML/PKDD dataset have been
used. The three presented systems have been compared in terms of their
detection results, processing time and number of training requests used. For
this comparison, the CSIC dataset has been used.
In summary, this thesis proposes three WAFs based on stochastic and ML
techniques. Additionally, the systems are compared, what allows to determine
which system is the most appropriate for each scenario.

Resumen
Las aplicaciones web están expuestas a diferentes amenazas y es necesario
protegerlas. Los sistemas de detección de intrusiones (IDSs del inglés Intrusion
Detection Systems) son una solución externa a la aplicación web que no requiere
la modificación del código de la aplicación para protegerla. Estos sistemas se
sitúan en la red, monitorizando los eventos y buscando señales de anomalías o
amenazas que puedan comprometer la seguridad de los sistemas de información.
Los IDSs se han aplicado al análisis de tráfico de varios protocolos, tales
como TCP, FTP o HTTP. Los Cortafuegos de Aplicaciones Web (WAFs del
inglés Web Application Firewall) son un caso especial de los IDSs que están
especializados en analizar tráfico HTTP con el objetivo de salvaguardar las
aplicaciones web.
El incremento en la cantidad de datos circulando por Internet y la creciente
sofisticación de los ataques hace necesario contar con mecanismos de protección
que sean efectivos y eficientes.
Esta tesis propone tres WAFs basados en anomalías que tienen las
características de ser de alta velocidad, alcanzar altos resultados de detección
y contar con un diseño sencillo. El enfoque basado en anomalías define el
comportamiento normal de la aplicación, de modo que las acciones que se
desvían del mismo se consideran anómalas. Los WAFs diseñados trabajan en
la capa de aplicación y analizan el contenido de las peticiones HTTP. Estos
sistemas están diseñados con diferentes algoritmos de detección para comparar
sus resultados y rendimiento.
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Dos de los sistemas propuestos están basados en técnicas estocásticas: una
de ellas está basada en técnicas estadísticas y la otra en cadenas de Markov.
El tercer WAF presentado en esta tesis está basado en aprendizaje automático.
El aprendizaje automático (ML del inglés Machine Learning) se ocupa de
cómo construir programas informáticos que aprenden automáticamente con la
experiencia y puede ser muy útil cuando se trabaja con grandes cantidades de
datos. En concreto, este tercer WAF está basado en árboles de decisión, dada
su probada efectividad en la detección de intrusiones. En particular, se han
empleado cuatro algoritmos: C4.5, CART, Random Tree y Random Forest.
Típicamente se distinguen dos fases en los IDSs: preprocesamiento y
procesamiento. En el caso de los sistemas estocásticos, en la fase de
preprocesamiento se realiza la extracción de características. El procesamiento
consiste en el entrenamiento del sistema para que aprenda el comportamiento
normal y más tarde se comprueba cuán bien el sistema es capaz de clasificar
las peticiones entrantes como normales o anómalas. Los modelos de detección
de los sistemas están implementados bien con técnicas estadísticas o bien con
cadenas de Markov, dependiendo del sistema considerado.
Para el sistema basado en árboles de decisión la fase de preprocesamiento
comprende tanto la extracción de características como la selección de
características. Estas dos fases se han optimizado. Por un lado, se proponen
nuevos métodos de extracción de características. Éstos combinan características
extraídas por medio de conocimiento experto y n-gramas y tienen la capacidad
de mejorar los resultados de detección de ambas técnicas por separado. Para la
selección de características, se ha utilizado la medida GeFS (del inglés Generic
Feature Selection), la cual ha probado ser muy efectiva en la reducción del
número de características redundantes e irrelevantes.
Además, para los tres sistemas, se ha realizado un estudio para establecer
el mínimo número de peticiones necesarias para entrenarlos y obtener un cierto
resultado. Reducir el número de peticiones de entrenamiento puede ayudar en
gran medida a la optimización del consumo de recursos de los WAFs así como
en el proceso de adquisición de datos.
Además de diseñar e implementar los sistemas, la tarea de evaluarlos
es esencial. Para este propósito es necesario un conjunto de datos.
Desafortunadamente, encontrar conjuntos de datos etiquetados y adecuados no
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es una tarea fácil. De hecho, el estudio de los conjuntos de datos más utilizados
en el campo de la detección de intrusiones revela que la mayoría de ellos no
cumple los requisitos para evaluar WAFs. Para enfrentar esta situación, esta
tesis presenta un nuevo conjunto de datos llamado CSIC, que satisface las
condiciones necesarias para evaluar WAFs satisfactoriamente.
Los sistemas propuestos se han evaluado experimentalmente. Para ello, se
ha utilizado el conjunto de datos propuesto (CSIC ) y otro existente llamado
ECML/PKDD. Los tres sistemas presentados se han comparado con respecto a
sus resultados de detección, tiempo de procesamiento y número de peticiones
de entrenamiento utilizadas. Para esta comparación se ha utilizado el conjunto
de datos CSIC.
En resumen, esta tesis propone tres WAFs basados en técnicas estocásticas
y de ML. Además, se han comparado estos sistemas entre sí, lo que permite
determinar qué sistema es el más adecuado para cada escenario.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“Security, like correctness, is not an additional
feature."
— Andrew S. Tanenbaum
This chapter shows the importance of web applications nowadays
and points out the security risks that they are exposed to. Web
Application Firewalls (WAFs) are able to protect web applications
without the need of modifying their code. WAFs analyze web traffic
and look for anomalies that could threaten the web server. On the
one hand, modern WAFs deal with an increasing amount of data
and on the other hand, attacks are becoming more complex. This
leads to the necessity of both effective and efficient WAFs. This
thesis presents three anomaly-based WAFs that satisfy these two
conditions. The proposed systems apply stochastic and machine
learning algorithms, in particular statistical techniques, Markov
chains and decision trees. Additionally, adequate datasets are
essential for evaluating WAFs. However, existing datasets present
various disadvantages. In order to fill this gap, this thesis presents
a new dataset for adequately evaluating WAFs. In this chapter,
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the motivation, objectives and structure of this dissertation are
presented.
1.1 Background
The Internet has changed the way people interact with technology. It is
considered one of the inventions that has changed the world the most in the last
40 years [Burkeman, 2009], [Wharton, 2009]. Web technologies have modified
our daily life and transformed our customs in a large variety of sectors, such as
economy, education, telecommunications, entertainment, healthcare and so on.
During their evolution, web applications have increased in complexity.
Applications belonging to Web 1.0 were basically document repositories, where
pages were static and the user was limited to view their content [Stuttard and
Pinto, 2007]. The evolution to the next and current generation (2.0), introduced
interactive and collaborative web applications [Shelly and Frydenberg, 2011].
Examples of Web 2.0 applications are social networks, blogs, wikis and search
engines. Differently to first web applications, web servers of the second
generation usually connect to supporting back-end systems such as databases,
mainframes and financial or logistical systems [Stuttard and Pinto, 2007].
Evolution of web applications continues: researchers are currently working on
Web 3.0. This next generation is characterized by the semantic web. This
technology consists in making machines understand and interpret the content
and semantics of web applications [Rollett et al., 2007]. As can be seen, the
evolution of web applications make them grow in complexity, introducing new
functionalities and mixing a vast amount of technologies.
Web applications are an open window to the world that provides to millions
of users the access to huge amounts of information and services in a wide range
of different areas:
Economy. Web applications have changed the economy sector in different
aspects. For example, nowadays users can interact online with their
banks, performing actions such as checking the balance of their bank
accounts, making money transfers or contracting deposits.
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Another economy sector revolutionized by web applications is commerce.
On the one hand, thousands of online shopping applications have
been created regarding business to consumer. On the other hand,
many interesting web applications help companies in their commerce
transactions in the field of business to business.
Within organizations, web applications help in managing company
resources and give access to human resource services [Stuttard and Pinto,
2007]. Furthermore, they play a critical role in advertisement.
Education and Science. E-learning consists in leaning through internet.
This paradigm has transformed education and science. Nowadays many
web applications offer access to online courses. Furthermore, wikis have
changed the generation of contents, by allowing the participation of users
in their creation in a collaborative manner. Regarding science, specialized
websites and online journals offer scientific contents.
Entertainment. Web applications have helped in the evolution of the
entertainment field with the introduction of blogs, multimedia streaming
and news feeds. In the gaming world, distant users can play together
connected through the network. Additionally, the industry of porn moves
big amounts of traffic and money every day. It is estimated that the yearly
revenue of this business ranges between 1 and 97 billion USD [Wondracek
et al., 2010].
Communications. Videoconferences are an example of how web applications
have impacted communications. Other example is webmail, that brings
people into contact. It makes possible to handle emails in a remote
server as if the traditional mail clients were installed. Furthermore, social
interactions are conceived differently since social networks appeared.
These kind of webs are used in diverse environments, ranging from labor
to personal relationships.
Other areas. Web search engines are an example of other uses of web
applications. These engines are massively used nowadays to retrieve
online information. Other example are applications dedicated to file
downloading and sharing, that have impacted sectors such as cinema
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or music. The Internet of Things is the network of physical objects
embedded with hardware and software that provides connectivity with
the manufacturer, operator or other connected devices [Atzori et al.,
2010]. Web applications are widely used as configuration interfaces for
network-capable embedded devices [Bojinov et al., 2009].
According to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) [ITU, 2015]
and Internet Live Stats [Real Time Statistics Project, 2014], the number of
Internet users constitutes more than 40% of the world population. Figure 1.1
shows the growth in the number of internet world users over the last years.
Figure 1.1 – Number of Internet users in the world over the last years.
Internet Live Stats 2014.
This incessant growth in the number of internet users implies an increase
in the amount of data available in the Internet. The research fields big
data [Cárdenas et al., 2013], [Camacho et al., 2014], [Curry et al., 2013]
and data science [Jifa and Lingling, 2014] study how to deal, analyze, store
and extract knowledge from the high amount of data transferred over the
Internet today. According to the Cloud Security Alliance [Cárdenas et al.,
2013], human beings create 2.5 1018 bytes of data per day. Besides operating
with big volumes of data, web applications move large amounts of money every
day. Moreover, new computing and communication paradigms such as cloud
computing, wireless networks and smartphone platforms allow web applications
be accessed from many different places and devices.
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These characteristics of web applications make them attractive targets for
attackers. The fact of having millions of users, being accessed from different
platforms, moving large amounts of money and handling private information
make them tempting for cybercriminals. Attacker’s motivations are classified
by Barber into curiosity, vandalism, hacktivism, industrial espionage, extortion
and fraud, information warfare and ethical hacking [Barber, 2001].
Web applications present vulnerabilities very often. As long as web
applications turn more complex and include diverse technologies, they become
more fragile [Stuttard and Pinto, 2007]. Moreover, the immature awareness
of developers about the importance of security might produce source code
with security vulnerabilities that can be exploited by an attacker. According
to a recent Symantec Report [Wood, 2014], the number of total breaches
experimented an increase of 62% from 2012 to 2013 and the number of new
vulnerabilities for web-based attacks increased by 28%. The number of web
attacks is increasingly growing. Furthermore, attacks are rapidly evolving
and their sophistication increasing. For example, botnets are recent threats
that aim to manage and control illegitimately a network of computers. They
differentiate from traditional malware in their capability to combine several ideas
implemented separately by traditional malware [Brezo et al., 2013]. Advanced
Persistent Threats (APTs) are a breed of threats that use multiple attack
techniques to avoid being detected and maintain the control over a target
system for long periods of time [Tankard, 2011]. They are complex attacks that
usually consist of several stages. APTs are performed by highly-skilled and
motivated attackers targeting sensitive information from specific organizations
that might even employ social engineering methods [Cárdenas et al., 2013].
The consequences of web attacks can be drastic. They can imply huge losses
of money or reputation. Thus, it is necessary to saveguard web applications and
their users. To that aim, reliable and effective security protection mechanisms
are necessary. Furthermore, given the amount of data these systems have to
deal with, they should be efficient in the request processing and consume low
resources.
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1.2 Concepts about web security
Despite the effort on security awareness of several institutions such as
MITRE [MITRE, 2014a], SANS Institute [SANS Institute, 2015] or Open
Web Application Security Project (OWASP) [OWASP, 2013], web application
developers are not completely aware of web vulnerabilities, or they are not
implementing correctly the corresponding countermeasures [Scholte et al., 2011].
Given the increasing need of protecting web applications, the security research
community has developed several tools and techniques to improve the security
of web applications.
Some of these techniques try to guarantee a secure coding of web applications.
This is the case of static [Jovanovic et al., 2006], [Wassermann and Su, 2008]
and dynamic [Schwartz et al., 2010], [Newsome and Song, 2005], [Nguyen-Tuong
et al., 2005] code analysis. These solutions require a thorough examination
of the application source code, either with (dynamic) or without (static) the
compilation of the application. Considering that some web applications contain
thousands of lines, this can be a tedious task.
Additionally, other solutions have been developed, like Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDSs). These systems monitor the events of a computer or network
in order to detect malicious actions and behaviors that can compromise their
security. One of the advantages of IDSs is that they can safeguard web
applications without modifying the code even if it is wrongly programmed.
This technology has been extensively used for protecting computer systems.
They have been applied to analyze traffic corresponding to different network
protocols, such as File Transfer Protocol (FTP), Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP) or Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP).
In these systems two stages are usually distinguished: preprocessing and
processing. Preprocessing includes those tasks carried out before the formal
processing of data, such as dataset creation, feature extraction and feature
selection [Kotsiantis et al., 2006]. Processing makes reference to the detection
itself.
Traditionally, IDSs have been classified as either signature detection systems
or anomaly detection systems [García-Teodoro et al., 2009]. On the one hand,
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signature detection looks for signatures (patterns) of known attacks. For
that, it uses pattern matching techniques against a database with attack
signatures. This approach is unable to detect new attacks and databases must
be frequently updated. Additionally, signature matching usually requires a high
computational effort. This detection method is also called negative approach
since it defines what is not allowed. On the other hand, anomaly detection
overcomes these problems. However, it is prone to more false positives. It
looks for anomalous system activity by defining the normal behavior of the web
application. Then, actions deviating more than a threshold from the defined
normal behavior are tagged as intrusive. The base idea is “denying everything
unless explicitly allowed”. A disadvantage is that in complex environments,
obtaining an accurate and updated description of the normal behavior might
not be an easy task. Anomaly detection is also referred to as positive approach
since it defines the allowed application behavior.
Anomaly IDSs are usually trained first and tested later [García-Teodoro
et al., 2009]. During the training the system learns several models that describe
the normal behavior of the web application. After the training phase, the
system is operative. During the test phase the system classifies incoming traffic.
Later, the performance of the system can be evaluated. It is done by contrasting
the classification information of the system, obtained in the test phase, with
the corresponding label in the traffic.
Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) are considered a particular case of IDSs.
They are specialized in working with web traffic. IDSs and WAFs are explained
in more detail in Chapter 2.
1.3 Motivation
The global motivation of this thesis is improving the security of web applications.
It means reducing the gap between attacks and defense. This would help millions
of people to enjoy a safe Internet experience. In order to do that, this thesis
basically focuses on five aspects:
• Designing several WAFs.
• Creating a new dataset for evaluating WAFs.
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• Analyzing how the number of training requests influences the detection
results.
• Searching for new feature extraction methods.
• Comparing different WAFs.
These aspects are further explained in the following sections.
The motivation of these five points is presented next:
• Regarding the design of WAFs, stochastic and Machine Learning (ML)
techniques are applied in order to improve both the effectiveness
and efficiency of this type of systems. Effectiveness measures how
well a system detects. Effective systems are those that detect attacks at
the same time that they do not raise false alarms. Whereas, efficiency
considers how to perform the detection in an optimal way. It considers
the amount of resources that the system needs to reach such detection
results. Additionally, it is desired that WAFs are designed following the
simplicity principle.
• Detection results of WAFs are directly influenced by the dataset selected.
Choosing an adequate dataset to evaluate these systems is critical.
However, acquiring labeled and quality datasets is an open problem in
web intrusion detection [Sommer and Paxson, 2010]. Many of the existing
datasets, such as LBNL, DARPA and UNB ISCX count with a number
of drawbacks. In some cases, these drawbacks can even turn the datasets
unusable. To be considered appropriate, a dataset should fulfill a number
of requirements, like containing both HTTP normal traffic and modern
attacks. Additionally, they should be labeled, publicly available and
not anonymized. Given the importance of adequately evaluating
IDSs and considering the drawbacks of most existing datasets, creating
adequate datasets for evaluating WAFs is a main motivation of this thesis.
• When evaluating IDSs, generally the whole dataset is used, regardless of
its number of requests. Besides affecting the training phase duration, the
number of training requests influences the detection results of the WAFs
(i.e., it determines the number of attacks detected and the number of
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false alarms). Studying the influence of the number of training requests
in the detection results can reveal useful information for reducing the
number of training requests needed to achieve certain results.
Although this is an important issue for the optimization of the WAF
resources, it has been scarcely studied.
• Features extracted from requests affect the detection results of WAFs.
Depending on how well these features can distinguish between normal
traffic and attacks, the detection results of the system vary. Thus,
studying feature extraction methods is relevant for optimizing WAFs.
The motivation in this point is to improve the results of current
extraction techniques, without using a big amount of features.
• For the comparison of different WAFs, a labeled and adequate
dataset is necessary. However, existing WAFs are frequently evaluated
independently, i.e., without the same conditions or the same data. This
impedes the comparison of different WAFs. Filling this gap is the
motivation of this thesis.
1.4 Objectives
The main goal of this thesis is optimizing the security capabilities of WAFs based
on stochastic and ML detection techniques, as well as creating an adequate
dataset that allows the evaluation and comparison of these systems.
Concretely, the objectives of this work are the following:
• Design and implement anomaly-based WAFs that use stochastic
and machine learning detection algorithms. The challenge is
that they work at high-speed, reach high detection results,
consume low resources and count with a simple design.
In particular, stochastic algorithms refer to statistical techniques and
Markov chains. Regarding ML, the algorithms applied are decision trees
(DT).
The systems should analyze HTTP traffic and detect attacks that involve
a single request, being able to detect multiple types of web attacks.
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Regarding the detection results, the goal is that the systems achieve a
high detection rate (DR) while their false positive rate (FPR) is low.
Detection rate measures the number of attacks that are detected and
false positive rate measures false alarms.
The resource consumption, measured by the number of features, should
be low.
These objectives should be reached by using a simple design, that does
not increment the processing time of the system (time consumed to
process a single request). This simplicity criteria makes reference to
Ockham’s razor. This principle states that among competing hypotheses
that predict equally well, the one with the fewest assumptions should be
selected. Therefore, the simplest, the best (provided that it is equally
effective).
• Study how the number of requests used in the training phase
influences the detection results of the system.
The objective is to study which is the minimum number of requests
necessary to train the system in order to achieve a certain detection result
of the system. Also to know if using higher number of training requests
implies obtaining better results.
• Propose new feature extraction methods for machine learning
that improve the detection results of existing strategies and
consume low resources.
The resource consumption is measured in terms of the number of features
used.
• Build an adequate dataset to train and test WAFs.
In order to be considered adequate and overcome the disadvantages of the
existing datasets, the objective is to build a labeled and public dataset.
Additionally, it should contain modern attacks and its requests should
not be anonymized.
Working with a common dataset allows researchers to compare their
systems. This aspect is related to the next objective.
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• Compare the behavior of the proposed detection techniques
(statistical methods, Markov chains and decision trees) to
determine which of them is the most appropriate for a given
scenario.
For this aim, the same dataset is used to evaluate the different detection
techniques. Their behavior is compared in regard to their detection
results, processing time and number of training requests needed.
1.5 Structure of this thesis
The remaining of this dissertation is structured as follows:
• Intrusion Detection: Concepts and Related Work.
Chapter 2 firstly introduces concepts about intrusion detection and
explains different criteria used to classify IDSs. Next, it describes related
detection systems in the literature, including a review of different methods
used for the preprocessing phases of the IDSs (feature extraction and
feature selection) and for the processing step. This chapter also highlights
the importance of studying the number of training requests.
• Data Acquisition for Web Intrusion Detection.
Chapter 3 discusses problems on existing datasets for evaluating WAFs
and proposes a solution: creating the new CSIC dataset. Details about
its generation process and application are explained.
• Stochastic detection techniques for web intrusion detection.
Chapter 4 presents two WAFs based on stochastic detection
techniques. The chapter covers the theoretical design and the empirical
experimentation of these WAFs. One of the systems is based on statistical
techniques and the other one on Markov chains. Details about different
aspects related to the design of the systems are supplied, including how
the system acquires knowledge, which detection models are used and how
the detection process is designed. Later, the chapter covers aspects related
to the empirical stage. The experimental settings and the measures used
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to evaluate the systems are presented. At last, experimental results,
as well as a study about the influence of the training requests in the
detection results, are shown.
• Machine learning techniques for web intrusion detection.
Chapter 5 presents a detection system within the machine learning
approach. The decision trees used in this work are explained and it
is argued why they are chosen. Several new feature extraction methods
are proposed. They combine both expert knowledge and n-grams and they
are able to improve the performance of these two approaches separately.
Furthermore, feature selection is applied in order to reduce the number of
irrelevant and redundant features. The Generic Feature Selection (GeFS)
measure chosen for feature selection is explained, as well as the criteria
used to select its instances. The setup and development of the experiments
are shown, as well as the results obtained. A detailed discussion of the
results is given. Moreover, a comparison of the stochastic and ML systems
is presented.
• Conclusions, contributions and future work.
The conclusions extracted from the elaboration of this dissertation are
explained in Chapter 6. Additionally, the contributions are analyzed and
the resulting publications are summarized. Finally, future research lines
are presented.
Chapter 2
Intrusion Detection: Concepts
and Related Work
“What characterizes a science man is not
owning knowledge or irrefutable truth,
but the altruistic and incessant search
of the truth.”
— Karl Popper
This chapter introduces concepts related to intrusion detection.
Intrusion detection systems are in charge of monitoring the traffic
in order to detect malicious actions. Web application firewalls
are a particular case of IDSs that analyze HTTP traffic. The
different components of these systems are explained, as well as
diverse criteria used to classify them. Two phases are usually
distinguished in IDSs: preprocessing and processing. Preprocessing
comprises feature extraction and feature selection. This chapter
explains what these phases consist in and reviews related papers
in the literature. Regarding the processing step, existing IDSs and
WAFs that apply statistical techniques, Markov chains and decision
trees are analyzed. Additionally, the importance of studying the
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number of training requests is discussed. Finally, the conclusions
section shows some questions that are still open in the state of the
art and that find answer in the following chapters.
2.1 Initial concepts
In this section several concepts related to intrusion detection and web security
are introduced.
2.1.1 Web applications
A web application typically consists of a finite number of web pages. The
number of pages is usually small and most of them are dynamic. Dynamic
pages are those that retrieve their content from a database on demand [Grove,
2010].
Web applications can be considered a particular case of the client-server
architecture, where the application is hosted on a web server and a client
requests pages. The communication between both is done through the HTTP
protocol.
The structure of web applications is generally organized in three tiers:
presentation, application and storage [Grove, 2010]. The presentation tier is
responsible for the user interface, that usually consists of a web browser. The
second tier hosts the web server, which handles all application processes.
Typically, the web server is an engine using some dynamic web content
technology, such as ASP, ASP.NET, CGI, JSP/Java, PHP, Perl, Python,
Ruby on Rails or Struts2. The storage tier is in charge of handling data the
application requires or provides, generally represented by a database.
2.1.2 HTTP protocol
Hypertext Transfer Protocol is an application layer protocol for distributed,
collaborative, hypermedia information systems [Fielding et al., 1999]. The
protocol enables the communication between the client and the web server. It
governs the way documents are exchanged and establishes the format of the
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requests and responses. Although there are other drafts, the current stable
version of this protocol is HTTP/1.1, released in 1999. HTTP is a client-server
protocol. It works as follows: the client requests documents or services to the
server and this one sends back a response to the client. In this protocol, each
transaction is independent of the preceding and following ones. That is, it is a
stateless protocol. It means that it does not record information about user’s
sessions. The protocol offers additional methods to store this information, like
the usage of cookies. They are small pieces of data sent by a website that are
stored in a user’s web browser [Grove, 2010].
HTTP requests are composed of: HTTP method, resource, version of the
HTTP protocol, headers and arguments. An example of an HTTP request and
its components is shown in Fig. 2.1.
Figure 2.1 – Example of an HTTP request and its components.
16 2. Intrusion Detection: Concepts and Related Work
2.1.3 Web attacks
According to OWASP, attacks are techniques that attackers use to exploit
vulnerabilities in applications [OWASP, 2013]. They pursue malicious intentions,
such as getting illegal access, manipulating or disabling systems. In its
report from 2009, the SANS Institute estimated that attacks against web
applications constitute more than 60% of the total attack attempts observed on
the Internet [Higgins, 2009]. Moreover, recent studies reveal that the number
of web attacks is increasingly growing [Wood, 2014].
There are multiple types of web attacks, such as Structured Query Language
(SQL) injection, content spoofing, cross-site scripting (XSS), buffer overflow,
cross-site request forgery, denial of service, Operating System (OS) commanding,
path traversal or Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) injection.
Web attacks can imply drastic consequences, such as gaining access to
databases with sensible user data, modification of web pages, non-availability
of service, execution of the attacker’s code, privilege escalation or access to
unauthorized files.
One of the common causes of attacks is a poor validation of the user-supplied
input. Such is the case of the well known SQL injection and XSS attacks. These
attacks are two of the most frequent web attacks [Acunetix, 2014]. According
to the Web Hacking Incident Database [Barnett et al., 2013], in 2011 SQL
injection constituted 18.87% of attacks and XSS 12.58%. Acunetix [Acunetix,
2014] claims that the distribution of web attacks is the one represented in
Fig. 2.2. Other attacks, like HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP) [Carettoni
and di Paola, 2009] have not received so much attention so far. Nevertheless,
this attack constitutes a real threat for web applications, as is shown in
our work [Balduzzi et al., 2011]. It presents the first automated tool for
the discovery of HPP vulnerabilities. Our prototype PAPAS (PArameter
Pollution Analysis System) was applied to more than 5 000 popular websites.
The experimental results show that about 30% of the analyzed websites
contain vulnerable parameters and that 46.8% of the discovered vulnerabilities
(i.e., 14% of the total websites) can be exploited via HPP attacks.
Web attacks can be classified as either static or dynamic [Alvarez and
Petrović, 2003a], [Alvarez and Petrović, 2003b].
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Figure 2.2 – Distribution of web attacks, according to Acunetix, 2014.
Static web attacks look for security vulnerabilities in a web application
platform: web server, application server, database server, firewall, operating
system and third-party components (such as cryptographic modules or payment
gateways). These security threats comprise well-known vulnerabilities and
erroneous configurations. A common characteristic of all these vulnerabilities
is that they request pages, file extensions, or elements that do not form part
of the web application as intended for the end user. Differently, dynamic web
attacks only request legal pages of the application but they harm the expected
parameters. Manipulation of input arguments can lead to different attacks
of variable impact, such as errors in the application that disclose information
about the platform, XSS attacks that steal information about other users or
command execution by means of buffer overflows.
Several efforts have been made in creating a more detailed classification of
web attacks. These efforts come, on the one hand, from organizations and on
the other hand, from the scientific community. Some of the classifications from
organizations are OWASP Top 10 [OWASP, 2013], Web Application Security
Consortium (WASC) Threat Classification [WASC, 2010], Common Weakness
Enumeration [MITRE, 2014b] and Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and
Classification [MITRE, 2012]. Examples of scientific research are [Alvarez and
Petrović, 2003a], [Lai et al., 2008], [Seo et al., 2004]. Although work is being
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done into this direction, there is not a clear consensus about a taxonomy for
web attacks.
Web attacks can be performed by different actors, that can be divided into
two types:
• Outsiders. They are external attackers, who do not belong to the
organization.
• Insiders. They are inside the organization, therefore they can have easier
access to certain systems. Ben Salem et al. distinguish between two
types of insiders: traitors and masquerades [Salem et al., 2008]. These
authors define a traitor as “a legitimate user within an organization
who has been granted access to systems and information resources, but
whose actions are counter to policy, and whose goal is to negatively
affect confidentially, integrity, or availability of some information asset.”
Masqueraders are attackers who succeed in stealing a legitimate user’s
identity and impersonate another user for malicious purposes.
A zero-day attack is a computer attack exploiting a vulnerability that has
not been disclosed publicly [Bilge and Dumitras, 2012]. It is difficult to defend
against zero-day attacks because of their nature: as long as the vulnerability
is not known, the affected software cannot be patched and signature-based
defense products cannot detect the attack. Unpatched vulnerabilities can be
very dangerous if exploited by attackers. It is estimated that the market value
of a new vulnerability ranges between $5 000 - $250 000 [Bilge and Dumitras,
2012].
Acquiring a deep knowledge and understanding of web attacks is critical
for developing adequate strategies and systems that protect against them.
2.2 Intrusion detection systems
The diversity of threats and the vulnerabilities of web applications make evident
the necessity of protecting them. Web Application Security Statistics reported
in 2008 an amount of 97 554 detected vulnerabilities of different risk levels in
their study of 12 186 analyzed sites [WASC, 2008]. About 49% of the analyzed
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web applications contained vulnerabilities of high risk level (urgent and critical).
In order to fulfill this need of protection, a range of solutions have been adopted.
Some of these methods are focused on secure code development. This is the
case of static and dynamic analysis techniques. The analysis of the code might
not be an easy task when it is complex or it contains thousands of lines. Other
solutions are external to the web application and do not require the modification
of the application’s code in order to protect it. As mentioned, this is the case
of IDSs, that protect an application independently of whether it is correctly
programmed or not.
In their guide to intrusion detection and prevention systems [Scarfone and
Mell, 2007], the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines
intrusion detection as “the process of monitoring the events occurring in a
computer system or network and analyzing them for signs of possible incidents,
which are violations or imminent threats of violation of computer security
policies, acceptable use policies, or standard security practices”. Although
many incidents are malicious in nature, many others are not, like user mistakes
while typing. Therefore distinguishing benign from anomalous actions is the
challenge of intrusion detection. In the same guide the problem of intrusion
prevention is described as “the process of performing intrusion detection and
attempting to stop detected possible incidents”. NIST defines an IDS as
“software that automates the intrusion detection process”.
Solving the intrusion detection and prevention problem has some difficulties
associated. Sommer and Paxson argue why anomaly intrusion detection is
more difficult to solve than other problems in computer science. Some of the
reasons the authors give are the high cost of errors and the variability in the
input data [Sommer and Paxson, 2010]. In this thesis, various techniques for
detecting intrusions will be presented.
2.2.1 Intrusion detection system classification
IDSs can be classified attending to different criteria, like the response mode,
the location and the detection methodologies. These classification criteria can
be seen in Fig. 2.3. In the following, they are further explained.
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Figure 2.3 – Criteria to classify IDSs.
2.2.1.1 Classification according to the response mode
Depending on the action carried out by the detection system when an anomaly
is detected, different types of systems can be distinguished:
• Intrusion Detection System: When an alert is detected, IDSs raise
an alarm to acknowledge the event. They work in a passive mode.
• Intrusion Prevention System (IPS): They are active. NIST defines
them as “software that has all the capabilities of an IDS and can also
attempt to stop possible incidents” [Scarfone and Mell, 2007]. Hence,
besides raising an alarm, they can block the anomaly or perform actions
to neutralize the attack, in order to protect the server from being
reached by malicious activity. An example of IPS in the literature is
Masibty [Criscione and Zanero, 2009]. It detects XSS and SQL injection
attacks. Another example is TokDoc [Krueger et al., 2010], that replaces
the detected malicious content by near normal values.
There are systems that offer the possibility to work on both modes, letting
the Information Technology (IT) professional configure the mode to be used.
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2.2.1.2 Classification according to the location
Regarding the location of the system (or the source of the audit data), two
categories of systems can be differentiated:
• Host-based systems (HIDSs) monitor the characteristics of a single
host and the events occurring within it looking for suspicious activity.
They can monitor different aspects, such as system logs, running processes,
application activity, file access and modification, and configuration
changes on the system or applications [Scarfone and Mell, 2007]. The
analysis of system calls is usually performed for detection in such systems.
This is the case of the seminal paper [Forrest et al., 1996]. Other examples
are given in [Naiman, 2004] and [Lanzi et al., 2010].
• Network-based systems (NIDSs) monitor network traffic for particular
network segments or devices in order to identify suspicious activity. They
are most commonly deployed at a boundary between networks, such as in
proximity to border firewalls or routers, Virtual Private Network (VPN)
servers or remote access servers [Scarfone and Mell, 2007]. Examples of
these systems can be found in [Kruegel et al., 2005b] and [Ariu et al.,
2011].
When protecting an information system, usually a mixture of both NIDSs
and HIDSs is necessary for a complete protection. Since HIDSs protect a
specific host, they are commonly deployed on critical hosts, such as publicly
accessible servers or servers containing sensitive information.
2.2.1.3 Classification according to the detection methodology
Several methodologies have been used to detect incidents. They are divided
into three groups: signature-based, anomaly-based and hybrid. Although these
concepts were introduced in Sec. 1.2, here they are described in more detail.
• Signature-based detection. It is also called misuse detection or
negative approach. This approach looks for signatures (patterns) of
known threats, that aim to exploit weaknesses in system and application
22 2. Intrusion Detection: Concepts and Related Work
software. It uses pattern matching techniques against a database of
attack signatures. It is useful to detect already known attacks or their
slight variations. However signature-based detection is not able to defend
against new attacks, threats disguised by the use of evasion techniques or
malicious variants of known threats that defeat the pattern recognition
engine. Considering that new attacks appear constantly, this is not
a desirable situation. The report by the European Union Agency for
Network and Information Security (ENISA) claims that the volume of
web-based attacks per day increased by 93% from 2009 to 2010, with 40
million attacks a day recorded in September 2010 [Ryck et al., 2011].
Additionally, attack pattern matching systems require large signature
databases to be constantly updated. Moreover, the comparison of
incoming traffic against every signature in the database requires a high
computational effort and increases the time necessary to process requests.
Snort is a well-known signature-based IDS [Roesch, 1999]. It is free
and open source, and it can act either as an IDS or an IPS. There is a
big number of available signatures for Snort, described in a particular
language that allows inspecting packets at different levels. The Malware
Information Sharing Platform [MISP, 2015] is a software that helps to
generate IDS rules.
Bro [Paxson, 2015] is another known open source IDS. It parses network
traffic to extract its application level semantics. The network activity is
compared with attack patterns or unusual activities. A specialized policy
language is used to tailor its operation [Varadarajan, 2012].
In the academic field efforts have also been done in the direction of
signature-based IDSs. For example, Anitha and Vaidehi used signatures
for detecting application layer attacks. The signatures are formulated
using regular expressions or finite state automata [Anitha and Vaidehi,
2006]. To deal with the constantly increasing number of rules that has to
be compared to input event streams, the authors proposed a semantic
classification tree that restructures the signature rules in order to reduce
the redundant checks. Goyal et al. applied a genetic algorithm that
uses a set of classification rules generated from a predefined intrusion
behavior [Goyal and Aggarwal, 2012]. A genetic algorithm is a search
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heuristic that mimics the process of natural selection [Mitchell, 1998].
Meng et al. proposed hash-based contextual signatures in order to
reduce the processing burden of signature matching and filter non-critical
alarms [Meng and Kwok, 2014].
• Anomaly-based detection. This approach is also known as positive
approach. Anomaly-based detection looks for behavior or use of computer
resources deviating from “normal” or “common” behavior. The underlying
principle of this approach is that attack behavior differs enough from
normal user behavior to be detected by cataloging and identifying the
differences involved. These systems have profiles that represent the normal
behavior of applications, users, network connections, hosts and so on.
Anomaly-based systems permit discerning normal traffic from suspicious
activity without signature matching. The main idea of this approach
is “denying everything unless explicitly allowed”. The difficulty of such
systems is obtaining an up-to-date, precise and feasible picture of the
normal behavior. It is specially hard to draw when working in complex
environments. In order to perform an accurate detection, it is important
that the profiles do not include any malicious activity. Otherwise that
activity would not be flagged as malicious in the detection phase.
The major advantage of this method is its effectiveness in detecting
previously unknown threats and their variations. As negative aspects,
these systems are prone to more false positives and their profiles
might need updating when the applications, users or network change.
Additionally, determining why a particular alert was generated and
validating that it is not a false positive might be a difficult task.
Anomaly-based systems usually comprise a training phase where the
normal behavior is learnt, and a test phase where the knowledge acquired
is used to tag the requests.
A known anomaly system was presented by Kruegel et al. in 2005.
It uses a number of models that capture the normal behavior of web
traffic [Kruegel et al., 2005b]. Other examples of anomaly-based systems
are explained in [El-Alfy and Al-Obeidat, 2014] and [Lin et al., 2012].
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• Hybrid systems. They combine the two approaches mentioned before.
The paper by Tombini et al. studies different possibilities of combining
anomaly and misuse detection. The authors conclude that depending
on the input dataset and on the designer objective, each combination
presents certain advantages [Tombini et al., 2004]. After measuring some
characteristics on web servers the authors propose an architecture where
an anomaly detector acts in first place and it feeds a misuse detector with
potentially intrusive events.
Depren et al. proposed an IDS architecture utilizing both anomaly
and misuse detection approaches. This hybrid architecture consists
of an anomaly detection module, a misuse detection module and a
decision support system combining the results of these two detection
modules [Depren et al., 2005].
Bringas et al. presented ESIDE-Depian [Bringas et al., 2008]. As
misuse detection module the system uses Snort and as anomaly detection
component, a Bayesian network algorithm is applied.
The paper by Sandip et al. also presents a hybrid IPS [Sandip et al., 2012].
The signature module employs conditional random fields to detect known
intrusions in real time. Conditional random fields are a framework for
building probabilistic models to segment and label sequence data [Lafferty
et al., 2001]. The anomaly detection module uses the outlier detection
provided by the conditional random field to detect unknown intrusions.
The advantage of hybrid systems is that they can detect more attacks
than signature-based or anomaly-based systems individually, while raising
less false positives. However they require more time and resources to
process the requests.
2.2.2 Structure of intrusion detection systems
According to the Common Intrusion Detection Framework
(CIDF) [Schnackenberg and Tung, 1999], IDSs are composed by four
components: event generators, event analyzers, response units and event
databases [Porras et al., 1999]. They are explained next:
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• Event generators obtain events from a computational environment and
turn the occurrences of the environment into objects with a format that
can be used by the subsequent component of the system. For example,
the decoding process would be included in this phase.
• Event analyzers take the objects from the previous component
and analyze them. Here two subcomponents can be distinguished:
preprocessor and detection engine. The first one performs all actions
before the classification of the incoming requests, such as parsing the
requests, feature extraction and feature selection. The detection engine
analyzes the requests searching for intrusions. These two stages will be
further analyzed later in this chapter.
• Event databases store events for later retrieval.
• Response units consume objects to carry out some kind of action. The
action depends on the type of system. IDSs raise an alarm when intrusions
are found, while IPSs block the requests to avoid them reaching the target
server.
2.2.3 Web application firewalls
IDSs are general systems that can analyze traffic corresponding to different
protocols, such as HTTP, FTP, TCP, etc. Each of these protocols has different
characteristics. When analyzing HTTP traffic, conventional firewalls operating
at network and transport layers are not enough to protect against web-specific
attacks. To be effective, systems analyzing traffic at the application layer are
necessary.
Web application firewalls are particular IDSs specialized on analyzing HTTP
traffic in order to detect web attacks.
According to WASC, a WAF is “an intermediary device, sitting between
a web client and a web server, analyzing Open System Interconnection (OSI)
Layer-7 messages for violations in the programmed security policy. A web
application firewall is used as a security device protecting the web server from
attack” [WASC, 2004]. Furthermore, WASC states that “WAFs solutions are
capable of preventing attacks that network firewalls and intrusion detection
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systems cannot, and they do not require modification of the application source
code” [WASC, 2006].
It is important that WAFs are designed to be both effective and efficient.
Being effective means detecting attacks while not raising false alarms. Besides
detecting correctly, being efficient implies low computational complexity and
resource consumption. This is the reason why efficiency is critical in WAFs
operating in real-time environments or in scenarios with resource constraints.
2.3 Preprocessing
Data preprocessing is extensively recognized as an important stage in
anomaly detection [Davis and Clark, 2011]. Preprocessing comprises all
tasks carried out before the formal processing of data, like dataset creation,
data cleaning, normalization, transformation, feature extraction and feature
selection [Kotsiantis et al., 2006]. From them, this thesis focuses on dataset
creation, feature extraction and feature selection. Dataset creation is covered
in Chapter 3 while feature extraction and feature selection are explained in
this section as well as in Sec. 5.3.1 and Sec. 5.3.2.
Preprocessing requires a high amount of effort in terms of both resources
and time, then it is important to pay attention to this previous step. According
to Kurgan and Musilek, it is usually assumed that about half of the effort
required for a project is spent on data preparation [Kurgan and Musilek, 2006].
The preprocessing step does not only affect the efficiency of the data storage
but also the performance of the detection system [Davis and Clark, 2011].
Many intrusion detection systems are designed by applying feature
extraction, feature selection and a classification algorithm. These two
preprocessing steps are explained next.
2.3.1 Feature extraction
Feature extraction consists in determining representative features from the
original data. Its aim is to obtain the appropriate features that represent
regularities of the original dataset. This phase is crucial for the success of the
classification algorithms [Lim et al., 2007].
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Features can be either extracted by looking at patterns in the data, or by
looking at the relationships between patterns. For the last option, data mining
methods, such as association rule learning and frequent episode for sequence
analysis, are used for feature extraction [Davis and Clark, 2011]. Association
rule learning is a method for discovering relations between variables in large
databases [Piatetsky-Shapiro, 1991]. An association rule is an expression
X ⇒ Y , where X and Y are sets of items. This expression means that
transactions of a database that contains X, tend to contain Y [Agrawal and
Srikant, 1994]. An episode is a collection of events describing actions of users or
systems that occur relatively close to each other in a given partial order. The
technique consists in discovering frequently occurring episodes in a sequence
in order to produce rules for describing or predicting the behavior of the
sequence [Mannila et al., 1997].
Feature extraction can be done either manually, automatically or combining
both of them:
• Many professionals rely on their expert knowledge to define a set
of features that can distinguish between normal traffic and attacks.
This approach often leads to high and reliable attack detection rates.
However, it is a manual process and not quickly adaptive to changing
network environments. It has been applied in intrusion detection in works
like [Kruegel et al., 2005b], [Sriraghavan, 2008] or [Criscione and Zanero,
2009].
• Automatic methods overcome the drawback of being manual.
Nevertheless frequently their results are less precise than those obtained
by means of expert knowledge methods. One of the methods generally
used in intrusion detection for feature extraction are n-grams. They are
explained in Sec. 2.3.1.1.
• A third alternative is combining the two previously mentioned
methods. However, this option has not been much explored in intrusion
detection. One of the few papers found about that is [Rieck, 2009]. In
this work Rieck extracted both manual and automatic features. However,
the experiments were performed for every isolated group of features and
their results did not consider the combination of features from different
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nature [Rieck, 2009]. Kloft et al. proposed a feature selection method.
They made experiments with a uniform mixture of n-grams and expert
knowledge features [Kloft et al., 2008].
2.3.1.1 N-grams
Models based on n-grams originate from the field of information retrieval and
natural language processing. They are “language-independent” models that
consist in fixed length overlapping symbol segments [Kowalski, 2010]. N -grams
are not a classification technique themselves. They are usually applied for
feature extraction or they are used in combination with other techniques for
the classification phase. One of the advantages of this model is that it does not
need domain knowledge, thus it is easy to automate. In the case of intrusion
detection, if a payload is considered a string, then a n-gram is a substring of
n characters. Let S be a space of all possible n-grams (n ≥ 1). When working
with byte sequences, S has the size of 28n (considering 8-bits representation for
each character): S = {n-gramsi|i = 1 . . . 28n}. According to that, the number
of 1-grams is 256, and this amount grows exponentially when n increases.
N -grams have been largely applied in intrusion detection, ranging from
HIDSs to NIDSs, and from 1-grams to higher order n-grams. Generally, the
method to extract features from n-grams is counting the number of appearances
of each n-gram in a string. In the case of web traffic, the string is the HTTP
request. In the following, a review of the literature in the application of n-grams
to intrusion detection is presented.
Regarding HIDSs, Forrest et. al applied n-grams to system calls [Forrest
et al., 1996]. This work is based on Artificial Immune Systems (AISs).
AISs are algorithms and systems that use the human immune system as
inspiration [Greensmith et al., 2010]. Several concepts from the immune field
have been extracted and applied to solve real world science and engineering
problems. Forrest et al. defined the sense of self and non-self for privileged
Unix processes. In this context, self refers to normal processes and non-self
to attacks. The concept of self was defined by using normal patterns of short
sequences of system calls. In order to detect the non-self data on system call, a
set of detectors were produced.
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AccessMiner [Lanzi et al., 2010], presented in 2010, was designed for malware
protection. Instead of building models on individual applications, it defines
the normal behavior as sequences of system calls of a broad set of benign
applications. To define the normal behavior, n-grams were applied to model
short sequences of system calls.
PHAD (Packet Header Anomaly Detector) detects attacks using anomaly
models based on n-gram statistics [Mahoney and Chan, 2001].
In relation to 1-grams, Wang et al. presented in 2004 their famous
payload-based anomaly detector PAYL [Wang and Stolfo, 2004]. This system
models payloads by using their byte value distribution. Following the anomaly
approach, a model of the statistical distribution of 1-grams in normal requests
is stored. When incoming requests are received for detection, their 1-gram
distribution is analyzed. Each n-gram not present in the normal model
increments the anomaly score of the packet. If the final anomaly score exceeds
a predefined threshold, then the packet is tagged as anomalous.
The anomaly detector Anagram [Wang et al., 2006] increases the security
of PAYL by modeling a mixture of high-order n-grams (n > 1). This mixture
is designed to detect anomalous and suspicious network packet payloads. The
system uses Bloom filters. They are essentially bit arrays of m bits, where any
individual bit i is set if the hash of an input value, mod m, is i. Anagram uses
a Bloom filter to store n-grams of normal packets and another one for known
attacks. In the test phase, the n-grams of the test packet are compared to both
normal and attack filters. Payloads that contain too many n-grams not present
in the normal Bloom filter, or present in the attack Bloom filter, are classified
as anomalous.
Higher order n-grams have been also employed by Bolzoni and Etalle,
who applied n-grams of different length for the algorithms used by their
anomaly-based NIDS [Bolzoni et al., 2009].
Variations of n-gram extraction have also been applied. Rieck and Laskov
introduced the concept of variable length n-grams (words). They presented a
detection system based on language models [Rieck and Laskov, 2007], [Rieck
and Laskov, 2006]. Their method proceeds by extracting language features, such
as n-grams and words from connection payloads, before applying unsupervised
anomaly detection. In order to differentiate between attacks and normal data,
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their proposal computes similarity measures between language models. These
measures can be used to generate attack signatures.
Another variation was presented by Perdisci et al. Their technique, called
2v-gram, consists of measuring features by using a sliding window. In 2v-gram,
this window has the peculiarity of covering two bytes which are v positions
apart from each other in the payload. Their system McPAD is designed to
mainly detect shell-code attacks in various forms [Perdisci et al., 2009]. It also
acts successfully with advanced polymorphic blending attacks. Nevertheless, it
does not perform well when the attacker tries to spread the attack over several
attack packets.
Since this dissertation is focused on detecting attacks over the HTTP
protocol, special emphasis is done in the review of systems specialized in
detecting intrusions over web traffic.
N-grams on web traffic. Regarding the particular case of web traffic, there
is a variety of works applying n-grams to the inspection of the payloads.
Naiman analyzes statistically contiguous sequences of n system calls. These
system calls proceed from processes generated by an HTTP daemon [Naiman,
2004]. The motivation is that occurrences of enough new n-grams in some
localized time frame constitute evidence of innovative behavior, which is
considered anomalous.
TokDoc is a prototype of a reverse proxy. Its particularity is that besides
acting as an IDS, it can work as an IPS, healing the malicious requests [Krueger
et al., 2010]. It has several detectors, being one of them based on 2-grams.
A variant of n-grams was employed in Spectrogram [Song et al., 2009].
Spectrogram is a machine learning based statistical anomaly detection sensor. It
defends against web-layer code-injection attacks, such as Hypertext Preprocessor
(PHP) file inclusion, SQL-injection, XSS and memory-layer exploits. It has
an inference model that tracks the n-gram level transitions within a string.
The gram size is an adjustable parameter of the system. Denoting xi as the
ith character within a string, the likelihood of a n-gram is calculated as the
likelihood of xn, that is conditioned by the n− 1 preceding characters. This
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strategy takes advantage of the overlapping nature of n-grams within an input
string.
Some systems also employ a sliding window of width n instead of using
n-grams. For instance, this is the case of HMMPayl [Ariu et al., 2011], that
extracts features by using sliding windows over the sequence of bytes that
represent the payloads. Their system later analyzes the features extracted by
applying Hidden Markov Models. Markov chains are explained in Sec. 2.4.1.2
and Sec. 4.2.
2.3.2 Feature selection
A feature selection method finds the minimum set of features that maximizes
the performance of a classification algorithm. This methodology follows the
principle of parsimony (or Ockham’s razor). This principle advocates for using
models and procedures that contain all that is necessary for modeling but
nothing more [Hawkins, 2004]. By reducing the number of features without
negatively affecting the detection results, feature selection increases the available
processing time and reduces the required system resources.
Feature selection is specially helpful when the number of features is high.
This is the case of n-grams, where the number of possible n-grams increases
exponentially with the value of n. This increase usually leads to the so called
curse of dimensionality and to the computational complexity problem. The
curse of dimensionality was coined by Bellman in 1961 to refer the fact that
many algorithms that can cope with low dimensions, do not work well on high
dimensionality. In machine learning, generalization can become exponentially
harder as the dimensionality grows [Domingos, 2012]. Dimensionality is
measured by the number of features. It should be considered that when
the number of dimensions is elevated, generally more traffic is required for the
training step.
Feature selection counts with a number of benefits [Nguyen, 2012], such as:
• General data reduction: limiting storage requirements.
• Performance improvement: increasing the algorithm speed.
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• Data understanding: gaining knowledge about the process that generated
the data.
Feature selection has been applied to intrusion detection. Li et al.
experimentally tested that their system achieves better detection results and
lower computational costs when feature selection is applied than when it is
not [Li et al., 2009].
In machine learning, feature selection methods are typically classified into
three categories: wrapper, filter and embedded models [Guyon et al., 2006], [Liu
and Motoda, 2007]. They differ in the way they interact with the classifier.
• The wrapper approach aims to improve the results of the specific
classifiers they work with. This approach employs the performance of
learning algorithms to assess the quality of the features and select them
accordingly. Using the learning algorithm implies a high consumption of
time and computational resources. Examples of the wrapper approach
are given in Sec. 2.3.2.1.
• The filter model directly considers statistical characteristics of a dataset
without involving learning algorithms. Due to its computational efficiency,
the filter method is used to select features from high-dimensional datasets.
This is generally the case of datasets used in intrusion detection. A major
challenge in the IDS feature selection process is to choose appropriate
measures that can precisely determine the relevance and the relation
between features of a given dataset. The relevance and the relation
of features are usually characterized in terms of correlation or mutual
information. Systems applying this approach are shown in Sec. 2.3.2.2.
• The embedded model of feature selection does not separate learning
from feature selection. The embedded model integrates the selection of
features in the model building [Nguyen, 2012]. An example of such model
is the decision tree induction algorithm, which selects a feature for each
intermediate node (those that are not leafs). No further section is shown
for this type of systems.
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2.3.2.1 Wrapper model
Within the wrapper approach, a big variety of algorithms has been applied in
the intrusion detection context. Some of them are reviewed next. One of the
examples was presented by Kloft et al., who generalized the vanilla Support
Vector Data Description (SVDD) algorithm [Kloft et al., 2008]. SVDD obtains
a spherically shaped boundary around a dataset that can be used to detect
outliers [Tax and Duin, 2004].
Other examples, like [Sivatha Sindhu et al., 2012] and [Tsang et al., 2007],
use genetic algorithms.
Li et al. used a modified random mutation hill climbing (RMHC) algorithm
as search strategy to specify a candidate subset for evaluation. Hill climbing is
a family of optimization techniques of local search. It is an iterative algorithm
that reaches the best solution by replacing an element by another one in case the
last one is nearer to the top of the hill. The process continues until no further
improvements can be found [Simon, 2013]. Random mutation hill climbing
selects randomly the next element to be examined. Li et al. also employed a
modified linear Support Vector Machines (SVM) iterative procedure as wrapper
approach to obtain the optimum feature subset [Li et al., 2009]. SVM are
supervised learning models that aim to separate categories in a high dimensional
feature space, by learning hyperplanes separated as much as possible. These
models make possible to predict the category of a point based on where the
representation of the point is located in the space.
Other authors used SVM together with Simulated Annealing (SA) to select
features [Lin et al., 2012]. SA is a generic probabilistic metaheuristic to
find an approximation to the global optimum of a given function in a large
search space. In order to obtain a more extensive search, the algorithm slowly
decreases the probability of accepting worse solutions as it explores the solution
space [Van Laarhoven and Aarts, 1987].
De La Hoz et al. proposed a multi-objective approach, using
the Non-dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm II (NSGA-II) for feature
selection [De la Hoz et al., 2014]. NSGA is a genetic-based algorithm for
multi-objective optimization. NSGA- II was created to improve NSGA. In
multi-objective optimization, trade-offs need to be taken between two or more
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conflicting objectives in order to reach optimal solutions. In this type of
problems, there is not a single solution that simultaneously optimizes all
objectives, but a number of optimal solutions, that are called Pareto optimals.
Pareto optimals are those solutions where none of the objective functions
can be improved without degrading some of the other objectives [Deb et al.,
2002]. The two objectives considered by De La Hoz et al. were maximizing
the classifier performance and minimizing the number of features. Afterward,
this technique was applied over a Growing Hierarchical Self-Organizing Map
(GHSOM) classifier. The Self-Organizing Map (SOM, also called Kohonen-Map)
is a type of Artificial Neural Network (ANN) that performs unsupervised
learning. The model consists of a number of neural processing units with
a weight vector. SOMs differentiate from other ANNs because they use a
neighborhood function to preserve the topological properties of the input
space. GHSOMs overcome some disadvantages of SOMs, such as its static
architecture and lack of representation of hierarchical relation. The GHSOM
is a hierarchical structure of several layers, whose number of units, maps and
layers are determined during the unsupervised learning process [Yang et al.,
2010].
2.3.2.2 Filter model
Several works that apply the filter method can be found in literature. This
section reviews some of them. Amiri et al. applied two algorithms for feature
selection: linear correlation coefficient and mutual information [Amiri et al.,
2011].
Correlation and mutual information are frequently used in feature selection.
Examples of algorithms that use such criteria are the known Correlation Feature
Selection (CFS) and the Minimal Redundancy Maximal Relevance (mRMR)
measures. These measures are explained in Sec. 5.3.2. In their work, Nguyen et
al. fused and generalized these measures in the so called GeFS measure [Nguyen
et al., 2010b]. In [Nguyen et al., 2010c], the authors compared GeFS with
other known algorithms, like SVM-wrapper, Markov-blanket and Classification
& Regression Tree (CART). This is the measure chosen for feature selection in
this thesis.
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Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is a popular method used for
dimensionality reduction. According to [Abdi and Williams, 2010], it is a
multivariate technique that analyzes a data table where observations are
described by several inter-correlated quantitative dependent variables. The
goal of PCA is to extract the important information from the data table, to
represent it as a set of new orthogonal variables called principal components,
and to display patterns of similarity of the observations and variables as points
in maps. This technique is frequently used to preprocess data and reduce the
dimensionality of a space, what helps to perform detection more efficiently.
Examples of its application in intrusion detection are [Wang et al., 2004], [Wang
and Battiti, 2006], [Bouzida et al., 2004], [Shyu et al., 2003], [Bouzida et al.,
2004], [Fonseca et al., 2008], [Jamdagni et al., 2013], [Zargar and Baghaie, 2012]
and [Zhang and White, 2007]. Most of these works have been experimentally
evaluated using the KDD 99 dataset [University of California, 1999]. This
dataset is a collection of simulated raw TCP dump data. The training dataset,
collected during seven weeks, consists of 494 021 records. The test dataset
covers two weeks of traffic. In each connection there are 41 attributes describing
different features of the connection and a label assigned to each either as an
attack type or as normal [Olusola et al., 2010].
2.4 Detection techniques
According to the classification of IDSs presented above in regard to their location
and detection method, this thesis is focused on NIDSs and anomaly-based
systems respectively.
Within the anomaly detection field, diverse types of algorithms have been
used to perform intrusion detection. Although there are different proposals
for classifying algorithms, a commonly accepted one is the classification used
in [García-Teodoro et al., 2009]. It consists of three main categories:
• Knowledge-based techniques. They try to capture the behavior from
the available system data [Debar et al., 1999]. These techniques rely
on highly qualified expert knowledge, that might be insufficient in cases
such as polimorphic or zero-day attacks. Polymorphic attacks are able
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to change its appearance with every instance, making its detection more
difficult [Fogla et al., 2006].
• Stochastic-based methods. They observe the activity of the network
and generate stochastic profiles to represent its behavior. As new events
are processed, the system profiles are updated. Typically, the current
profile is compared to the learned models. In case that current activity
differs more than a threshold from the stored one, it is flagged as
anomalous [García-Teodoro et al., 2009].
• Machine learning is concerned with how to construct computer
programs that automatically learn with experience. This automation
capability is very useful in the cyberspace, where big amounts of data
need to be handled.
Machine learning systems are based on the establishment of an explicit
or implicit model that allows to categorize the analyzed patterns [Tsai
et al., 2009].
This work is focused on the last two categories of techniques. Their
advantage is that they do not need so much expert knowledge. Additionally,
the applicability of machine learning and stochastic techniques coincides in
many cases [García-Teodoro et al., 2009], what makes feasible to apply both of
them in similar environments.
Next, the most important systems using stochastic techniques and machine
learning are revised.
2.4.1 Stochastic techniques
Within stochastic techniques, statistical methods and Markov chains are the
most widely used in intrusion detection. Next, a review of IDSs using these
techniques is presented.
2.4.1.1 Statistical-based techniques
Statistical methods define models that are usually represented by thresholds,
probabilities and basic statistical operators. Like stochastic models, statistical
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systems compare the incoming traffic to the learned models. In case the traffic
is different enough to the learned models, the behavior is labeled as abnormal.
Regarding IDSs, several statistical-based systems have been designed. The
first systems were univariate, such as Haystack [Smaha, 1988], Intrusion
Detection Expert System(IDES) [Denning and Neumann, 1985], [Lunt et al.,
1992] and its later version Next-Generation Intrusion Detection Expert System
(NIDES) [Anderson et al., 1994], [Anderson et al., 1995]. Later, Ye et al.
proposed a system based on a multi-variate statistical technique that considers
the correlations between two or more metrics [Ye et al., 2002]. Mahoney
and Chan also presented various systems that apply learning techniques in
order to detect anomalies in the network traffic: Packet Header Anomaly
Detector [Mahoney and Chan, 2001], LEarning Rules for Anomaly Detection
(LERAD) [Mahoney and Chan, 2002a] and Application Layer Anomaly Detector
(ALAD) [Mahoney and Chan, 2002b]. These systems use time-based models
where the probability of an event depends on the time since it occurred last.
Statistical techniques on web traffic. Since this thesis focuses on web
traffic, statistical-based systems specialized in detecting intrusions over web
traffic are analyzed in this section.
In anomaly-based systems, a typical approach is combining multiple anomaly
detectors, that employ different techniques, to describe the normal behavior
of a target web application. Those activities differing from those models are
tagged as anomalous. The system proposed in [Kruegel et al., 2005b] follows
this approach. This system inspects log files to analyze individual Uniform
Resource Identifiers (URIs) and parameters of GET requests whose return
code is between 200 and 300. It means they are successful requests. The
authors use a set of models for detecting malicious activity: attribute length,
attribute character distribution, structure of the parameters (regularity of
the non-printable characters), detection of anomalous values for an attribute
(different values for a fixed-value attribute), attribute presence or absence,
attribute order, access frequency, inter-request time delay, and invocation order
of the server-side programs. Note that these models are obtained by means of
expert knowledge. In their system, the task of a model is to assign a probability
value either to the whole query or to one of the query’s attributes. It is possible
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to associate several models to an attribute or to the whole query. Each model
contributes to the calculation of the anomaly score, that is calculated as a
weighted sum of the probability values returned by the models associated to
the attribute or query. Note that in this approach, every model associated
to the attribute or query needs to be processed for the calculation of the
anomaly score. A query is reported as anomalous if any of the attribute or
query anomaly scores is above the corresponding detection threshold. The
assumption behind this scheme is that those feature values with a sufficiently
low probability indicate a potential attack. A model can operate either in
training or test mode. In the training mode, the system creates profiles for
the normal values and establishes thresholds as the maximum anomaly score
plus an adjustable percentage. In the test mode, anomaly scores are calculated
and anomalous queries are reported. Their system is experimentally evaluated
making use of traffic from universities in California and Vienna, and from
a Google server. This approach was later generalized in [Robertson et al.,
2006], where a technique to automatically translate suspicious web requests
into anomaly signatures is presented.
A paper following the same scheme as Kruegel’s work is [Sriraghavan
and Lucchese, 2008]. It also monitors successful GET requests that contain
parameters. The system automatically creates parameter profiles that are
built using a multi-model approach. The following models are employed:
unknown program identification, unknown parameter identification, attribute
length, attribute character distribution and implementation of 6-bin character
distribution algorithm. About the last model, the authors prove that 3-bin
is more efficient than 6-bin. 3-bin distinguishes between letters, digits and
non-alphanumeric characters. While 6-bin considers the relative frequency
of 256 ASCII characters. Following the anomaly approach, these models
have a learning phase and a detection one. For the experiments, this system
uses attack-free traffic from the DARPA 99 dataset and attacks from the
ECML/PKDD dataset. Similarly to the system proposed in this thesis,
automatic learning ensures that the system can be used with different types of
web application environments, without the need of manual configuration.
Masibty [Criscione and Zanero, 2009] can act as an attack detector or a
blocker. It uses the concept of entry point (EP) to deal with complex web
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applications. An EP is basically an augmented URI that is further specialized
depending on parameters, session context and other influences. Masibty is
specialized on the detection of SQL injection and XSS attacks. Its architecture
presents different modules for anomaly detection. For example, for detecting
SQL injection attacks it contains engines regarding the order, presence, numbers,
token, distribution and length of the request parameters. Similarly to papers
presented before, this system combines the results from all anomaly engines in
order to calculate a single anomaly score for the whole request. For testing,
the authors use their own dataset. In the experiments, some attacks are
incorporated into the training dataset.
2.4.1.2 Markov chains
Markov chains are mathematical systems that undergo transitions from one
state to another, between a finite or countable number of possible states. They
are random processes usually characterized as memoryless: the next state
depends only on the current state and not on the sequence of events that
precedes it [Freedman, 1971].
During the training phase, the probabilities associated to the transitions are
estimated to capture the normal behavior of the target system. The detection
of anomalies is then carried out by comparing the anomaly score obtained for
the observed sequences with a fixed threshold [García-Teodoro et al., 2009].
Markov chains have been used in intrusion detection. They have been
applied in the context of host protection by authors such as Ye et al., that
presented an anomaly detection technique based on Markov chains to study
system calls of Solaris systems [Ye et al., 2004]. The paper by Bakhoum applies
Markov chains in the context of network intrusion detection [Bakhoum, 2011a].
A variant of Markov chains are Hidden Markov Models (HMM). They are
Markov processes with unobserved (hidden) states. In contrast to Markov
models, in a HMM the state is not directly visible. In Markov chains the state
is directly visible to the observer and therefore the state transition probabilities
are the only parameters. The output of a HMM, that is dependent on the state,
is visible. Each state has a probability distribution over the possible output
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tokens. Therefore, the sequence of tokens generated by a HMM gives some
information about the sequence of states [Elliott et al., 1995].
HMMs have been also applied to both host and network environments for
improving their security. In order to represent normal behavior and recognize
intrusions in system call datasets, Warrender et al. used a HMM with fully
connected states (i.e., transitions are allowed from any state to any other
state) [Warrender et al., 1999]. Yeung et al. employed HMMs, besides other
techniques, in an anomaly system that models program profiles based on Unix
system calls and user profiles based on Unix shell commands [Yeung and Ding,
2003]. Arnes et al. applied HMMs for a risk assessment tool integrated with
an IDS [Arnes et al., 2006].
Markov chains on web traffic. In the particular case of systems inspecting
web traffic, Markovian techniques have been extensively applied.
Estévez-Tapiador et al. presented an anomaly WAF that uses Markov chains
to model HTTP traffic [Estévez-Tapiador et al., 2004]. Two variants of the
system were proposed. The first one is an extension of the payload histograms,
using an alphabet corresponding to ASCII code. For every character in a normal
request, it calculates the probability that it is in the first position within the
payload and the probability that it is followed by any other character. If the
probability of a incoming request exceeds a given threshold, it is deemed as
anomalous. The second variant incorporates protocol-dependent information.
The idea behind it is that the probability of occurrence of certain strings within
each section of the payload is not uniform throughout the request. In this
approach the HTTP payloads are segmented into blocks of characters according
to protocol delimiters. These blocks are stored in a dictionary, that is filled
in the training phase by splitting normal requests. In the test phase, the
dictionary is used for evaluating the normality of the incoming requests. For
the experiments, a modification of the popular DARPA 99 dataset is employed,
taking normal traffic from the cited dataset and manually generating web
attacks.
As mentioned, Spectrogram is focused on detecting local and remote file
inclusion, XSS and SQLi attacks [Song et al., 2009]. It learns to recognize
legitime content and structure of the web-layer script arguments. The rest of
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the HTTP request is not analyzed. It uses a configurable number of Markov
chains to obtain a final likelihood score of the request being normal. Each
Markov chain is in charge of calculating the likelihood of each character and
then recovering the geometric mean of individual likelihoods. Differently to
other works, that consider that the probability of a character depends only
on the preceding character, Spectrogram considers that the probability of a
character depends on the n− 1 preceding characters. For the experiments the
authors used their own dataset.
As mentioned, besides detecting anomalies in web traffic, TokDoc puts
remedy to the detected attacks [Krueger et al., 2010]. It is done by locating
and substituting anomalous values by others that are closer to them and, at
the same time, are normal. In this way, it avoids malicious requests reaching
a protected web server. Within the detectors used, one of them is based on
Markov chains. For the construction of Markov chains, the authors consider
256 ASCII characters in the analysis of the arguments. For the experiments,
their own created datasets were used.
HMMs have also been applied to web attack detection. One of them is
HMM-Web, by Corona et al. It shows that HMMs are effective in detecting a
wide range of either known or unknown attacks against web applications [Corona
et al., 2009]. For the analysis of the requests two groups of characters are
considered: alphanumeric and non-alphanumeric. Similarly to Spectrogram,
HMM-Web uses an ensemble of HMMs to increase the performance, concretely
it uses an ensemble per attribute and another one for the sequence of attributes.
Then, it uses a maximum rule to select the model in the ensemble that best
describes the analyzed sequence.
In [Hosseinkhani et al., 2011], an extension of HMM-Web is presented. It
deploys a second dimension in order to improve the detection of input validation
attacks in web applications. That is, the approach proposes a training phase
with two dimensions: in the first one, the IDS learns normal values of the web
application attributes. In the second one, the sequence of normal probabilities of
these attributes is modeled. Both the training and detection phases use HMMs.
After employing a group of HMM, the maximum probability rule is used to
select the model in the ensemble that best describes the analyzed input value.
For the experiments, a mixture of the DARPA 99 and the ECML/PKDD
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datasets is used. A drawback of this system is that the second dimension
introduces a delay in the detection process.
HMMPayl puts emphasis on reducing the false positive rate and for that, it
exploits the power of HMM in modeling sequences of data [Ariu et al., 2011].
An ensemble of HMMs is used in parallel, being each HMM initialized with
different random values. Then, a selector is used for choosing the best classifier
selection strategy. Instead of analyzing the whole payload, they choose which
sequences of the payload are used to classify it. Experiments are carried out
using both public and private datasets.
2.4.2 Machine learning
Machine learning (ML) is a subfield of Artificial Intelligence that can help in
the automation of processes. In 1959, Arthur Samuel defined it as a “field
of study that gives computers the ability to learn without being explicitly
programmed” [Samuel, 1959].
ML has been extensively applied in intrusion detection [Tsai et al., 2009].
Detection systems based on ML allow to quickly detect attacks while demanding
much less manual work. Because of this reason, the approach is becoming
increasingly important for computer security, especially when considering the
huge amount of network data that IDSs need to analyze [Nguyen, 2012].
ML comprises a big range of algorithms that have been traditionally classified
into two different approaches: supervised and unsupervised learning. In
supervised learning algorithms the labels of the training dataset are available for
the learning process. Examples of supervised learning algorithms are decision
trees and support vector machines. Unsupervised learning algorithms, such as
the K-means clustering, can still learn the normal and abnormal behavior of
the dataset without their labels.
Several works have been presented in intrusion detection that apply ML
algorithms. Some of them are:
• Bayesian networks [Kruegel et al., 2003], [Ihler et al., 2006], [Barbara
et al., 2001], [Valdes and Skinner, 2000].
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• Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) and Self-Organizing Maps
(SOM) [Ramadas et al., 2003], [Xydas et al., 2008], [Ramos and
Abraham, 2005], [Khalkhali, 2011], [Yang et al., 2010], [Bolzoni et al.,
2006], [Depren et al., 2005], [Corchado and Herrero, 2011], [Ibrahim,
2010].
• Genetic Algorithms [Li, 2004], [Pillai et al., 2004], [Saniee Abadeh et al.,
2007], [Abadeh et al., 2011].
• Clustering and K-nearest Neighbors [Zanero and Savaresi, 2004], [Zanero,
2006], [Hautamäki et al., 2004], [Sequeira and Zaki, 2002], [Liao and
Vemuri, 2002], [Breunig et al., 2000], [Di Crescenzo et al., 2005], [Das
et al., 2009], [Corona and Giacinto, 2010], [Dessiatnikoff et al., 2011], [Li
et al., 2008], [Kirchner, 2010], [Davanzo et al., 2011].
• Decision Trees [Pfahringer, 2000], [Balon-Perin, 2012], [Depren et al.,
2005], [Sangkatsanee et al., 2011a], [Sivatha Sindhu et al., 2012], [Rao
et al., 2011], [Lin et al., 2012], [García et al., 2006], [Muniyandi et al.,
2012].
• Support Vector Machines [Sung and Mukkamala, 2003], [Bolzoni et al.,
2009], [Shrivastava and Jain, 2011], [Düssel et al., 2008].
Within the algorithms cited above, decision trees have been chosen in this
dissertation to distinguish between normal and anomalous traffic. This family
of algorithms is one of the most popular [Wu et al., 2007] and experimentally
successful of the machine learning algorithms.
According to SAS company, “decision trees are tools for multiple variable
analysis and can support in decisions using a tree-like graph” [De Ville, 2006].
They are widely used for classification and they can predict the output of new
or unseen observations. One of their advantages is that human-understandable
rules can be directly derived from them.
For the construction of the tree, the object of analysis is reflected in the
root. The branches of the tree are built by considering the relationship between
the object of analysis and one or more fields that serve as input fields to create
the branches. The leaf nodes represent classification categories.
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A proof of the successful application of decision trees in intrusion detection
is the work by Pfahringer. He won the famous DARPA intrusion detection
contest [Lippmann et al., 2000a] with an algorithm based on decision trees. The
author constructed an ensemble of ten decision trees run fifty times [Pfahringer,
2000]. The ensemble is constructed by applying bagging and boosting, besides
minimizing the error cost of predicting specific classes. According to Quinlan,
“bagging and boosting form a set of classifiers that are combined by voting;
bagging by generating replicated bootstrap samples of the data, and boosting
by adjusting the weights of training instances” [Quinlan, 1996].
Depren applied a J.48 decision tree to classify various types of attack in the
misuse module of a hybrid IDS [Depren et al., 2005], performing experiments
on the KDD 99 dataset.
Later, Sangkatsanee et. al studied the performance of several supervised
machine learning techniques on intrusion detection [Sangkatsanee et al., 2011a].
These authors used decision trees, a rule-based learning algorithm, two neural
networks and two Bayesian algorithms. From the various techniques mentioned,
the experimental results showed that decision trees can outperform all other
techniques. Then, the authors propose a detection engine of real-time IDSs
based on decision trees.
Balon-Perin applied several machine learning algorithms, being one of them
an ensemble of decision trees [Balon-Perin, 2012]. Each ensemble was specialized
on the detection of one class of attack. Additionally, bagging techniques were
used to increase the accuracy of IDSs.
Decision trees have also been used in conjunction with other techniques.
An example is the work from Rao et al. [Rao et al., 2011], where decision trees
are used together with clustering. Then, it mixes supervised and unsupervised
learning. Concretely, the authors use K-means clustering and a ID3 decision
tree to classify anomalous and normal activities in a computer network. In this
system, the decision tree algorithm is used to refine the decision boundaries by
learning the subgroups within the clusters created by the K-means algorithm.
Muniyandi et al. followed the same idea of the last mentioned paper, but
using the C4.5 decision tree instead of the ID3 [Muniyandi et al., 2012].
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The approach by Sivatha Sindhu et al. mixed neural networks and decision
trees [Sivatha Sindhu et al., 2012]. The system was experimentally evaluated
with a family of six decision tree classifiers, namely decision stump, C4.5, naïve
Bayes’ tree, random forest, random tree and representative tree model.
Lin et al. apply decision trees and simulated annealing. These techniques
are used to obtain decision rules for new attacks and to improve the accuracy
of classification [Lin et al., 2012].
Decision trees on web traffic. As can be seen, decision trees have been
extensively applied for detecting intrusions in network traffic. They have proven
to be very effective in this field, even outperforming other techniques. However,
they have been scarcely applied to the particular case of web traffic.
One of the few works found about it is [García et al., 2006]. This paper
applies an ID3 decision tree to distinguish a number of web attacks, including
some of their variants. in particular, the system is able to detect the following
attacks: SQL injection, XSS, code injection and directory traversal. The
authors use their own-built dataset for the experimentation stage.
An advantage of using decision trees is that their rules are easy to read,
thus, the root of an attack can be easily understood.
2.5 Importance of the number of training requests
The training phase is critical in intrusion detection systems. Depending on how
the training is performed, the system will be able to perform detection with
more or less precision. The shorter the training phase is, the least computational
time and resources are necessary. However, if the system is not trained with
enough requests, it will not be effective against attacks. Not having sufficient
data to completely determine a correct classifier or having a too big dataset
might lead to certain machine learning algorithms to overfitting. Overfitting
produces a classifier not grounded in reality that is only modeling random
peculiarities in the data [Domingos, 2012], [Hawkins, 2004]. Therefore, it is
important to study how many requests should be chosen to train the system so
that the performance results are maximized and, at the same time, the resource
and time consumption are minimized. This critical issue has not received much
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attention in intrusion detection. Except for [Bolzoni and Etalle, 2008], that
presents experiments with variations on the number of requests, usually the
whole dataset is used by default to carry out the experiments in intrusion
detection. Considering that statistical techniques require a certain number
of requests in order to obtain meaningful results, this study turns specially
interesting in this area.
The idea behind the adequate number of training requests is satisfying the
principle of parsimony: including the necessary training requests, but no more.
This criteria also leads to a better detection.
Studying the influence of the number of training requests on the performance
of the system would allow to 1) determine how many training requests should
be gathered in the data acquisition process to achieve certain results on the
detection system and, 2) to estimate the time and resources necessary for the
training phase (also for retraining in case it is necessary).
2.6 Conclusions
After analyzing the mentioned papers in the literature, a group of conclusions
and open questions can be drawn:
• Regarding feature extraction, n-grams is a commonly used strategy
to build features in intrusion detection. However, the combination of
manually and automatically extracted features has been scarcely explored
in the field.
• Feature selection improves both the performance and computational cost
of intrusion detection systems. The GeFS measure for feature selection
has been successfully applied to network traffic. However its performance
on web traffic is an open question.
• Generally, statistical-based learning systems need to evaluate all detection
models in order to establish the anomaly score of the request, that is, to
decide about its normality/abnormality. Algorithms reducing resource
and time consumption are necessary.
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• Markov chains are effective in distinguishing attacks and normal traffic.
Thus, they can be successfully applied to intrusion detection.
• Machine learning has been extensively used in intrusion detection.
Decision trees have been proven to be effective in intrusion detection.
Although these precedents make them promising to be applied in other
scenarios, they have not been much used in web traffic analysis.
• Little attention has been paid to the study of how the number of requests
used in the training phase affects the performance of the system. The
knowledge acquired with such study allows to know, for example, the
amount of requests necessary to achieve a certain detection result. Getting
this type of information is useful in the data acquisition process, as well
as in the estimation of time and resources necessary for training and
retraining the systems.
The remaining of this thesis gives answers to these open questions.

Chapter 3
Data acquisition for web
intrusion detection
“Scientia potentia est. - Information is power.”
— Francis Bacon
Adequate datasets are of vital importance for training and testing
WAFs. This chapter studies the characteristics that a dataset should
present to be considered appropriate for this purpose. Unfortunately,
finding datasets that meet these characteristics is not an easy task.
The study of the most used datasets in intrusion detection reveals
that most of them present a number of drawbacks to be applied to
the evaluation of WAFs. In order to solve this situation, this thesis
provides a new dataset called CSIC that satisfies the conditions
established for the proper evaluation of WAFs. The dataset is being
used by the scientific community. The characteristics of the dataset,
as well as the process followed to create it are explained in this
chapter. Additionally, the current applications of the dataset in the
scientific community are presented. Lastly, conclusions are shown.
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3.1 Problems in data acquisition for intrusion detection
Counting with appropriate datasets to train and test WAFs is critical. The
quality of these datasets directly influences the evaluation of these systems.
However, in the web intrusion detection community there is a scarcity of
standard and common datasets to evaluate these systems. In relation to this
issue, several authors claimed that “the most significant challenge that an
evaluation faces is the lack of appropriate public datasets for assessing anomaly
detection systems” [Sommer and Paxson, 2010], [Tavallaee et al., 2010]. Due
to this scarcity, many researchers opted to create their own datasets, many
of which are of private use. The problem of this situation is that it hinders
the comparison between different systems. Furthermore, many of the existing
datasets present a series of disadvantages that difficult their use in web detection
systems. This makes noticeable that the necessity of counting with labeled
and adequate datasets to train, test and compare WAFs is not covered in web
intrusion detection. Fulfilling this gap is the motivation of this chapter.
3.1.1 Requirements for adequate datasets
In order to adequately configure and evaluate web intrusion detection systems
it is necessary that the dataset used satisfies a series of requirements:
• It is convenient that it is publicly accessible. This allows other researchers
use it and compare their systems.
• It should contain HTTP traffic, since this is the type of traffic WAFs
analyze.
• The dataset needs to be labeled. Otherwise, it is not possible to evaluate
the performance of WAFs.
• It should contain at least two classes: normal and attack. Anomalies
could also be included. Anomalous traffic is further explained in Sec. 3.4.
• The dataset should contain a variety of modern attacks and their
variations. According to Symantec, web attacks have evolved significantly
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in the last years [Wood, 2014]. Including modern attacks allows to check
if the system is able to detect current web attacks.
• Additionally, it is desirable that the traffic contains realistic values and it
is not anonymized, with the purpose of not losing realism.
3.1.2 Evaluation of existing datasets
Unfortunately, difficulties associated to obtaining adequate datasets to evaluate
WAFs are manifold. As mentioned before, there is a scarcity of labeled and
appropriate datasets to evaluate web intrusion detection systems. Furthermore,
many existing datasets face a number of troubles. Several existing datasets
have been analyzed to check whether they satisfy the conditions presented in
the previous section for considering a dataset as adequate. In regard to that, a
number of problems have been found:
• Dataset not labeled. A common problem is that requests do not have
a label indicating the class they belong to. The dataset is simply captured
traffic. However, this is not enough for evaluating WAFs. Labels are
necessary to measure how well the system is able to classify the instances.
• Many datasets do not contain HTTP traffic. For example, the
LBNL dataset contains network traffic. This dataset contains traces with
full header network information, but without payload [LBNL and ICSI,
2005]. The payload contains the information belonging to the application
layer.
• Many datasets are not publicly available or they might be
difficult to obtain. When the datasets are private, they are not usable
by the scientific community. This does not make possible the comparison
of systems between each other. In some cases, the reason for the obscurity
is the privacy of data, what impedes sharing the traffic.
In other cases, the datasets are partially available, i.e., they are only
accessible for selected researchers. This is the case of the UNB ISCX
intrusion detection evaluation dataset [Shiravi et al., 2012]. It is based
on the concept of profiles, which contain an abstract representation of
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events and behaviors seen on the network. There are two types of profiles:
the first one describes an attack scenario and the second one extracts
mathematical distributions or behaviors of applications, protocols or low
level network entities. Agents are used to generate HTTP traffic, among
other protocols, from the profiles created. This dataset is only available
for selected researchers and it is necessary to apply for it. The dataset
takes several weeks to be obtained and in our case, it has not been possible
to get access to it yet.
The ECML/PKDD dataset, that was generated for the European
Conference on Machine Learning and Principles/ Practice of Knowledge
Discovery in Databases (ECML/PKDD) Challenge in 2007, is also
partially available [Raïssi et al., 2007]. In this case, it has been possible to
obtain it. This dataset is labeled and contains exclusively HTTP traffic.
• The dataset is not updated. Since new web attacks are constantly
appearing, it is important that the dataset is up to date. It implies
containing modern attacks in order to adequately test the effectiveness of
WAFs in contemporary environments.
The DARPA dataset [Lippmann et al., 2000a], [Lippmann et al., 2000b]
was presented in 1998 and 1999 by MIT. It contains network traffic,
including HTTP traffic. This dataset is one of the most used ones for
evaluating intrusion detection systems. However, the DARPA dataset has
been criticized by the intrusion detection system community [McHugh,
2000], [Brown et al., 2009]. One of the reasons is that it is out of
date and it does not include many of the modern attacks, making it
not adequate for evaluating current WAFs. In fact, some researchers
([Estévez-Tapiador et al., 2004], [Hosseinkhani et al., 2011]) have used
this dataset in conjunction with others, or with their own created attacks,
to overcome this disadvantage.
• Traffic is anonymized. Privacy concerns are frequently a cause
for anonymizing data. The preprocessing process that implies the
anonymization of the dataset can lead to the loss of realism and can
also negatively affect the quality of detection results. The previously
mentioned ECML/PKDD dataset is an example of anonymized traffic.
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Except for the attack part, all parts of its requests are anonymized.
Hence, there are not two requests addressing to the same web application.
This characteristic makes it unusable for a number of systems, for
example [Hosseinkhani et al., 2011].
This problem also affects to the LBNL dataset. The traffic of this
dataset has been anonymized to remove information that could identify
an individual (Internet Protocol) IP.
• Not balanced amount of normal traffic and attacks. This problem
is notable, for instance, in traffic gathered at warfare competitions. An
example are datasets created in DEFCON Capture the Flag (CTF) [The
Shmoo Group, 2011]. Since it was generated during the competition,
this traffic mainly consists of intrusive traffic [Kruegel et al., 2005a].
In scenarios different from adversarial environments, this characteristic
might make traffic unrealistic, since the proportion of attacks might result
disproportionate in relation to the amount of normal traffic. In relation
to this topic, and trying to overcome some of the current inconvenients,
Sangaster et al. studied how to generate useful datasets by collecting
traffic from warfare competitions [Sangster et al., 2009].
The cited problems have been obtained from the analysis of the datasets
most used in intrusion detection. Table 3.1 shows, for each of the analyzed
datasets, whether they satisfy or not the conditions shown in Sec. 3.1.1 for
being considered an adequate dataset. The table shows that none of them
satisfies all requirements.
Table 3.1 – Analysis of existing datasets satisfying requirements for an
adequate dataset for evaluating WAFs.
Dataset Public HTTP Labeled Two Modern Non
access traffic classes attacks anonymized
UNB ISC 7 3 3 3 3 3
ECML/PKDD 7 3 3 3 3 7
LBNL 3 7 3 3 7 7
DEFCON 3 3 3 7 3 3
DARPA 98/99 3 3 3 3 7 3
Captured traffic 3 3 7 7 3 3
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3.2 Solution: generating a new dataset
Given the problems associated to the existing datasets, a new dataset was
created in this dissertation to overcome the exposed drawbacks.
For the generation of the new dataset, three alternatives for obtaining web
traffic were studied:
• Publishing a testbed web application on the Internet.
• Surfing the testbed web application in a controlled environment.
• Generating traffic artificially.
Next, these possibilities are analyzed in more detail:
• Publishing the application on the Internet allows to obtain realistic
and reliable traffic. In this case, normal traffic is gathered but,
unfortunately, attacks are also collected, since in the Internet there
are hackers and malicious programs that try to hack web applications.
The drawback of this alternative is that collected traffic is not labeled,
unless it is done under controlled conditions (this is the next option).
As mentioned, merely collecting web traffic is not enough for adequate
datasets. It needs to be labeled. Manually labeling the huge amount of
data necessary to evaluate a WAF is not a feasible option. In fact, it
would be like manually solving the intrusion detection problem. For this
reason, this alternative was discarded.
• Another possibility is surfing the application in a controlled
environment. In this alternative, users have the role of either normal
user or attacker. The differentiation of roles makes possible to label the
requests of the dataset. The class label is in correspondence to the role
of the user generating the request. This alternative offers more control of
the traffic targeting the application and, then, of the content and realism
of the dataset. The drawback of this option is that, as thousands of
requests are needed, collecting users to generate the traffic might not be
easy or cheap.
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• Artificially generating traffic. A main advantage of this option is
that it ensures the traffic to be correctly labeled. Although the traffic
is not real, it allows to create the dataset exactly as desired. This gives
flexibility to decide what type of traffic (normal or attack) will be included
in the dataset, as well as which types of attacks. Because of the mentioned
reasons and, given the drawbacks of the previous alternatives, this option
was considered the most suitable one for our purposes.
This option was successfully applied to create the CSIC dataset. The
characteristics and the generation process of this dataset are explained in the
next sections.
3.3 Characteristics of the CSIC dataset
The CSIC dataset was created in our department in 2010. As contribution of
this work, it was designed with the aim to overcome the described drawbacks of
existing datasets. A public dataset, usable by the whole scientific community,
allows the comparison of different detection systems.
In total, the CSIC dataset contains 36 000 normal requests and more than
25 000 anomalous requests. The requests are labeled either as normal or
anomalous. Regarding the generation of attacks, both static and dynamic
attacks were generated, including modern web attacks such as SQL injection,
buffer overflow, information gathering, CRLF injection, cross-site scripting,
server side include and parameter tampering.
Table 3.2 shows that the CSIC dataset satisfies all requirements defined
for adequately evaluating WAFs. This table includes the CSIC dataset in
the previously presented Table 3.1 in order to compare this dataset with the
previously analyzed ones. The table shows that the CSIC dataset is the only
one that satisfies the desired requirements.
The CSIC dataset is publicly available at http://www.isi.csic.es/dataset.
There, three files can be found: one file for training and two files for testing.
The training file contains 20 MB of only normal traffic. Regarding the testing
datasets, one of them contains 20 MB of normal traffic and the other one
15.7 MB of anomalous data.
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Table 3.2 – Analysis of existing datasets and the CSIC dataset satisfying
requirements for an adequate dataset for evaluating WAFs.
Dataset Public HTTP Labeled Two Modern Not
access traffic classes attacks anonymized
UNB ISC 7 3 3 3 3 3
ECML/PKDD 7 3 3 3 3 7
LBNL 3 7 3 3 7 7
DEFCON 3 3 3 7 3 3
DARPA 98/99 3 3 3 3 7 3
Captured traffic 3 3 7 7 3 3
CSIC 3 3 3 3 3 3
3.4 Generation process
Since in the generation process of the dataset it was necessary to generate
attacks, targeting web applications published in the Internet was not a feasible
option. Hence, an ad hoc environment was built for our purposes. A web
application was specially created for this goal. Also, a web server and a WAF to
protect it were deployed in a virtualized environment. Virtualized environments
have several advantages, such as resource saving, data privacy preservation,
security and flexibility [Sahoo et al., 2010], [Li et al., 2015]. The WAFs presented
in this thesis are explained in Chapters 4 and 5.
Although the target web application was not published in the Internet, it
has the same structure and functionalities as real applications, in order to make
it the most realistic possible. It consists of an e-commerce web application,
developed with JSP and running under Apache Tomcat.
For the generation of the dataset, it was considered that targeting a single
web application would be enough for our purposes. The designed application is
composed of several web pages that allow users to do actions such as buying
items with a shopping cart or registering by providing their personal data.
Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 show screenshots of different pages belonging to the
web application. In particular, Fig. 3.1 presents a list of products that can
be bought in the e-commerce application, called “Nuestra Tierra”. Figure 3.2
shows the shopping cart when a client bough some products. And Fig. 3.3
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Figure 3.1 – Screenshot of the e-commerce application showing available
products.
Figure 3.2 – Screenshot of the e-commerce application showing an
example of the shopping cart when some products are bought.
contains the registration page, where users introduce their personal data in the
fields.
As usually happens with modern web applications, some pages of the
e-commerce application admit arguments. Examples of parameters of this
website are: a product name that a user wants to buy, the amount of it, a
user’s address in the registration process or his/her telephone number.
The generation of the traffic is made with the help of dictionaries.
Dictionaries are data files that contain real data that can be used to fulfill the
values of the website arguments. For example, in the case of our web shopping,
dictionaries contain values corresponding to product names, user names, user
addresses, telephone numbers, etc. This data is used to fill in the values of
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Figure 3.3 – Aspect of the web application for the registration process.
the arguments in the traffic generation process. In particular, there are two
dictionaries per argument in the web application: one with normal values, and
another one with anomalous values. All data collected for dictionaries was
extracted from real databases, with the aim of making the collected data as
much realistic as possible.
Once the dictionaries are built, the generation of both normal and anomalous
traffic can take place. In order to do that, all publicly available pages of the
web application are visited (similarly to what a spider would do). In case the
visited web page has arguments or cookies, their values are filled out with data
taken from the dictionaries (normal or anomalous, depending on the type of
traffic to be generated). The data values are chosen randomly.
Contrarily to some papers in the literature, like [Kruegel et al., 2005b], that
use background traffic as normal traffic, the generation process of this dataset
allows to make sure that normal traffic does not contain any attack. This is
important for the training of anomaly-based WAFs, since if attacks are learned
in this approach, they might not be detected.
The dataset contains individual HTTP requests. One of the advantages
of the dataset is that it is not necessary to take care of packet fragmentation,
what facilitates its use. Additionally, the generation process of the dataset does
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not need to deal with logs. This is beneficial since it can be a tedious task.
In fact, some tools, such as Logstash, were born to help with the problems
associated to handling logs.
In addition to attacks, the CSIC dataset contains anomalous traffic. Both
categories are labeled as anomalous. Anomalous traffic makes reference to
requests that are not normal but do not have attack intention. For example, a
telephone number that contains letters. These requests could be generated, for
instance, as consequence of user typographic errors. Anomalies could be used
twofold: 1) when they are used in the training phase, they simulate noise in
the traffic. Then it is possible to test the system under those circumstances.
2) When anomalies are included in the test stage, they allow to exhaustively
test anomaly-based systems, checking how well they reject everything that is
different from the established normal behavior.
Note that the dataset is designed to satisfy the requirements mentioned
in Sec. 3.1.1 for adequately evaluate WAFs. Since it is publicly available, it
is usable by researchers to evaluate and compare their systems. The dataset
is labeled and it contains normal and anomalous HTTP traffic, including a
variety of modern web attacks. It addresses a realistic web application and the
values of the arguments are taken from real databases. Additionally, the traffic
is not anonymized.
This dataset is used to experimentally train and test the different WAFs
proposed next in this thesis.
3.5 Applications of the CSIC dataset
As mentioned, the motivation of making the CSIC dataset public is that the
scientific community can use it. And indeed, the dataset is being used by other
researchers.
Kozik et al. used the CSIC dataset to evaluate the behavior of their
security algorithms. These algorithms are designed to detect injection attacks,
in particular, SQLi and XSS [Kozik et al., 2014a], [Kozik et al., 2014b].
We have certainty that researchers at Alzahra University (Iran) of are also
using the dataset for anomaly detection on web server logs. They are even
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doing research on what features extract from it, besides the ones presented in
Sec. 4.5 and Sec. 5.4.2 of this dissertation.
Furthermore, a version of this dataset in comma-separated values (CSV)
format has been done by Scully at Aberystwyth University [Scully, 2015]. This
format facilitates the use of the dataset with tools such as Weka [Hall et al.,
2009], that provides a wide range of machine learning algorithms.
3.6 Conclusions
The main conclusions of this chapter are the following:
• Obtaining public labeled and suitable datasets for training and testing
WAFs is not an easy task.
• Most of the existing datasets present drawbacks that render them
inappropriate for evaluating WAFs.
• The proposed CSIC dataset satisfies the requirements desired for
adequately evaluating WAFs. Among other characteristics, it is public,
labeled, and its data is not anonymized, what makes it ideal for this
purpose. The creation of the dataset helps to solve an important problem
that was opened in the field: the scarce of labeled and adequate datasets
to evaluate WAFs. Furthermore, it makes possible to compare different
web detection systems.
• The CSIC dataset is currently being used by the scientific community.
Chapter 4
Stochastic techniques for web
intrusion detection
“Mathematics is the alphabet in which God has
written the universe."
— Galileo Galilei
This chapter presents two WAFs based on stochastic techniques. To
perform detection, one of the WAFs applies statistical algorithms
and the other one Markov chains. An explanation about the main
concepts of Markov chains is included in this chapter. Additionally,
the general architecture of the systems, as well as their design, are
presented. The design of the systems comprises two phases. First,
the preprocessing step takes place, where features are extracted.
The processing phase consists of both training the system and
later testing it. The detection algorithms make use of two models.
One of them makes reference to the length of certain elements of
the HTTP request and, the other one, to properties about their
characters. These models, together with other information, are
stored in the Normal Behavior Description (NBD) file during the
training phase. The structure of this file is described. During
62 4. Stochastic techniques for web intrusion detection
the detection process, the information stored in the NBD file is
retrieved to decide about the normality/abnormality of the incoming
requests. The systems are experimentally evaluated using the CSIC
dataset. After establishing the experimental setup, the results of the
experiments are shown and discussed. A study about the influence
of the number of training requests is also included in this chapter.
Finally, the conclusions drawn are presented.
4.1 Introduction
Stochastic techniques have been extensively used in intrusion detection. Several
references about it can be found in Sec. 2.4.1. In this chapter, two WAFs
based on stochastic techniques are proposed. The systems operate at the
application layer and follow an anomaly-based approach. The objective is
constructing systems that reach high-speed and high detection, while keeping
a simple design. One of the proposed systems applies statistical techniques
for detection, and the other one Markov chains. These techniques are chosen
because they are the stochastic algorithms most widely used in intrusion
detection. Both proposed systems share a common structure, given that both
are based on stochastic techniques. However, each of them presents a different
implementation, according to the particularities of the algorithm used.
4.2 Markov chains concepts
In order to better understand the implementation of the Markovian system
presented in this chapter, the main concepts of this technique are explained in
this section.
A Markov chain is defined by a set of N states Γ = {S1, S2, . . . , SN} and,
by the pair of probability matrices, Π and A [Feller, 1968], [Ramana, 2007].
The matrices express the temporal evolution of the system from a statistical
point of view. Concretely, Π = pii,∀i ∈ [1, N ], is a vector that indicates the
probability of the i-th state being the first element of the temporal sequence of
observations:
pii = P (q1 = Si),
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where qt represents the current state of the model at time t and Si the elements of
the temporal sequence of observations. This vector has the following constraints:
pii ≥ 0,∀i ∈ [1, N ] :
N∑
i=1
pii = 1.
Matrix A, A = aij,∀i, j ∈ [1, N ], represents the transition probabilities
between states. Given that the system is in a state i at some time t, the
matrix gives the probability of reaching the state j at time t+ 1. The matrix
of transition probabilities can be estimated as follows:
aij = P (qt+1 = Sj|qt = Si) = P (qt = Si ∩ qt+1 = Sj)
P (qt = Si)
.
Matrix A has the following two constraints:
aij ≥ 0,∀i, j ∈ [1, N ] :
∑
j
aij = 1,∀i ∈ [1, N ].
The probability P (t)j of state j at time t is given recursively by
P
(1)
j = pij, P
(t)
j =
N∑
i=1
P
(t−1)
i aij, t > 1.
Markov models have two stages: the first one is learning, where Γ, Π and
A are learned. The second stage is evaluation. During this stage it is checked
whether an observed sequence is recognized by the learned Markov chain. The
details about how they are implemented are explained in next sections of this
chapter.
Next, the general architecture of both stochastic systems is explained.
4.3 General architecture
The systems presented analyze HTTP traffic in order to protect a target web
application. They act as reverse proxies. A reverse proxy is a type of proxy
server that directs client requests to the appropriate back-end server. The
architecture of the designed WAFs is shown in Fig. 4.1. The objective of a WAF
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is to accurately distinguish whether the received requests are suspicious or not.
For that, it receives as input a collection of HTTP requests r1, r2, . . . , rn. This
input comes from a client that targets the protected web server. After processing
an input request, the system outputs a single bit ai for the corresponding ri.
This output indicates whether the request has been classified as normal or
anomalous. The proposed WAFs are programmed in Java. The communications
between the client and the WAF, and between the WAF and the server, are
implemented via sockets. The systems can be located between the client and
the server, or they could be included as a module of the web server to be
protected.
Figure 4.1 – Web Application Firewall Architecture.
Detection takes place at the application layer. Analyzing the payload of the
requests, and not only the headers of the TCP packet, makes possible to be
more efficient and detect more types of web attacks. According to WASC, the
analysis developed at the application layer is capable of detecting web attacks
that cannot be detected when working on lower OSI layers [WASC, 2006].
The proposed WAFs can act online or offline. Online systems are those
connected to the network, handling traffic on demand. Contrarily, offline
systems are disconnected from the network, typically analyzing requests from
a dataset.
The incoming requests are processed individually. This means that
those requests analyzed previously do not influence the decision about the
classification of the present request. Thus, these WAFs are focused on detecting
attacks that involve a single request. Some systems in the state of the art are
specialized on detecting a specific type of attack, like [Valeur et al., 2005] in
detecting SQL attacks or [Kirda et al., 2009] and [Wurzinger et al., 2009] in
detecting XSS. In contrast to this type of systems, the WAFs presented in this
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work are designed to detect multiple types of web attacks, such as SQLi, XSS,
buffer overflow, server side include or parameter tampering, among others.
Additionally, the whole HTTP request is analyzed. This characteristic
is different from other works, that analyze only some parts of the request,
like [Kruegel and Vigna, 2003] and [Song et al., 2009]. This decision was taken
based on the fact that attacks can be included in any part of the request.
For instance, XSS attacks could be embedded into the User-Agent header, or
cookies could be used as part of web attacks (cookie hijacking) [Riley et al.,
2010]. Then, in order to detect these attacks, the whole request needs to be
analyzed.
4.4 Design
The proposed systems follow an anomaly-based approach. In this approach
the normal behavior of the web application is characterized and those requests
that deviate more than a threshold from the specified behavior are deemed as
anomalous. This approach was further explained in Sec. 2.2.1.3.
The proposed systems are designed following two stages: preprocessing and
processing. These stages are explained next. This design is shared by both
systems since they apply stochastic algorithms.
• Preprocessing. When an individual request is received, it is firstly
decoded. Then, feature extraction takes place: those features
considered relevant for detecting attacks are extracted from the request. It
is done by means of expert knowledge about web attacks. For extracting
features, the request is parsed into its components: HTTP method,
resource, version of the HTTP protocol, headers and arguments. The
resource is composed of directories and a file. In this thesis, arguments
include both arguments of POST requests and parameters in the query of
GET requests. Headers and arguments are further split into their name
and value. Figure 2.1 on Sec. 2.1.2 shows an example of an HTTP request
and its components.
With the aim of detecting both static and dynamic attacks, the following
features are extracted from the different request components:
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– Method name.
– Path and name of the resource targeted.
– For each header: header name and stochastic models of the header
value.
– For each argument: argument name and stochastic models of the
argument value.
Argument and header values are considered more critical from the web
security perspective since attacks are more frequently embedded in these
components. Thus, stochastic models are applied to capture the properties
of these components. The models are implemented differently depending
on the algorithm used, statistical or Markovian. Detection models are
explained in Sec. 4.5.
The features extracted are stored in the Normal Behavior Description file.
Details of this file are given in Sec. 4.6.
The proposed approach is applied at token level [Krueger et al., 2010].
Features are extracted from each component individually, not from the
whole request. This is useful due that each component might have a
different nature. Furthermore, each argument or header might have
different properties. For example, the character distribution of a zip code
is different from the one of a user’s name argument. According to Kruegel
et al., “systems that focus on web-based attacks show that by taking
advantage of the specificity of a particular application domain is possible
to achieve better detection results” [Kruegel et al., 2005b]. Since it gives
more precision than if the features were extracted for the whole request
or for a group of components, it is the option chosen to design WAFs in
this thesis.
• Processing. The processing stage of a request is different depending on
the phase of the system: training or test. During the training phase,
the features extracted are used to learn the normal behavior of the web
application. It implies filling the NBD file and training the corresponding
detection models.
In the test phase, incoming traffic is classified. In order to do that, it is
checked whether the features of the incoming request match the normal
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behavior stored in the NBD file. If any feature does not match the normal
behavior, the whole request is deemed as anomalous. Otherwise, it is
classified as normal.
After the test phase, the request is encoded and sent to the web server.
It is important to clarify that the action performed in this step depends
on whether the system acts as an IDS or IPS. The presented systems can
work on both modes. In the IDS mode, these systems send all requests
to the server and raise an alarm when the request has been classified as
anomalous. In the IPS mode, the systems only forward normal requests.
That is, anomalous ones are blocked.
An scheme of the presented design can be seen in Fig. 4.2.
Figure 4.2 – Design structure of stochastic-based WAFs.
Next, detection models are presented.
4.5 Detection models
Detection models are applied to characterize the behavior of argument and
header values. Recall that models are applied to every argument or header
present in the request and that the models are applied individually to each of
them, what gives more precision in the detection.
These detection models are based on normality intervals that define a range
within the argument or header values are considered normal. Values falling
outside the intervals are considered anomalous. The limits of the intervals are
learned during the training phase. If only normal traffic is used during the
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training phase, the limits of the intervals establish thresholds between what is
considered normal or anomalous.
Both stochastic systems use two detection models. One of the models
analyzes the length of the argument/header value and the other, calculates
stochastic properties of its characters. The detection models are implemented
differently depending on the algorithm used. Next, details about statistical
and Markovian detection models are given.
4.5.1 Statistical detection models
As mentioned, the statistical approach uses two detection models: 1) length
and, 2) character distribution of the argument/header values. These models
are explained next.
• Length model. Length is a useful criterion to detect attacks due to the
fact that, on the one hand, values of normal requests do not usually contain
many bytes and, on the other hand, many web attacks use a considerable
large amount of input characters (such as code injection, XSS and buffer
overflow). This model captures the length of the argument/header value.
The limits of the interval are established as the minimum and the
maximum length of the argument/header values seen in the training.
In previous experiments, we set these limits to different values, as it will
be explained later.
• Character distribution model. Several intervals are defined for
this model. By using our expert knowledge about web attacks, we
observed that not all characters have the same importance in web
attacks. Special characters are particularly relevant for the detection
of numerous web attacks. Furthermore, Sriraghavan and Lucchese
proved that considering letters, digits and non-alphanumeric characters
is more efficient than considering the relative frequency of the 256 ASCII
characters [Sriraghavan and Lucchese, 2008]. Therefore, instead of
considering the 256 ASCII characters individually, the statistical WAF
models the characters of the argument/header values into three groups:
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– Letters.
– Digits.
– Non-alphanumeric characters.
Besides the improvement in the detection, an advantage of considering
these three groups is that it accelerates the training and checking processes
of the models.
Percentages of the character distribution, according to these three groups,
were used as features to build the model. It is composed of three intervals:
– Percentage of letters.
– Percentage of digits.
– Percentage of non-alphanumeric characters included in a set
of non-alphanumeric characters allowed for the corresponding
argument/header. This set is formed during the training of the
system. That is, non-alphanumeric characters corresponding to the
argument/header value are included into the set.
Similarly to the length model, the limits of the intervals are fixed
with the minimum and maximum percentages found on the training
argument/header values. Next, an example of how the lower limit of
the letter interval is calculated. At the beginning its value is set to
the percentage of letters corresponding to the first header/argument
analyzed. If the percentage of the following values analyzed is lower than
the established limit, the limit of the interval is replaced by the new
percentage.
As mentioned, different limits of the intervals were considered in a previous
version of the model. In that case, instead of the minimum and the maximum
values, the mean (µ) and the standard deviation (σ) were used to calculate
the limits. The width of the interval was regulated by a sensibility parameter
s ∈ [0.2, 4]:
[µ− σ · s, µ+ σ · s].
From the experiments, it was observed that if the sensibility parameter
was not high enough, some normal values fell outside the interval in the test
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phase. Particularly, it happened in those cases that were not close enough to
the mean. Since the criteria of establishing the limits of the interval with the
minimum and maximum values makes the system more efficient, this option
was preferred.
It is remarkable that the approach proposed has less models than most
of the existing statistical WAFs. For example, Kruegel et al. uses eight
detection models [Kruegel et al., 2005b]. Sriraghavan and Lucchese use five
models [Sriraghavan and Lucchese, 2008]. And the paper from Criscione and
Zanero employs six models for detecting SQL attacks [Criscione and Zanero,
2009]. Provided that it does not harm the detection, using a low amount
of simple models allows to save time and resources, at the same time that
simplifies the design of the system.
4.5.2 Markovian detection models
The system based on Markov chains also uses two detection models for the
characterization of the application normal behavior: the first model considers
the length of the argument/header value and the second its structure. Note
that structure is different from character distribution. The structure does not
only consider the percentage of each type of character, but also the order of
the characters. It captures which character is followed by another one.
• Length model. This model uses the length of an argument or header
value in order to detect anomalies.
Similarly to the statistical case, this model is based on intervals that
define the range of normality for the argument/header values. However, it
also presents some differences. One difference is that the Markovian model
makes the assumption that the length of normal argument/header values
follows a Gaussian distribution. This distribution is used to calculate the
thresholds of the length interval:
– Instead of considering the minimum length of the training values
as in the statistical case, the Markovian model sets the lower limit
of the interval to zero. It was done since from the security point of
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view, it is not necessary to restrict the lower limit. That is, a string
is not dangerous because the fact of being short.
– The upper limit is established as follows: given a probability, the
corresponding percentile of the Gaussian distribution is taken. For
example, if the probability is fixed to 0.9, the upper limit is the
value below which 90% of the observations fall.
For a normal distribution, the percentile is calculated with this
equation:
percentile = µ+ zscore · σ,
where µ is the mean, σ the standard deviation and zscore, also known
as standard score [Bluman, 2007]), is a measure to know how far
a data point is above or below the population mean, expressed in
standard deviations.
Then, the limits of the length interval are set as follows:
[0, percentile].
The probability p associated to the calculation of the corresponding
percentile is a parameter of the model. Its values can be configured
by the IT operator to test the behavior of the system under those
conditions (see Sec. 4.9).
• Structure model. Markov chains are ideal for modeling the structure
of tokens, since they can capture the order in which characters are
distributed. Recall that Markov chains are defined by Γ, Π and A. These
concepts were explained in Sec. 4.2.
The knowledge about the different states reached by the system, Γ, is
obtained though the observation of the system outcomes Θ = Oi, that are
considered as possible states of the system. In our Markovian system, the
states correspond to the different types of characters: l (letter), d (digit)
and non-alphanumeric characters (such as *,(,),-,’, etc). Note that again,
the characters are grouped, what makes possible to reduce the number of
states of the Markov model. However, in this case each non-alphanumeric
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character constitutes an state itself. Contrarily to the statistical model,
there is not a generic state that covers all non-alphanumeric characters.
The probability of matrix A and vector Π are estimated during the training
phase. The idea is that this model captures the normal distribution of the
characters forming the argument/header values. Each argument and each
header has its own Markov chain, what allows to capture the particular
structure of the corresponding values. During the test phase, it is checked
whether a given sequence of observations is recognized by the previously
estimated model or not.
For the learning phase, the simplest generalization of the Markov model
was considered. In it, every observed state depends on the previous
one, and only on the previous one. Then, the matrix of probabilities of
transitions can be estimated by:
aij =
P (qt = Oi ∩ qt+1 = Oj)
P (qt = Oi)
.
The two probabilistic terms in the previous expression can be calculated
by counting occurrences of the states in the observed values. Similarly,
Π can be estimated by counting the occurrences of states in the first
character of the observed training values. For example, in the case of an
argument with value "Markov", the only state is l. The state l of vector
Π takes value 1, corresponding to "M". The transition from state l to l in
matrix A takes value 5.
All stochastic models are stored in the NBD file, that is explained next.
4.6 Normal behavior description file
The normal behavior learnt about the web application under study is stored in
a normal behavior description (NBD) file. It is implemented as an XML file.
XML files have the advantages of being universal and easily readable.
The structure of the NBD file is related to the components of HTTP requests.
It has the following nodes:
• Methods. This node includes a whitelist of the allowed HTTP methods.
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• Headers. It contains a list of the admitted HTTP headers and a
characterization of their values. Header values are described in a rule
node that contains the two detection models explained in Sec. 4.5. The
models are implemented differently depending on the system.
• Directories. This node has a tree-like hierarchy, in close correspondence
to the web application’s directory structure:
– Directories of resources belonging to the web application are
represented by their name in a directory node, allowing to nest
directories. There is a node for each subdirectory in the resource.
– The web page of the resources (file) is characterized by its name in
a file node, placed within the corresponding directory node.
• Arguments. Each argument of the web page is defined by its name and
value in an argument node, holding from the corresponding file node. The
values of the arguments are characterized by the statistical or Markovian
models, depending on the system. The structure of the NBD file for these
models is explained below.
4.6.1 Particularities of the NBD file for the statistical
system
In this section the particularities of the structure of the NBD file corresponding
to the statistical detection models are explained. Statistical models are present
in the NBD file for each argument, and each header, in order to characterize
the statistical properties of their values. The intervals corresponding to the
statistical length and character distribution models are represented within the
stats node of the NBD file. The stats node corresponding to the length model
contains these elements:
• minLength.
• maxLength.
The stats node corresponding to the character distribution model contains
the following elements:
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• minLetter.
• maxLetter.
• minDigit.
• maxDigit.
• minSpecial.
• maxSpecial.
• special.
All elements starting with min represent the lower limit of the corresponding
interval. They are calculated as the minimum value seen in the training
argument/header values. For that, the length of the first element is established
as the minimum at the beginning. Then, if during the training phase the feature
of the incoming value is lower than the current limit in the NBD file, the lower
limit is updated. Analogously, elements starting with max elements refer to
the upper limit. It is calculated similarly but with the maximum value. The
element called special represents the set of non-alphanumeric characters allowed
for the corresponding argument/header value. Recall that the statistical values
are extracted for each argument/header independently, since their values could
have totally different properties.
Figure 4.3 shows an example of the structure of the NBD file configured for
the target e-commerce web application presented in Sec. 3.4. In the example,
the file “add.jsp” in the “public” directory represents a page in charge of adding
a new product to the shopping cart. This page has two arguments: the name
of the product that the customer wishes to buy and the amount of items
selected. As an example, argument “amount” is shown. The allowed values of
this argument have a maximum length of 3, then its maximum value is 999.
These values are fully formed by digits, i.e., no letters or special characters are
permitted for this argument.
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<configuration>
<methods>
<method>GET</method>
<method>POST</method>
</methods>
<headers>
<rule name="Accept-Charset">
<stats minLength="5" maxLength="20"
minLetter="4" maxLetter="90"
minDigit="2" maxDigit="60"
minSpecial="2" maxSpecial="25"
special="-"/>
</rule>
</headers>
<directories>
<directory name="shop">
<file name="index.jsp"/>
<directory name="public">
<file name="add.jsp">
<argument name="amount">
<stats minLength="1" maxLength="3"
minLetter="0" maxLetter="0"
minDigit="100" maxDigit="100"
minSpecial="0" maxSpecial="0"
special=""/>
</argument>
...
Figure 4.3 – NBD file example for the statistical algorithm.
4.6.2 Particularities of the NBD file for the Markovian
system
In this section, the structure of the NBD file related to Markovian models
is presented. The length model is represented by the length node in the file.
This node is defined by the lower and upper limits of the length interval. The
Markov model node contains information about the structure of the values
represented by a Markov chain. This node describes the states Γ, vector Π,
and matrix A of the Markovian model. This model is updated dynamically as
long as the training requests are received. Note that only the states found in
the training values will be captured by the model. For example, a zip code will
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only have the state d. In this case, states l and non-alphanumeric characters
are not needed to define the allowed values of this argument. This implies that
the dimension of matrix A is not fixed. It is minimized as much as possible for
each token. This fact helps to reduce the memory consumption to store the
model and the time needed to check if a string matches it.
Figure 4.4 shows an example of the NBD file configured for “Nuestra Tierra”
web application. The example is presented for the same web page “add.jsp”.
Regarding the length model, the lower limit is fixed to zero. The upper limit
is calculated as the percentile of the Gaussian distribution. The “amount”
parameter contains only digits. As there is only one state, vector Π and matrix
A have only one element (100% of the characters are digits). In the case
of the “product name” argument, the possible states are: letter and space
(non-alphanumeric character). Then, the dimension of Π is 1x2 and A is 2x2.
As vector Π reflects, the name of a product can only start with a letter. Matrix
A contains the following knowledge: in 90% of the cases the character following
a letter is another letter, and in 10% of the cases it is a space. After a space
always a letter is following.
4.7 Detection process
Detection process takes place during the test phase. In this step the system
is already trained and it is ready for operation. The goal of this phase is to
correctly classify the incoming requests as normal or anomalous.
An schema of the detection process is depicted in Fig. 4.5. It consists of a
succession of steps that are in charge of testing whether the request satisfies
the normal behavior learned or not. To do that, the first step is extracting
features from the incoming request. Then, the detection process takes place. In
it, it is successively checked whether different components of the request match
their corresponding section in the NBD file. This file has been previously filled
with those values considered normal for the target web application.
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<configuration>
<methods>
<method>GET</method>
<method>POST</method>
</methods>
<headers>
<rule name="Accept-Language">
<length lowerLimit="0" upperLimit="2"/>
<markovModel A="1.0" Pi="1.0" states="l"/>
</rule>
</headers>
<directories>
<directory name="shop">
<file name="index.jsp"/>
<directory name="public">
<file name="add.jsp">
<argument name="amount">
<length lowerLimit="0" upperLimit="2.29"/>
<markovModel A="1.0" Pi="1.0" states="d"/>
</argument>
<argument name="productName">
<length lowerLimit="0" upperLimit="14.56"/>
<markovModel A="0.9 0.1 1.0 0.0" Pi="1.0 0.0" states="l, space"/>
</argument>
...
</file>
</directory>
</directory>
</directories>
Figure 4.4 – NBD file example for the Markov chain algorithm.
The detection process is composed of the following steps:
1. The process starts checking the HTTP method. It is done by checking
whether the method belongs to the whitelist contained in the NBD file or
not. In case the method is not present, the whole request is rejected and
the detection process ends. Otherwise the detection process continues.
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Figure 4.5 – Detection process flow.
2. Headers are checked. For each header, the process is the following:
(a) Firstly, it is checked whether the header name appears in the NBD
file.
(b) If so, its value is checked. To consider a header as valid, its value
should match both detection models. It is done differently depending
on the system (statistical or Markovian). The detection process of
these models is later explained in this section.
3. Regarding resources, it is checked if both the path (directories) and the
file accessed are in correspondence with the tree structure of the NBD
nodes.
4. If there is any argument, each of them is checked in a way similar to
headers’ checking:
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(a) Firstly, it is checked whether the argument is allowed for the targeted
resource or not. To be allowed, the argument name should be
included in the list of arguments of the corresponding resource.
(b) If so, the value of the argument is tested. The argument should satisfy
both detection models. Checking these models is done following the
same process carried out with headers. It is later explained in this
section.
Since there is no previous information about which header or argument
could be more prone to be an attack, they are checked in the same order as
they appear in the request. As can be observed, only when it is confirmed that
every part of the request is normal, the request is tagged as normal. As soon
as any part of the request does not match the normal criteria established, the
whole request is classified as anomalous. It is remarkable that this process has
a design where not all modules need to be evaluated. Some of them can be
skipped under certain circumstances. In particular, these circumstances happen
when any part of the request does not pass any of the defense lines. In that
case, the request is directly rejected. This fact makes possible to accelerate the
decision process. Even more, it is new in comparison to most statistical-based
works in the literature, like [Kruegel et al., 2005b], [Cheng, 2009], [Sriraghavan
and Lucchese, 2008], [Criscione and Zanero, 2009]. These works usually need
to evaluate every model before deciding about the normality/abnormality of
the request.
Since this process checks different parts of the request, it allows the detection
of both static and dynamic attacks.
4.7.1 Detection process in statistical models
The process to check whether a specific argument/header value of the incoming
request satisfies the statistical models follows this structure:
• First, the length model is checked. To satisfy this model, the length of the
argument/header value to be tested should fall inside the corresponding
length interval in the NBD file. Since this interval specifies the limits
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of normal values, they are classified as normal. Otherwise, they are
considered anomalous.
• Second, the character distribution model is analyzed. To be considered
normal, the value to be checked should be included inside the three
intervals defined in the NBD file, that correspond to the letter, digit
and non-alphanumeric character distribution. Additionally, its special
characters should be contained in the corresponding special set. If any of
the thresholds are bypassed (i.e., the values fall outside the intervals) or
the value contains non-allowed special characters, the request is labeled
as anomalous.
4.7.2 Detection process in Markovian models
The process to check whether the Markovian model is satisfied is the following:
• First, the length model is evaluated by checking if the length of the
incoming argument/header value is inside the corresponding interval of
allowed lengths.
• Second, to evaluate whether a given observed value is recognized by the
previously estimated Markov chain, the following approach is adopted:
Given a Markov chain λ = (Γ, A,Π) and a sequence of observed symbols
O = O1, O2, . . . , OT , the sequence is recognized by the Markov chain if the
probability of the sequence being generated by the Markov chain (P [O|λ])
exceeds an established threshold. Recall that the state corresponding to
the characters is checked, not the character itself.
Based on [Estévez-Tapiador et al., 2004], the representation on a
logarithmic scale of the Maximum A-posteriori Probability (MAP) is used
to evaluate if the observed sequence has been generated by the Markov
chain:
LogMAP (O, λ) = log(piO1) +
T−1∑
t=1
log(aOtOt+1). (4.1)
Since it is logarithmic, in this measure no probability can be zero. A
usual technique to avoid zero values is performing a previous smoothing
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of the Markov chain. A simple way of smoothing the model is setting
those probabilities lower than a given threshold, to a fixed value called .
As long as the observations fit the model, the “LogMAP” function (4.1)
does not have abrupt changes of slope. However, if there is any unexpected
symbol, there will be an abrupt change of slope. Detecting these changes
would mean detecting anomalies. To detect them, an approximation of
the derivative of the “LogMAP” function can be used:
DW (t) = |LogMAP (t)− 1
W
W∑
i=1
LogMAP (t− i)|, (4.2)
where W is the window size, that can take values W = 1, 2, 3, . . .. The
last term in (4.2) is the mean of the last W outputs. This equation
supplies an output for each symbol analyzed in the sequence. When the
output exceeds a fixed threshold τ , the sequence of observed symbols
is classified as anomalous.  and τ are configurable parameters of the
model.
4.8 Experimental setup
In this section the setup carried out for the experimental stage is explained.
Given that the CSIC dataset satisfies the requirements established in
Sec. 3.1.1 to be considered appropriate for evaluating WAFs, it is used to
conduct the experiments to evaluate the proposed systems.
Recall that the training dataset contains only normal traffic. Since the
algorithms are anomaly-based, the models learn correctly the normal behavior
of the web application when they are trained with only normal traffic. Although
a certain amount of noise would be tolerable for the stochastic algorithms, in
anomaly-based systems, attacks included in the training dataset could result
undetected in the test phase. This is why they were not included in the training
dataset for these experiments.
The systems perform a two-class detection: the requests are classified as
either normal or abnormal.
82 4. Stochastic techniques for web intrusion detection
With the aim of studying how the variation of the number of training
requests influences the detection results of the system, a number of experiments
are run. Let the number of experiments be M = 15. These experiments are
performed with an increasing number of training requests. The number of
requests used in each experiment is tri = 2i − 1, ∀i ∈ [1,M ]. That is, the
number of training requests ranges from 1 to 32 767.
The number of possible combinations to choose tri normal requests among
the total number of normal requests in the CSIC dataset (36 000) is very high.
Since trying all possibilities is infeasible, a few of them (H) have been randomly
chosen. In particular, H = 10. There are different options for choosing requests,
like stratified, quota or random [Ellison et al., 2009]. Within them, the random
method has been selected due that there is no previous information about
how the system is going to be attacked. More about experiments is argued in
Sec. 4.10.
The procedure for each experiment is the following: the system is trained
with tri requests randomly chosen. Then the system is tested with a fixed
subset of testing requests, that contains te normal requests and te anomalous
requests, with te = 1000.
After the test phase the performance of the detection algorithm is evaluated,
as it is explained next.
4.9 Evaluation measures
Evaluating IDSs is a hard task. Sommer and Paxson even state that “evaluation
turns out to be more difficult than building the detector itself” [Sommer and
Paxson, 2010]. They point out the difficulty in finding the right data to test
the systems and complications in interpreting the results as the main obstacles
for evaluating IDSs. Difficulties in gathering data were addressed in Sec. 3.1.
Despite these difficulties, several measures can be used to evaluate IDSs
performance. Before introducing these measures, a few concepts are introduced
first.
Table 4.1 shows the contingency matrix of a detection system. If a real
attack is detected, the system obtains a True Positive (TP). Otherwise it is a
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Table 4.1 – Contingency matrix for detection systems.
Detection classification
Negative Positive
Real label Negative TN FP
Positive FN TP
False Negative (FN). If a normal event is signaled as normal by the detector,
it is a True Negative (TN). It is a False Positive (FP) if it is classified as an
attack.
For evaluating IDSs, detection rate and false positive rate are measures
generally used in the field. Detection rate (also known as recall) measures the
number of alarms that are indeed attacks. It is calculated as follows:
DR = TP
TP + FN .
The false positive rate indicates the number of alarms that are not really
attacks, i.e., false alarms:
FPR = FP
FP + TN .
DR y FPR take values between 0 and 100 and are expressed as a percentage.
The objective of IDSs is maximizing the detection rate while minimizing
the false positive rate. As can be seen, these objectives are antagonistic, then,
they are not easy to optimize simultaneously. The challenge of IDSs is to reach
a tradeoff between DR and FPR.
DR and FPR are usually plotted in Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curves [Provost et al., 1998]. According to Bradley, a ROC curve
provides a way to visually represent the trade-off between false positive and
detection rates by varying a parameter [Bradley, 1997]. Since plotting DR
vs. FPR represents one point in the graph when all parameters are fixed, the
variation of the parameter is used to draw the whole curve. For example, it is
common to use the detection threshold as a parameter of the ROC curve.
In our case, the parameter chosen for the graph is the number of requests
used in the training phase. This parameter is used for both the statistical and
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Markovian algorithms. As mentioned, the value of the parameter is increased
exponentially. Experiments are performed as follows. For every number of
requests used for the training (tri), the system is tested subsequently. This
allows to observe the influence of the parameter on the detection results. This
process is repeated H times.
In the case of Markov chains, additionally, the parameters of the Markov
chain are used in the ROC curve to test their behavior when they take different
values:
• Parameter p corresponds to the probability used to calculate the percentile
of the length model. This model was explained in Sec. 4.5. The values
tested for p are p = 0.9, p = 0.95 and p = 0.99.
• The parameter  is used to smooth the Markov model. As it was mentioned
in Sec. 4.7, it is assigned to values in the transition probabilities whose
values in the trained model are 0 or lower than a threshold. When  takes
low values, the system is more sensible to deviations with respect to the
normal behavior. Following the study of Estevez-Tapiador et al. about
the values of this parameter, the values tested are:  = 10−15,  = 10−10,
 = 10−8 and  = 10−4 [Estévez-Tapiador et al., 2004].
• Parameter τ is the threshold used to decide whether a token value is
normal or anomalous. If the parameter takes low values, the detection is
more prone to false positives. On the contrary, if it is very high, it is not
possible to detect attacks with a low level of abnormality. Then, different
values have been tried to conclude which one leads to better detection
results: τ = 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, 200, 300.
4.10 Results
This section presents the detection results obtained in the experimental stage
by both systems. Results are presented according to the different evaluation
measures previously shown.
As mentioned in the previous sections, given a number of training requests,
the experiments are performed H times. This reduces the possible effect of
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Figure 4.6 – ROC curve of the statistical algorithm. The parameter
used is the number of training requests.
randomness and shows better the actual behavior of the WAFs. The results of
the system are expressed as the mean and standard deviation of the H trials.
The results of the statistical-based system are shown in Fig. 4.6. It plots
the ROC curve (DR vs. FPR) of the algorithm. The parameter chosen is the
number of requests used in the training phase. A zoom of the upper left corner
is shown for more clarity.
The results obtained for Markov chains can be seen in Fig. 4.7. Additionally,
for Markov chains, a study of the behavior of the systems for various values of
the parameters has been done. Figure 4.8 shows the ROC curve corresponding
to different values of the parameter p, Fig. 4.9 for parameter  and Fig. 4.10
for parameter τ . These results are discussed in Sec. 4.11. Moreover, the values
of the parameters have been studied according to the incremental number of
requests used to train the system. Figure 4.11 and Fig. 4.12 show the DR
and FPR corresponding to parameter p. Figure. 4.13 and Fig. 4.14 present
results for parameter . And Fig. 4.15 and Fig. 4.16 for parameter τ . These
figures show a small figure inside with a zoom of the graph to facilitate the
visualization of the results.
A discussion of these results is given in the next section.
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Figure 4.7 – ROC curve of the Markovian algorithm. The parameter
used is the number of training requests.
Figure 4.8 – ROC curve of the Markovian algorithm. The parameter
used is p.
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Figure 4.9 – ROC curve of the Markovian algorithm. The parameter
used is .
Figure 4.10 – ROC curve of the Markovian algorithm. The parameter
used is τ .
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Figure 4.11 – DR according to the increase of the number of training
requests for the Markovian algorithm. The parameter used is p.
Figure 4.12 – FPR according to the increase of the number of training
requests for the Markovian algorithm. The parameter used is p.
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Figure 4.13 – DR according to the increase of the number of training
requests for the Markovian algorithm. The parameter used is .
Figure 4.14 – FPR according to the increase of the number of training
requests for the Markovian algorithm. The parameter used is .
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Figure 4.15 – DR according to the increase of the number of training
requests for the Markovian algorithm. The parameter used is τ .
Figure 4.16 – FPR according to the increase of the number of training
requests for the Markovian algorithm. The parameter used is τ .
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The influence of the number of training requests in the results can be better
appreciated in the following figures and tables. Figure 4.17 presents the results
for statistical techniques. It reflects the influence of the training requests on
the detection results (DR and FPR). Training requests are represented in a
logarithmic scale. These results are detailed in Table 4.2 that shows, for each
iteration, the corresponding number of training requests, as well as the mean
(σ) and standard deviation (µ) of the DR, FPR and processing time.
Figure 4.17 – Study of the influence of the number of requests on the
detection results of statistical algorithm. DR and FPR are plotted vs.
the number of training requests.
Regarding Markov chains, Fig. 4.18 shows the influence of the number
of training requests in the results of the algorithm. The detection results
presented above, as well as the processing time of the Markovian algorithm are
summarized in Table 4.3. This table shows the mean and standard deviation
of DR, FPR and processing time for each tri.
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Table 4.2 – Detection results and processing time for the statistical
algorithm.
Iteration Num. Training DR (%) FPR (%) Processing Time
Requests (ms/request)
µ σ µ σ µ σ
1 1 100 0 96.7 1.68 1751 2.81
2 3 100 0 95.1 2.34 393.66 2.54
3 7 100 0 90.0 2.27 179.95 2.39
4 15 100 0 81.6 3.41 86.17 2.34
5 31 100 0 67.4 4.01 43.8 1.87
6 63 100 0 46.4 4.32 19.58 1.62
7 127 100 0 31.6 3.57 11.2 1.53
8 255 99.9 0.05 16.5 1.60 5.19 1.27
9 511 99.8 0.05 11.0 1.69 2.77 1.05
10 1023 99.8 0.05 8.2 0.74 1.79 1.01
11 2047 99.6 0.14 5.7 0.83 1.1 0.88
12 4095 99.5 0.14 3.6 0.45 0.85 0.80
13 8191 99.4 0 1.5 0.12 0.68 0.61
14 16 383 99.4 0 0.9 0.05 0.63 0.34
15 32 767 99.3 0.05 0.4 0.08 0.59 0.29
Figure 4.18 – Study of the influence of the number of requests on the
detection results of Markovian algorithm. DR and FPR are plotted vs.
the number of training requests.
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Table 4.3 – Detection results and processing time for the Markov chains
algorithm.
Iteration Num. Training DR (%) FPR (%) Processing Time
Requests (ms/request)
µ σ µ σ µ σ
1 1 100 0 97.2 0.70 2519 2.70
2 3 99.9 0.05 95.6 1.51 493 2.35
3 7 100 0 90.0 1.18 202.81 1.89
4 15 99.7 0.12 80.2 3.03 186.22 1.66
5 31 99.8 0.19 69.1 3.17 50.83 1.58
6 63 99.4 0.20 45.6 1.96 37.69 1.29
7 127 99.3 0.09 23.6 2.96 20.01 0.52
8 255 99 0.29 13.1 0.88 17.53 0.95
9 511 98.5 0.14 5.7 0.97 13.78 0.88
10 1023 98.4 0.05 3.8 0.59 43.45 0.69
11 2047 98.2 0.08 2.9 0.34 10.32 0.45
12 4095 98.1 0.05 2.0 0.22 10.16 0.29
13 8191 98.1 0.05 1.7 0.37 9.93 0.07
14 16 383 98.1 0 1.1 0 8.87 0.07
15 32 767 98.1 0 1.0 0.05 7.9 0.09
4.11 Discussion
Next, the results presented previously for the statistical and Markovian systems
are analyzed.
4.11.1 Discussion of statistical results
Table 4.2 reveals that when the statistical WAF is trained with 16 383 requests,
it is able to achieve a mean DR of 99.4% while the mean FPR is 0.9%.
Results of Table 4.2 are represented graphically in Fig. 4.6. The corresponding
standard deviations are 0% and 0.05% respectively. A property of the Gaussian
distribution is that 95.4% of the values are 2σ away from the mean value.
Assuming a Gaussian distribution in the example before, it means that for
95.4% of the values, the DR remains 99.4%, and FPR ranges from 0.8% to 1%.
Analyzing the three columns corresponding to σ in the table, it can be seen
that for FPR and time, the standard deviation decreases as long as the system
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is trained with a higher number of requests. In the case of the DR, σ takes
values near zero.
Considering that the standard deviation takes values near zero, especially
when the system is trained with a higher number of requests, we did not continue
performing more experiments. We considered that taking H possibilities was
representative enough. These results presented correspond to the mean of the
H = 10 runs. It is expected that the standard deviation would be even smaller
when a higher number of experiments is performed. Since σ takes small values,
when DR and FPR results are given in this document without specifying σ,
they refer to the mean value.
The mean processing time corresponding to the example above is
0.63 ms/request. All processing time measurements have been obtained with
an Intel core i7 CPU at 2.40 GHz and 8GB RAM, SO Windows 8, 64 bits.
A possibility to obtain even lower processing time values would be to study
the viability of parallelization in some parts of the process. Potential points to
introduce parallelization in the design of the presented WAFs are the different
steps of the detection process presented in Sec. 4.7 or the checking of the
different headers/arguments. Some works also have been done in the direction
of running Markov chains in parallel [Gopal and Casella, 2011], [Angelino, 2014].
However, a thorough study of this issue falls outside the scope of this thesis.
Representing the results graphically, the ROC curve of Fig. 4.17 shows
that when a low amount of training requests is used, the algorithm rejects
most requests. That is, DR is very high but false positive rate is also very
high. As long as the system is trained with more requests, the trend of the FP
is to decrease progressively. Three stages can be observed in the graph. At
the beginning (from 1 to 255 training requests), the reduction of the FPR is
very sharp. When the system starts being trained with more requests (until
8191 training requests), FPR decreases more slowly. In the last stage, when
the system is trained with higher amounts of requests, the fall is very soft.
Meanwhile, DR keeps almost invariable. DR has the highest value possible
(100%) at the beginning and, later, it is very lightly reduced. These results
reflect that when the algorithm does not have enough information, it cannot
detect correctly. When more information is provided, the system can detect
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intrusions while raising scarce false alarms, until a point where the addition of
more requests is not really providing new knowledge to the algorithm.
In comparison with other papers in the literature, the presented systems
use a low amount of requests. For example, TokDoc [Krueger et al., 2010]
uses a third of the requests of the FIRST08 dataset for the training phase,
that is, 484 040 requests. It was also trained with a third part of the BLOG09
dataset, i.e., 393 980 requests. Our statistical algorithm is able to reach a mean
DR of 99.4% and a mean FPR of 0.9%, while only using 16 383 requests. The
advantages of needing a low number of requests were explained in Sec. 2.5.
All types of attacks included in the CSIC dataset have been successfully
detected by the statistical algorithm.
4.11.2 Discussion of Markovian results
Table 4.3 shows that with 32 767 training requests the Markovian system reaches
a mean of 98.1% DR and 1% FPR. The associated σ are 0% and 0.05%. These
results can be seen graphically represented in Fig. 4.7. In Table 4.3 it can be
observed that σ decreases when the system is trained with more requests and
it takes values near zero. The mean processing time associated to these results
is 7.9 ms/request.
Regarding the study of Markov chain parameters, Fig. 4.8 shows that the
optimal value for parameter p is p = 0.99. The best value is chosen as the
one that achieves the best balance between a high DR and a low FPR. Study
of parameter p reveals that when its value is 0.8, the system cannot classify
correctly. When p = 0.8, DR and FPR are both 1, regardless the number of
requests used to train the system. This means that all requests analyzed by the
system are tagged as attacks. Therefore, in the case of our Markovian system,
this value is not meaningful to distinguish between normal and anomalous
requests. Hence, this parameter value should not be used.
The study of parameter  in Fig. 4.9 shows that the best results are achieved
when  = 10−15. In the case of τ , the best value is τ = 50. The influence
of this parameter can be seen in Fig. 4.10. Similarly to what happened with
parameter p, when τ = 30 the systems cannot distinguish between normal and
abnormal values, then, this value should be discarded.
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Analyzing results in Fig. 4.18, it can be seen that, similarly to the statistical
system, the results pass through three different stages in the study of the
influence of training requests. Firstly, the DR and FPR are both high when
the algorithm is fed with few requests. As long as more requests are used in
the training, the trend of the algorithm is to achieve better results, until the
algorithm does not improve anymore, even when more traces are provided.
This behavior of the system is also reflected in the study of parameters. It
is shown in Fig. 4.11 and Fig. 4.12 for parameter p, Fig. 4.13 and Fig. 4.14
for parameter  and Fig. 4.15 and Fig. 4.16 for parameter τ . These figures
show DR and FPR respectively, for different values of the parameters when
the number of training requests increases. Again, the results of the Markovian
algorithm improve when the number of training requests increases, until a point
where results hardly increase.
Optimal values for parameters, p = 0.99,  = 10−15 and τ = 50, were used
for the results shown in Table 4.3.
4.12 Conclusions
The main conclusions drawn from this chapter are:
• The proposed statistical and Markov chains algorithms are able to
correctly distinguish attacks from normal traffic. The whole request
is analyzed for intrusion detection, what allows detecting attacks in any
part of an HTTP request.
• The presented algorithms achieve high detection rates. Statistical
techniques reach a mean DR of 99.4% and a mean FPR of 0.9%, with
0% and 0.05% values for the standard deviation respectively. Markov
chains achieve 98.1% DR and 1% FPR in average, with the same standard
deviation values than in the previous case. Additionally, the algorithms
are able to detect zero-day attacks. Moreover, all types of attacks in the
CSIC dataset are detected.
• The algorithms proposed are high-speed. Using 16 383 training requests
the statistical techniques reach a mean processing time of 0.63 ms/request,
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with 0.34 standard deviation. This technique can even reach up to 0.59
ms/request when trained with 32 767 requests. In the case of Markov
chains, the processing time for 32 767 training requests is 7.9 ms/request,
with a standard deviation of 0.09 ms/request.
• The algorithms are designed following the simplicity principle, while
not negatively affecting the detection results. Only two simple models,
applied to argument/header values, are used for detection. The rest of
the detection is done by means of whitelists. Besides than effective, the
detection process is designed to be efficient. It means that for each request
only the necessary components are evaluated. When any of the normality
conditions is not satisfied, the process does not need to continue any
longer.
• The study regarding the influence of the number of training requests
reveals that it is possible to achieve a mean FPR of 1% with a reduced
number of requests in comparison to the amounts that have been typically
used in intrusion detection so far. The experiments show that the
statistical technique presented uses 16 383 requests to achieve a mean
FPR of 0.9% and Markov chains use 32 767 to achieve a mean FPR of
1%.
This study also confirms the expected trend in the behavior of the
algorithms: they detect correctly only when enough training requests are
received. However, after some point, increasing the number of requests
does not incorporate new knowledge to the learned behavior.
• The CSIC dataset can be successfully used to evaluate stochastic-based
WAFs. The fact of testing different systems with the same dataset allows
their comparison.

Chapter 5
Machine learning techniques for
web intrusion detection
“Intelligence is the ability to adapt to change."
— Stephen Hawking
This chapter proposes a WAF based on machine leaning techniques.
In particular, it is based on decision trees. After analyzing the
general architecture of the WAF, its design is presented. For this
system, the preprocessing phase comprises feature extraction and
feature selection. New feature extraction methods are proposed.
For feature selection, the GeFS measure is used. Processing
corresponds to the classification process, that is performed with the
help of decision trees. The system is evaluated using two datasets:
our CSIC dataset and the publicly available ECML/PKDD one.
After fixing the experimental settings, the results obtained from
the experiments are presented. Experiments show that the new
combination methods improve the results of both expert knowledge
and n-grams separately. Additionally, a study of the influence of
the number of training requests is given. Results are analyzed from
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different points of view. A comparison of stochastic and ML systems
is also included. Finally, the conclusions drawn are presented.
5.1 Introduction
The automation capabilities of machine learning have been applied to many
computer areas, among them, to intrusion detection. Some examples of
IDSs based on ML are presented in [Chen et al., 2005], [Mulay et al., 2010]
and [Sangkatsanee et al., 2011b]. The previous chapter proposed WAFs that
apply stochastic techniques for performing detection. This chapter also presents
a WAF, but in this case, the system uses ML techniques. Like in stochastic
systems, the ML-based WAF follows the anomaly approach. The objective
is again designing high-speed and high detection systems that have a simple
design. The design of the system includes a preprocessing and a processing
stage. In the preprocessing stage, feature extraction and feature selection are
applied. In particular, new feature extraction methods are proposed in this
chapter. These methods combine expert knowledge and n-grams, and they
prove to be more effective than these two techniques separately. Within the
variety of ML algorithms, decision trees are chosen for the classification stage
due to their successful application in intrusion detection. Four different decision
tree algorithms are applied, namely C4.5, CART, Random Tree and Random
Forest. Further details of the system and the experiments carried out are
explained in this chapter.
5.2 General architecture
The architecture of the ML system has many similarities with the stochastic
systems presented in the previous chapter. The system works at the application
layer analyzing the whole payload of HTTP requests. After analyzing the
incoming requests, the system outputs its classification decision about the
normality or abnormality of the request. The system detects a variety of web
attacks that involve a single request.
The ML-based WAF analyzes the payloads at both token and request levels.
It makes the approach more complete from a security point of view, since more
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attacks can be detected. Including the request level is useful in cases where
all tokens satisfy the detection requirements but the whole request does not.
For example, when the length of all tokens are within the length limits but the
whole request is not. It does not mean that the analysis at token level is not
necessary. As it was argued before, it allows to detect many web attacks that
otherwise would go undetected.
5.3 Design
The design of the system counts with two stages: preprocessing and processing.
An scheme of this design is shown in Fig. 5.1.
Figure 5.1 – Design structure of ML-based WAF.
• Preprocessing. This stage consists of feature extraction and
feature selection. Notions of these two processes can be found in
Sec. 2.3. Regarding feature extraction, in intrusion detection it is usually
done by applying either manual or automatic techniques. This thesis
proposes new feature extraction methods for ML by combining both
techniques. The previously proposed stochastic systems use expert
knowledge to extract features. Differently, the ML system combines expert
knowledge features with n-gram ones. The objective is that the proposed
methods improve the detection results of the separate techniques at the
same time that they consume low resources. These feature extraction
methods proposed are explained in Sec. 5.3.1.
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In order to guarantee that this combination consumes low-resources,
feature selection is applied to reduce the number of irrelevant and
redundant features. From the feature extraction categories presented
in Sec. 2.3.1, the filter model was chosen, given that it requires less
computational resources. In particular, the GeFS measure for intrusion
detection is applied. This measure has been successfully tested with
network traffic before [Nguyen et al., 2010b], [Nguyen et al., 2011].
However, it has not been applied to web traffic so far. In this dissertation
its behavior in HTTP traffic is studied. Details about this measure are
given in Sec. 5.3.2.
• Processing. This step comprises the classification phase. ML include
a set of algorithms, such as Bayesian networks, artificial neural networks,
genetic algorithms, support vector machines or decision trees. From these
algorithms, decision trees have been widely and successfully applied to
intrusion detection. For this reason, they are chosen for the classification
process of the ML system. This election is based on the fact that
this family of algorithms is one of the most popular machine learning
algorithms [Wu et al., 2007]. Additionally, decision trees have been proven
to obtain experimentally successful results in intrusion detection. In fact,
the winner of the famous DARPA intrusion detection contest [Lippmann
et al., 2000a] was an algorithm based on decision trees [Pfahringer, 2000].
This characteristics make them promising to be applied to web attack
detection. Decision trees have been rarely employed to classify web
traffic. One of the goals of this thesis is studying their performance in
the classification of this type of traffic.
According to No-Free-Lunch Theorem, there are no universal classifiers
for every kind of data [Wolpert, 1996], [Wolpert, 2001]. Since there is no
standard classification algorithm for WAFs, four decision tree algorithms
have been applied: C4.5, Classification And Regression Tree, Random
Tree and Random Forest. They have a training and a test phase. These
algorithms are further explained in Sec. 5.3.3.
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5.3.1 Feature extraction
This thesis proposes new methods for feature extraction. These methods
combine expert knowledge and n-gram features. A description of n-grams can
be found in Sec. 2.3.1.1. Three combined extraction methods are proposed:
• Combine-select. This alternative firstly mixes all features extracted
by expert knowledge and n-grams. As the number of n-grams often
leads to dimensionality problems, afterwards, feature selection is applied
in order to reduce the number of features. In the seldom cases where
the combination of automatic and manual features was applied in the
literature (see Sec. 2.3.1), this alternative was used. More alternatives
are presented next.
• Select-combine. This alternative mixes expert knowledge features
that have been previously selected. Differently to the previous option,
feature selection is performed firstly and, the resulting features, are mixed
subsequently.
• Select-n-gram-combine. This alternative follows the idea of
select-combine, however, it only takes the selected values of n-grams.
Expert knowledge features are not selected because they come from
knowledge of web attacks experts. Therefore, the subset derived from this
alternative is composed, on the one hand, by expert knowledge features
and, on the other hand, by the selected features from n-grams.
An scheme of these three alternatives can be seen in Fig. 5.2. Each of the
alternatives generates different subsets of features, receiving the same name
than the corresponding alternative. That is, the corresponding subsets are
called combine-select, select-combine and select-n-gram-combine. These subsets
are called “combination cases”. In contrast, expert knowledge and n-gram
subsets are referred to as “basic cases”.
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Figure 5.2 – Structure of the three proposed combination alternatives.
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5.3.2 Feature selection
The GeFS measure, proposed by Nguyen et al., is used in this thesis for feature
selection. The main concepts of the GeFS measure are explained next. For
further details see [Nguyen et al., 2010b].
The feature selection problem can be defined as finding
x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n that maximizes the function GeFS(x):
maxx∈{0,1}n GeFS(x) =
a0 +
∑n
i=1Ai(x)xi
b0 +
∑n
i=1Bi(x)xi
, (5.1)
where binary values of the variable xi indicate the appearance (xi = 1) or the
absence (xi = 0) of the feature fi; a0, b0 are constants; Ai(x), Bi(x) are linear
functions of variables x1, . . . , xn and n is number of features.
There are several feature selection measures that can be represented by
this form, such as the Correlation Feature Selection and Minimal Redundancy
Maximal Relevance measures.
Correlation Feature Selection measure: The Correlation Feature
Selection measure evaluates subsets of features on the basis of the following
hypothesis: “Good feature subsets contain features highly correlated with the
classification, yet uncorrelated to each other” [Hall, 1999].
Considering the merit of a feature subset S with k features as
MeritSk =
krcf√
k + k(k − 1)rff
,
the CFS criterion tries to maximize the merit of the subset of features:
maxSk
 rcf1 + rcf2 + ...+ rcfk√k + 2(rf1f2 + ..+ rfifj + ..+ rfkf1)
 ; (5.2)
rcf represents the average value of all feature-classification correlations and rff
is the average value of all feature-feature correlations.
By using binary values of the variable xi to indicate the appearance (xi = 1)
or the absence (xi = 0) of the feature fi in the globally optimal feature set, the
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expression (5.2) can be rewritten as an optimization problem:
maxx∈{0,1}n
{
(∑ni=1 aixi)2∑n
i=1 xi +
∑
i6=j 2bijxixj
}
.
Minimal Redundancy Maximal Relevance measure: This method
considers relevant features and redundant features simultaneously. For the
given feature set S and the class c, D(S, c) represents the relevance of S for
the class c and R(S) the redundancy of all features in set S. Then the mRMR
measure is defined as
maxS {D(S, c)−R(S)} . (5.3)
Relevance is defined as
D(S, c) = 1|S|
∑
fi∈S
I(fi; c),
and redundancy
R(S) = 1|S|2
∑
fi,fj∈S
I(fi; fj),
where I(fa, fb) is the mutual information function, with fa and fb being features
or the class label.
In the mRMR criterion, the binary values of the variable xi are used in
order to indicate the appearance (xi = 1) or the absence (xi = 0) of the feature
fi in the globally optimal feature set. The mutual information values I(fi; c),
I(fi; fj) are denoted by constants ci, aij, respectively. Suppose that there are
n full-set features, then, the problem (5.3) can be described as an optimization
problem:
maxx∈{0,1}n
{∑n
i=1 cixi∑n
i=1 xi
−
∑n
i,j=1 aijxixj
(∑ni=1 xi)2
}
.
To solve the feature selection problem 5.1, it is transformed into a mixed
0-1 linear programming problem, which is later solved by using the branch and
bound algorithm.
Next, the search strategy for obtaining relevant features and the criterion
to choose the appropriate instance of the GeFS measure are detailed:
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• Step 1 : Analyze the statistical properties of the given dataset in order to
choose the appropriate instance (CFS or mRMR) of the GeFS measure.
The criterion to choose the appropriate instance in each case is the
following: the CFS measure is chosen if the dataset has many features
that are linearly correlated to the class label and to each other. Otherwise,
the mRMR measure is selected.
In the case of web traffic, the methodology applied to implement this
step is twofold:
1. First, the corresponding subset of features is visualized in the
two-dimensional space to get a plot matrix. In the matrix, each
element represents the distribution of data points depending on,
either the values of a feature and the class label, or the values of
two features.
2. With the aim of verifying the observations from the graphics, the
next step is to calculate correlation coefficients between features.
For that, the commonly used Pearson’s correlation coefficient [Lutu,
2010] is used. These coefficients take values between -1 and 1.
According to Cohen’s criteria for interpreting correlations, values
lower than 0.1 have no practical significance [Lutu, 2010]. Then,
it is considered that there are linear correlations between features
when at least half of the coefficients are greater than 0.1 [Nguyen,
2012].
This methodology can be seen graphically in Fig. 5.3.
• Step 2 : According to the choice from Step 1, construct the optimization
problem in 5.1 for the CFS or mRMR measures. In this step, expert
knowledge can be used by assigning the value 1 to the variable if the
feature is relevant and the value 0 otherwise.
• Step 3 : Transform the optimization problem of the GeFS measure to a
mixed 0-1 linear programming (M01LP) problem, which is to be solved
by means of a branch and bound algorithm. A non-zero integer value of
xi from the optimal solution x indicates the relevance of the feature fi
regarding the GeFS measure.
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These steps are to be followed for every subset in which feature selection is
applied.
Figure 5.3 – Scheme for the selection of the appropriate instance of the
GeFS measure.
5.3.3 Classification
The intrusion detection problem has been frequently formulated as a pattern
recognition task [Nguyen, 2012]. Thus, it can be seen as a classification problem,
where the requests should be classified as normal or anomalous.
Decision tree algorithms are predictive models that can be used as classifiers.
They are very useful when massive volume of data need to be analyzed. In this
work, the classification algorithms are in charge of deciding whether to label
the incoming request as normal or anomalous. An advantage of decision trees
is that they construct human-understandable classification rules, which could
be later included in a signature-based detection system. In relation to that,
papers like [Robertson et al., 2006] and [Bolzoni and Etalle, 2008] studied how
to derive rules from an anomaly detection system.
As mentioned, four decision trees have been applied as classification
algorithms in the ML system. Following, a brief explanation of each algorithm
is presented. Further details about the algorithms can be found in [Duda et al.,
2001] and [Wu et al., 2007].
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• C4.5 was introduced by Ross Quinlan. It is an algorithm used to
generate decision trees that are built from a set of training data using the
concept of information entropy [Quinlan, 1993]. At each node of the tree,
C4.5 chooses the attribute that most effectively splits its samples into
differentiated classes. For that, the criterion is to choose the attribute
that gives the highest normalized information gain. Then the C4.5
algorithm recurs on the smaller sublists. The initial tree is pruned to
avoid overfitting. Overfitting was explained in Sec. 2.5.
• CART stands for Classification And Regression Tree. It was popularized
by Breiman et al. It is a recursive partitioning method that builds trees
for predicting continuous dependent variables (regression) and categorical
predictor variables (classification) [Breiman et al., 1984]. CART is a
non-parametric algorithm. It generates a binary decision tree that is
constructed by splitting the node that best differentiates the target
variable into two child nodes repeatedly. It starts with the root node,
that contains the whole learning sample. Important aspects of CART are
deciding when the tree is complete and assigning a class to each terminal
node.
• Random trees include the idea of selecting features randomly. This
idea was introduced independently by Ho [Ho, 1995], [Ho, 1998] and Amit
and Geman [Amit and Geman, 1997]. The implementation used in this
thesis constructs a tree that considers K randomly chosen attributes
at each node. It does not perform pruning to reduce the size of the
decision tree. According to Olaru and Wehenkel, the goal of pruning
“is to provide a good compromise between a model’s simplicity and its
predictive accuracy, by removing irrelevant parts of the model” [Olaru
and Wehenkel, 2003].
• Random forest is an ensemble classifier that consists of many decision
trees. Its output class is the mode of the class’ output by individual
trees. The algorithm for inducing a random forest was developed by
Breiman [Breiman, 2001], Cutler and Stevens [Cutler and Stevens, 2006].
Figure 5.4 shows an example of a decision tree extracted from the Weka
software [Hall et al., 2009]. It is built by the C4.5 algorithm over the
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select-n-gram-combine subset of the ECML/PKDD dataset when it is trained
with 255 requests. The values in the leafs represent the class: normal is
represented as 0 and abnormal as 1. The number in brackets mean the number
of instances that fall into that category. The tree can be interpreted as follows:
if the incoming payload contains ≤ 1 character ’(’ (attribute x85), then the
request is classified as normal. Otherwise, if it has none or one character ’)’
(attribute x83), then the request is also considered normal. If this is not the case,
it is analyzed if attribute x29 is lower or equal to 7. Attribute x29 represents
the number of keywords in the path. In that case, the request is classified as
anomalous. Otherwise, the length of the header "User-Agent" (attribute x13) is
checked to label the request. This label is anomalous if x13 ≤ 66 and normal
otherwise. As can be seen, it is easy to derive rules from a decision tree.
Figure 5.4 – Example of decision tree built with the C4.5 algoritm.
5.4 Experimental setup
This section explains the experimental setup of the experiments performed with
the ML-based WAF. First, the datasets used are explained. Then, settings
regarding the preprocessing stage are presented. At last, settings for the study
of the influence of the training requests in the detection results are given.
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5.4.1 Datasets
In this chapter, two datasets are used to experimentally evaluate the detection
algorithms: our CSIC dataset and the ECML/PKDD dataset.
The CSIC dataset was presented in Chapter 3. It was employed in the
previous chapter for evaluating stochastic algorithms. The advantage of using
this dataset for stochastic and ML algorithms is that it makes possible the
comparison of both techniques.
Additionally, the publicly available ECML/PKDD dataset is used. This
dataset was generated for the ECML/PKDD 2007 Discovery Challenge [Raïssi
et al., 2007]. It is composed of 50 000 samples, including 20% of attacks.
The dataset is divided into the training and the test sets. The training set
is employed for the experiments. Requests are labeled with specifications of
normal traffic or the following attack classes: cross-site scripting, SQL injection,
LDAP injection, XPATH Injection, path traversal, command execution and
server-side include (SSI) attacks. Although the requests of this dataset are
anonymized, we consider interesting to evaluate the system using a public
dataset.
This dataset could not be used with stochastic systems due to the
characteristics of these systems and the anonymity of the dataset. The fact
that the ECML/PKDD dataset is anonymized implies that there are not two
requests addressing the same web application. This makes the dataset unusable
for the stochastic algorithms designed in this thesis given that they use the
string corresponding to the resource as part of the detection process. The
XML file generated would be huge and there would be no repeated resources,
what does not make sense from the statistical point of view, since statistical
algorithms need a number of requests in order to obtain meaningful results.
In the case of ML, the system extracts features from the resources, that is,
they use properties of the resources, like their length, instead of the string of
the resource name itself. These characteristics make the ECML/PKDD dataset
applicable in the ML case.
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5.4.2 Preprocessing Settings
In this section, the settings for the experiments regarding the preprocessing
stage are presented.
The design mentioned in Sec. 5.3 is applied to all subsets of features: expert
knowledge, n-gram, combine-select, select-combine and select-n-gram-combine.
This section explains, for each subset, the settings related to feature extraction
and feature selection. Regarding the first step, it is explained how each technique
extracts features. For feature selection, the adequate instance of the GeFS
measure is chosen for each subset, following the criterion that was given in
Sec. 5.3.2. Additionally, it is shown how the opposite choice of the GeFS
measure would negatively affect the results.
5.4.2.1 Expert knowledge
Next, feature extraction and feature selection settings for the expert knowledge
subset are presented.
Feature extraction. By means of our expert knowledge and taking as
inspiration [Rieck, 2009], various features that are considered relevant for
web attack detection have been extracted. These 30 features are shown in
Table 5.1.
As can be seen in the table, some of the features refer to the length of different
parts of the request, since length is an important aspect to be considered in the
detection of attacks such as buffer-overflow or XSS. Other group of features
makes reference to the appearance of certain types of characters. In particular,
to the number of appearances of letters, digits and non-alphanumeric characters
in the path and argument values. Note that, differently to the stochastic case,
the appearance of these characters is not analyzed in headers. The importance
of distinguishing between these groups of characters was explained in Sec. 4.5.
Going deeper into this idea, expert feature extraction in ML distinguishes two
categories of non-alphanumeric characters, depending on whether they have a
special meaning in certain programming languages or not.
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Table 5.1 – Names of 30 expert knowledge features that are considered
relevant for the detection of web attacks for the ECML/PKDD dataset.
Feature Name Symbol
Length of the request 
Length of the path
Length of the arguments  ?
Length of the header “Accept” †
Length of the header “Accept-Encoding”
Length of the header “Accept-Charset”
Length of the header “Accept-Language”
Length of the header “Cookie”
Length of the header “Content-Length”
Length of the header “Content-Type”
Length of the Host
Length of the header “Referer”
Length of the header “User-Agent”
Method identifier
Number of arguments
Number of letters in the arguments
Number of digits in the arguments
Number of ’special’ char in the arguments •  ?
Number of other char in the arguments •  ?
Number of letters in the path
Number of digits in the path
Number of ’special’ char in the path
Number of other char in path
Number of cookies
Minimum byte value in the request 
Maximum byte value in the request
Number of distinct bytes † ?
Entropy 
Number of keywords in the path ?
Number of keywords in the arguments
The symbol • refers to features selected by the CFS for the expert knowledge subset,
 to features selected by the mRMR for the expert knowledge subset, † to the
characters selected by CFS for the combine-select subset and ? to the characters
selected by mRMR for the combine-select subset. (For the complete set of features
selected for the combine-select alternative, see also Table 5.3).
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Therefore, four kind of characters are considered for machine learning:
• Letters.
• Digits.
• Non-alphanumeric characters that have a special meaning in a set of
programming languages, SQL and Javascript in our case. This type of
characters are referred in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 as ’special’ chars.
• Other characters, i.e., non-alphanumeric characters that are not included
in the third category.
Another feature is built by studying the entropy [Shannon, 2001] of bytes
composing requests. Following the idea of Rieck, other group of features is
built by counting the appearances of certain keywords in different parts of the
request. These keywords have been previously included in a list that contains
terms with special meaning in certain programming languages that are often
used in injection attacks, like SQL and Javascript.
Feature selection. According to the methodology to choose the appropriate
instance of the GeFS measure exposed in Sec. 5.3.2, the next steps are followed:
• Firstly, features are visualized in the two-dimensional space. The resulting
graph represents the distribution of data points. All combinations have
been exhaustively studied, that is, feature vs. feature and class vs. feature,
for each feature and each class. As example, a few of these plots are
shown in Fig. 5.5. It shows the data point distribution of the expert
knowledge subset of the ECML/PKDD dataset. In the first example (a),
feature “length of the arguments” is plotted vs. feature “length of the
path”. Differently, in the second example (b), the “number of letters in
the arguments” is plotted vs. the “length of the path”. Both normal and
anomalous requests are used in the representation. These figures show
that there is a non-linear relationship between the features extracted by
means of expert knowledge.
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Table 5.2 – Names of 30 expert knowledge features that are considered
relevant for the detection of web attacks for the CSIC dataset.
Feature Name Symbol
Length of the request ± 	
Length of the path ± 	
Length of the arguments ± 	
Length of the header “Accept” ∩
Length of the header “Accept-Encoding” ∩
Length of the header “Accept-Charset” ∩
Length of the header “Accept-Language” ∩
Length of the header “Cookie” ∩
Length of the header “Content-Length” ∩
Length of the header “Content-Type”
Length of the Host ∩
Length of the header “Referer” ∩
Length of the header “User-Agent” ∩
Method identifier
Number of arguments ±
Number of letters in the arguments ± 	
Number of digits in the arguments ± 	
Number of ’special’ char in the arguments ± ∩ 	
Number of other char in the arguments
Number of letters in the path ± 	
Number of digits in the path ± ∩
Number of ’special’ char in the path ±
Number of other char in path ∩
Number of cookies ∩
Minimum byte value in the request 4
Maximum byte value in the request
Number of distinct bytes 	
Entropy ± ∩
Number of keywords in the path 	
Number of keywords in the arguments
The symbol ± refers to features selected by the CFS for the expert knowledge subset,
∩ to features selected by the mRMR for the expert knowledge subset, 4 to the
characters selected by CFS for the combine-select subset and 	 to the characters
selected by mRMR for the combine-select subset. (For the complete set of features
selected for the combine-select alternative, see also Table 5.4)
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Examples for the CSIC dataset are shown in Fig. 5.6. They show feature
“length of header ‘Accept-Encoding’ ” vs. “length of the request” and
feature “length of the arguments” vs. “length of the path”. In this case,
there are linear relationships between the features.
Figure 5.5 – Examples of the expert knowledge data point distribution
for the ECML/PKDD dataset. (a) Feature “Length of the arguments”
vs. feature “Length of the path”. (b) Feature “Number of letters in the
arguments” vs. feature “Length of the path”.
Figure 5.6 – Examples of the expert knowledge data point distribution
for the CSIC dataset. (a) Feature “Length of header ‘Accept-Encoding’ ”
vs. feature “Length of the request”. (b) Feature “Length of the arguments”
vs. feature “Length of the path”.
• In order to verify the observations from the graphics, the correlation
coefficients between the features have been calculated. For the
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ECML/PKDD dataset, more than 83% of the correlation coefficients
are lower than 0.09. According to the criterion established in step 1
of Sec. 5.3.2, that considers that there are linear correlations between
features when at least half of the coefficients are greater than 0.1, it
can be stated that in this case, non-linear relationships are the most
representative. Recall that the criterion explained in Sec. 5.3.2 establishes
that the CFS measure is chosen if the dataset has many features that
are linearly correlated to each other and mRMR, otherwise. Therefore,
in this case the mRMR measure is chosen.
In the case of the CSIC dataset, more than 63% of the correlation
coefficients are greater than 0.1, hence, the instance of the GeFS measure
chosen is CFS.
Once the instances are selected, they are applied for selecting features.
Figure 5.7 (a) represents, for the ECML/PKDD dataset, the number of features
of the full subset (subset with all features, i.e., before feature selection) and the
number of features after applying the CFS and mRMR instances. As can be
seen, the number of features is reduced by 93% with CFS and 80% with mRMR.
Although the selected instance for the ECML/PKDD dataset (mRMR) is not
the one that reduces the most the number of features, this measure is more
appropriate than CFS when detection results are also considered. It will be
further explained in Sec. 5.5. The information about which particular features
are selected by each measure can be found in Table 5.1. In the table, symbols •
and  are used to represent the selection of each instance of the GeFS measure.
The number of features before and after feature selection for the case of the
CSIC dataset is shown in Fig. 5.7 (b). The selected instance (CFS) reduces
63.3% of the features, while mRMR does it by 53.3%. In Table 5.2, symbols ±
and ∩ are used to indicate which particular features are selected by the GeFS
instances.
Note that in both Table 5.1 and Table 5.2, many features have several
symbols next to them, which means that they have been selected by different
feature selection instances and in diverse subsets. This indicates that they are
important features for detecting attacks in the studied datasets.
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Figure 5.7 – Number of features for the expert knowledge subset.
(a) For the ECML/PKDD dataset. (b) For the CSIC dataset.
5.4.2.2 N-grams
The settings regarding feature extraction and feature selection for n-grams are
explained next.
Feature extraction. For extracting features with n-grams in the ML system,
n-grams are set to n = 1. This value has been chosen since n = 1 is the simplest
case. It should be considered that in web traffic there are no long strings since
they are limited by the request length. In those cases, small values for n are
usually chosen. Although it could be expected that the results would improve
as n increases, there are papers in the literature using n-grams in HTTP
traffic which show that it is not necessarily the case, like [Song et al., 2009]
and [Perdisci et al., 2009]. Furthermore, cases with n > 1 require high cost in
time and computational complexity, what is not appropriate for algorithms
operating in real environment or scenarios with resource constraints. Therefore
cases with n > 1 have not been considered in this thesis.
Following the formula given in Sec. 2.3.1.1 for calculating the number of
n-grams, S = {n-gramsi|i = 1 . . . 28n}, the number of all possible 1-grams is
256. Recall that the ML-based system analyzes the whole request. When
analyzing the requests of the studied datasets, it was revealed that not all
1-grams were present. The result obtained was that only 96 features (37.5% of
256) appear at least once in the ECML/PKDD dataset and 114 (44.5%) in the
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case of the CSIC dataset. The features corresponding to the ECML/PKDD
dataset are listed in Table 5.3 and those corresponding to the CSIC dataset in
Table 5.4.
Table 5.3 – 96 characters appearing in the ECML/PKDD dataset at
least once.
Character Symbol Character Symbol Character Symbol Character Symbol
k ? 5 g LF • 
a ? 3 = ;
_ :  " ? I
9 0 D h
z x $ • Q
W f H E
R 4 Y .
7 , 6 q
p e r L
i b & m
@ C Space •  s ?
2 Z A u
c F v 1
y LF ? l
M j 8 n
d - • t † P
∗ K / G
V U w T
S o N J
+ • B ’ • ]
O X % • )  •
| ? ( •  \ • ? ˜
< • > [ • ! •
# • { ‘ • † }
Symbol • refers to the 15 characters selected by the CFS measure for n-grams,  to
the 5 characters selected by the mRMR measure for n-grams, † to the characters
selected by CFS for the combine-select alternative and ? to the characters selected by
mRMR for the combine-select alternative. For the complete set of features selected
for the combine-select alternative see also Table 5.1.
With the assumption that normal traffic payloads are different from attack
ones, the automatic method for extracting features from the requests is the
following: given an HTTP request req, a feature vector of req is constructed
as xreq = (x1, x2, . . . , xλ), where xi is the number of appearances of n-grami in
req and λ the number of 1-grams appearing at least once in the corresponding
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dataset. The vector constructed for every request represents the number of
appearances of the corresponding n-gram in the HTTP request. In our case,
1-grams correspond to individual characters.
Table 5.4 – 114 characters appearing in the CSIC dataset at least once.
Character Symbol Character Symbol Character Symbol Character Symbol
k J 5 g
a ∩ 3 	 = ∩ ; ± 	
: O I ± 9
0 D h z
x + ± [ B
f H E 4 ±
. 7 , 6
q ∩ p 	 e r
) L ± ∩ i 	 b
m C Space s
2 A u c
F 1 LF l
M j 8 n ∩
d ∩ 	 - ± ∩ 	 t ∩ 	 P 	
∗ K / ± G
U ( T S
o N R & ±
ñ ? 4 V y
w ó v @
á Q % ± ~
ç é ú X
W Á í #
< ± > ’ ± _
à ! " ä
ü ù ö Z
ò º À É
Í Ñ Ó è
ì ï | ± Y
$ Ú 4
Symbol ± refers to features selected by the CFS measure for the n-grams, ∩ to
features selected by the mRMR for n-grams, 4 to the characters selected by CFS
for the combine-select subset and 	 to the characters selected by mRMR for the
combine-select subset. For the complete set of features selected for the combine-select
alternative see also Table 5.2.
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Feature selection. The scheme cited in Sec. 5.3.2 has been applied for
feature selection:
• Examples of the visualization of n-gram features in the two-dimensional
space are shown in Fig. 5.8 for the ECML/PKDD dataset. Figure 5.9
shows examples for the CSIC dataset. As can be observed, there are
linear relations between the n-gram features of both datasets.
Figure 5.8 – Examples of the n-gram data point distribution of the
ECML/PKDD dataset. (a) Feature “Class label” vs. feature “Number
of appearances of character ‘a’ ”. (b) Feature “Number of appearances
of character ‘>’ ” vs. feature “Number of appearances of character ‘a’ ”.
• The study of the correlation coefficients reveals the following: more
than 52% of the correlation coefficients are greater than 0.1 for the
ECML/PKDD dataset. According to the criterion explained before, it
means that there are linear relationships, and then, the selected measure
for the n-gram subset is CFS . For the CSIC dataset, 57% of the coefficients
are higher than 0.1, hence, CFS is selected. This confirms the observations
from the graphs.
Figure 5.10 (a) shows the number of features for the full-set of the
ECML/PKDD dataset and the number of features after feature selection.
It can be seen that CFS reduces 84% (from 96 to 15) of the irrelevant or
redundant features for detecting web attacks, while mRMR reduces 95%
of them.
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Figure 5.9 – Examples of the n-gram data point distribution of the
CSIC dataset. (a) Feature “Number of appearances of character ‘5’ ” vs.
feature “Number of appearances of character ‘k’ ”. (b) Feature “Number
of appearances of character ‘O’ ” vs. feature “Number of appearances of
character ‘a’ ”.
In the case of the CSIC dataset, the reduction is represented in
Fig. 5.10 (b), where the mRMR instance reduces the number of features
almost by 93%, while CFS does it by 89.5%.
The specific features selected by each GeFS instance can be observed
in Table 5.3 for the ECML/PKDD dataset (represented with symbols •
and ), and in Table 5.4 for the CSIC dataset (symbolized by ± and ∩).
It is remarkable that, indeed, some of the 1-grams selected are critical
for the detection of web attacks. For instance the quotation mark (’)
is included in many SQL injection attacks, characters ‘<’ and ‘>’ are
typically appearing in scripts such as the ones used in XSS attacks, and
‘%’ has a special meaning in SQL or shell script.
5.4.2.3 Combination
Next, settings for the combination cases are shown.
Feature extraction. After selecting the appropriate feature selection
instance for the expert knowledge and n-gram subsets of features, the exact
number of features of the three combination subsets can be specified:
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Figure 5.10 – Number of features for the n-gram subset.
(a) For the ECML/PKDD dataset. (b) For the CSIC dataset.
• Combine-select. In the case of the ECML/PKDD dataset, the resulting
subset of the combine-select alternative is composed of 126 features
in total, corresponding to the combination of 30 features from expert
knowledge and 96 features from n-grams. For the CSIC dataset, the
subset is composed of 30 features from expert knowledge and 114 features
from n-grams, resulting in a total of 144 features. The process of feature
selection applied to these subsets is later explained in this section.
• Select-combine. Recall that this alternative applies first feature selection
and then combines the features. There are four options for generating
the subsets of features, corresponding to the two instances of the GeFS
measure (CFS and mRMR) for selecting features from expert knowledge
and n-grams. The reasonable subset to be constructed is the one composed
of the features selected by the appropriate instances of the GeFS measure.
Then, for the ECML/PKDD dataset the subset is the one constituted by
15 n-gram features (selected by CFS) plus 6 expert knowledge features
(selected by mRMR). For the CSIC dataset, it is formed by 11 expert
knowledge features (selected by CFS) and 12 n-gram features (selected by
CFS). These subsets are called mRMR+CFS and CFS+CFS due to the
selected instances respectively. Additionally, another subset with features
selected by the non-chosen GeFS instance is also shown in the Results
section (Sec. 5.5), with the purpose to see how the opposite choice of
feature selection methods would negatively affect the detection. Therefore,
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the new subset mRMR+mRMR is added to the previous subsets. This
subset is composed of 11 features (6 + 5) in the case of the ECML/PKDD
dataset and 22 (14 + 8) in the case of the CSIC one. Since the features
that compose these two subsets are already selected, it is not necessary
to apply feature selection again.
• Select-n-gram-combine. As only n-grams are selected with this alternative,
there are two possible subsets to be considered, corresponding to the
two GeFS instances possible for the expert knowledge subset. These
two subsets are called expert+CFS and expert+mRMR. In this case,
since both datasets use the CFS instance for n-grams, the subset chosen
for the experiments is expert+CFS. The results are also shown for the
expert+mRMR subset.
As a summary, Table 5.5 shows the structure of the subsets corresponding
to each combination alternative for the ECML/PKDD dataset. An equivalent
table is shown in Table 5.6 for the CSIC dataset. The number of features of
the combine-select subset corresponds to the full subset, that is, before feature
selection. Next section explains the subset after feature selection.
Table 5.5 – Description of the subsets corresponding to each combination
alternative for the ECML/PKDD dataset.
Alternative Subset Name Expert Knowledge N -gram Total NumberFeatures Features of Features
Combine-select Combine-select 30 96 126
Select-combine mRMR+CFS 6 (mRMR) 15 (CFS) 21mRMR+mRMR 6 (mRMR) 5 (mRMR) 11
Select-n-gram-combine Expert+CFS 30 15 (CFS) 45Expert+mRMR 30 5 (mRMR) 35
Feature selection. In the case of the combination subsets, feature selection
is applied after feature extraction only in the case of the combine-select subset.
The statistical properties of the select-combine and select-n-gram-combine
subsets are not necessary to be studied given that the features in these subsets
have been already selected in the basic cases.
Since the combine-select subset contains a higher amount of features and
they have manual and automatic nature, it is specially useful to apply feature
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Table 5.6 – Description of the subsets corresponding to each combination
alternative for the CSIC dataset.
Alternative Subset Name Expert Knowledge N -gram Total NumberFeatures Features of Features
Combine-select Combine-select 30 114 144
Select-combine CFS+CFS 11 (CFS) 12 (CFS) 23mRMR+mRMR 14 (mRMR) 8 (mRMR) 22
Select-n-gram-combine Expert+CFS 30 12 (CFS) 42Expert+mRMR 30 8 (mRMR) 38
selection in this case, in order to reduce the number of redundant and irrelevant
features. The instance of the GeFS measure is selected as follows:
• Two examples of the data point distribution of the combine-select subset
for the ECML/PKDD dataset are represented in Fig. 5.11. They show that
there are not linear relationships between features. The examples for the
CSIC dataset, represented in Fig. 5.12, also show no linear relationships.
Figure 5.11 – Examples of the combine-select data point distribution
of the ECML/PKDD dataset. (a) Feature “Number of digits in the
path” vs. feature “Length of the header ‘Accept-Charset’ ”. (b) Feature
“Length of the header ‘Accept-Language”’ vs. feature “Length of the
header ‘Accept-Charset’ ”.
• The analysis of the correlation coefficients corresponding to the
combine-select subset confirms the observations of the graphs. For the
ECML/PKDD dataset, more than 76% of the coefficients are lower than
0.09, what means that there are non-linear relations between the features
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Figure 5.12 – Examples of the combine-select data point distribution of
the CSIC dataset. (a) Feature “Number of special char in the arguments”
vs. feature “Length of the request ”. (b) Feature “Number of special char
in the arguments”’ vs. feature “Number of letters in the arguments”) of
the CSIC dataset.
of this subset. Therefore, the mRMR measure is the convenient one for
this case. In the case of the CSIC dataset, 66% of the coefficients are
lower than 0.09, then the mRMR measure is also chosen in this case.
After selecting the corresponding instance of the GeFS measure, it is applied
for selecting features in the combine-select subset. For the ECML/PKDD
dataset, Fig. 5.13 (a) shows the number of features of the full subset and for
the subsets after feature selection. Although the instance selected in this case
is mRMR, both instances are shown for comparison. The reduction in the
number of features for the combine-select subset rises up to 91.27% for the
mRMR instance and to 96.83% for CFS .
The corresponding graph for the CSIC dataset is represented in Fig. 5.13 (b).
The reduction is 97.92% for CFS and 88.2% for mRMR. mRMR is the selected
instance. Although it is not the instance that reduces the most the number of
features, it can lead to better detection results, as will be seen in Sec. 5.5.
The features selected from the combine-select subset of the ECML/PKDD
dataset are represented in Table 5.1 and Table 5.3. Symbol † is used for CFS
and ? for mRMR. For the CSIC dataset, symbols4 and 	 are used in Table 5.2
and Table 5.4 to represent the selected features. Note that, for both datasets,
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Figure 5.13 – Number of features for the combine-select subset.
(a) For the ECML/PKDD dataset. (b) For the CSIC dataset.
many features selected by the CFS and mRMR measures are the same in the
case of expert knowledge, n-grams as well as in the select-combine case, what
indicates that these features are significant for the detection of web attacks.
The number of features of the select-combine and select-n-gram-combine
subsets of the ECML/PKDD and CSIC datasets can be seen in Fig. 5.14 (a)
and (b) respectively.
Figure 5.14 – Number of features of the select-combine and
select-n-gram-combine subsets. (a) For the ECML/PKDD dataset.
(b) For the CSIC dataset.
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In summary, Table 5.7 shows the GeFS instances chosen for every subset
of the ECML/PKDD and CSIC datasets. As can be seen, the appropriate
instances of the GeFS measure are the same chosen for both datasets in all
cases, except for the expert knowledge subset.
Table 5.7 – GeFS instance chosen for each subset of the ECML/PKDD
and CSIC datasets.
Subset GeFS instance
ECML/PKDD CSIC
Expert Knowledge mRMR CFS
n-gram CFS CFS
Combine-select mRMR mRMR
Select-combine Nothing Nothing
Select-n-gram-combine Nothing Nothing
5.4.2.4 Classification algorithms
As mentioned, the experiments are carried out with the four decision trees: C4.5,
CART, Random Tree and Random Forest. These algorithms are described
in Sec. 5.3.3. These algorithms receive as input the subsets of features. In
particular, they are applied to analyze all subsets of features (expert knowledge,
n-gram, combine-select, select-combine and select-n-gram-combine), both before
and after feature selection.
Decision trees have two stages: training and test. In the training phase,
normal and anomalous requests feed the algorithm to obtain a model that
classifies the traffic. In the test phase the knowledge previously learned is
used to check how well the algorithm detects, i.e, if the requests are correctly
classified as normal or anomalous.
The implementation of decision trees used are those provided by the Weka
software (University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand) [Hall et al., 2009].
Cross validation is a validation technique for assessing how the results of the
algorithm will generalize to another data set. In N -fold cross validation, the
dataset is divided into N equally sized subsets. It is run N times. In each of
them, one of the subsets is used for testing and the remaining N − 1 are used
for training the algorithm. The results are averaged and standard deviation
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is calculated [Kubat, 2015]. The use of cross validation allows to obtain more
reliable results. In our case, experiments are conducted with 10-fold cross
validation. According to Kohavi, 10-fold stratified cross validation is an optimal
method for real world datasets [Kohavi, 1995]. The remaining setting values
used are those set by default in the Weka software.
5.4.3 Settings for the study of the influence of training
requests in the detection results
As mentioned, decision trees have a training and a test phase. For this kind of
algorithms, both normal and anomalous requests are used to train the system.
In this way, the algorithm can learn how to classify the instances (two-class
detection: normal and anomalous). Both types of traffic are also used in the
test period.
In order to study how the number of training requests influences the
performance of the system, once all the previous subsets of features are evaluated,
the one that reaches the best results is chosen for the study of how the number
of requests influences the algorithm’s detection results.
For that, a number ofM = 15 experiments is run, with an increasing number
of requests per experiment. Like in the stochastic case, the number of training
requests used in each experiment is given by the formula tri = 2i − 1,∀i ∈ [1,M ].
In each experiment, the system is firstly trained with tri requests randomly
chosen, and then, it is tested with a fixed subset of requests. This fixed subset
is composed of te normal request plus te anomalous requests, with te = 1000.
The M experiments are run H = 10 times. Each time, different possibilities for
choosing tri requests are analyzed. Running the experiments multiple times
helps to truly reflect the behavior of the WAF, independently of which training
requests are chosen. Randomness has been picked for request sampling since it
is not possible to know in advance which type of attack the system is going to
receive. The next section shows the results obtained from the experiments.
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5.5 Results
This section shows, on the one hand, the results of the different subsets, in
order to determine the effectiveness of the combined methods proposed. On
the other hand, the results of the study about the influence of the number of
training requests in the detection capacity of the WAF are presented.
5.5.1 Results of the subsets
With the purpose of validating whether the proposed combined feature
extraction methods are more effective than individual techniques, the results
corresponding to the two basic cases are shown first, and then, those
corresponding to the three combination alternatives. Detection results are
presented in terms of DR and FPR. Additionally, the number of features used
by each technique and its processing time are also included. The number of
features used gives a measure of the resource consumption. The achieved results
are measured by means of detection rate and false positive rate.
5.5.1.1 Expert knowledge
Regarding expert knowledge, Table 5.8 shows the detection results of the four
classification algorithms for the ECML/PKDD dataset. The rows show the
results for the different decision trees used and, finally, the average value. The
column full-set shows the results before feature selection and the CFS and
mRMR columns correspond to the results after feature selection. In the table,
the selected GeFS instance is highlighted with bold letters (mRMR in the case
of expert knowledge).
When considering also the number of features, shown in Fig. 5.7 (a), it is
noticeable that the GeFS measure greatly reduces the number of features, while
it keeps almost the same detection results. Although CFS reduces the number
of features (from 30 to 2) more than mRMR (from 30 to 6), its detection results
are worse, with lower DR (89.1% vs. 91.22%) and higher FPR (23.18% vs.
15.3%). This fact shows that the method used to choose the proper instance of
the GeFS leads to select the instance that reaches better results, although it
might not be the one that selects a lower amount of features. Note that the
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Table 5.8 – Detection rate and false positive rate of four decision trees
performed on the expert knowledge subset of the ECML/PKDD dataset.
Classifiers Detection Rate (%) False Positive Rate (%)
Full-set CFS mRMR Full-set CFS mRMR
C4.5 95.42 89.07 92.30 7.8 23.2 15.1
CART 95.51 89.12 92.23 7.9 23.1 14.7
Random Tree 92.43 89.11 88.81 10.6 23.2 16.3
Random Forest 95.80 89.10 91.53 8.1 23.2 15.1
Average 94.79 89.10 91.22 8.6 23.18 15.3
Bold letters are used to highlight the selected subset, corresponding to the chosen
GeFS instance.
goal of reducing the number of features and improving the detection results are
contradictory, therefore, a tradeoff should be made. Feature selection attempts
to reduce the number of features without negatively affecting the detection
results.
This reduction in the number of features also implies a decrease in the
processing time measurements of the system. Table 5.9 shows the processing
time values associated to the results presented in Table 5.8. The third column
shows the difference in ms/request between the first and second column,
that is, before and after feature selection. The fourth column represents
the improvement percentage that this difference represents. Note that the
average improvement is calculated as the percentage that the average difference
represents, not as the average of the four values in the improvement column.
The average difference is calculated as the difference between the average
values of the first and second columns. It can be seen that feature selection
signifies an average reduction of 67.33% in the processing time (from 1.01
ms/request to 0.33 ms/request). All processing time measurements have been
obtained with an Intel core i7 CPU at 2.40 GHz and 8GB RAM, SO Windows 8,
64 bits. Processing times should be taken as approximate values, as other
factors could have interfered in the measurements, such as other tasks running
in the operating system or memory availability.
Results for expert knowledge over the CSIC dataset are shown in Table 5.10.
As opposed to the ECML/PKDD dataset, the instance chosen for the CSIC
dataset is CFS, which is highlighted in bold type. In this case, Fig. 5.7 (b)
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Table 5.9 – Processing time and improvement for the expert knowledge
subset of the ECML/PKDD dataset.
Classifiers Processing Time (ms/req.) Improvement
Full-set mRMR Difference Improvement(%)
C4.5 2.12 0.24 1.88 88.68
CART 0.64 0.13 0.51 79.69
Random Tree 0.22 0.12 0.10 45.45
Random Forest 1.07 0.84 0.23 21.50
Average 1.01 0.33 0.68 67.33
shows that CFS is the instance that reduces the most the number of features
(it uses 11 features) and also the instance that gets better results (93.55%
detection rate vs. 75.5% for mRMR).
Table 5.10 – Detection rate and false positive rate of four decision trees
performed on the expert knowledge subset of the CSIC dataset.
Classifiers Detection Rate (%) False Positive Rate (%)
Full-set CFS mRMR Full-set CFS mRMR
C4.5 94.98 94.07 79.8 5.3 6.8 25.7
CART 94.31 93.72 79.86 7.0 6.8 25.3
Random Tree 92.76 92.71 71.36 7.7 7.8 30.6
Random Forest 93.93 93.69 71.70 6.0 7.2 30.5
Average 93.99 93.55 75.5 6.5 7.15 28.02
As Table 5.11 shows, in this case the average improvement in the processing
time is 43.18%.
5.5.1.2 N-grams
Table 5.12 summarizes the performance of the four decision trees over the
n-gram subset of the ECML/PKDD dataset. The results confirm that the
selection of the GeFS instance leads to better results. In this case it is CFS,
that is highlighted in bold letters in the table. It can be observed that when
the instance is chosen differently to the linear correlation criterion explained
in Sec. 5.3.2, the results are negatively affected. This shows the importance
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Table 5.11 – Processing time and improvement for the expert knowledge
subset of the CSIC dataset.
Classifiers Processing Time (ms/req.) Improvement
Full-set CFS Difference Improvement(%)
C4.5 1.22 0.42 0.80 65.57
CART 0.52 0.25 0.27 51.92
Random Tree 0.16 0.13 0.03 18.75
Random Forest 1.61 1.21 0.40 24.84
Average 0.88 0.50 0.38 43.18
of the proper selection of the GeFS instance. Considering the number of
features in Fig. 5.10 (a), as well as the detection results in Table 5.12, it can be
observed that besides reducing the number of features from 96 to 15, the CFS
measure is even able to improve the detection results (from 92.99% to 93.47%).
Furthermore, the GeFS measure is able to reduce the resource consumption.
This can be appreciated in Table 5.13, that shows an average improvement of
90.82% in the processing time after applying feature selection.
Table 5.12 – Detection rate and false positive rate of four decision trees
performed on the n-gram subset of the ECML/PKDD dataset.
Classifiers Detection Rate (%) False Positive Rate (%)
Full-set CFS mRMR Full-set CFS mRMR
C4.5 94.12 94.12 89.95 9.2 10.4 18.7
CART 94.92 94.16 90.03 8.7 10.2 18.3
Random Tree 88.55 91.90 88.73 15.7 11.9 22.0
Random Forest 94.41 93.70 89.12 11.0 10.7 20.7
Average 92.99 93.47 89.45 11.15 10.8 19.9
For the CSIC dataset, the instance of the GeFS measure chosen is also
CFS. Considering the number of features in Fig. 5.10 (b) and the results in
Table 5.14, it can be seen that, in this case, the feature selection measure
is able to reduce the number of features by 84%, at the expense of reducing
the detection rate by 2.16% (from 84.59% to 82.43%). Table 5.15 shows that
the processing time improvement for the n-gram subset of the CSIC dataset
ascends to 85.48% in average.
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Table 5.13 – Processing time and improvement for the n-gram subset
of the ECML/PKDD dataset.
Classifiers Processing Time (ms/req.) Improvement
Full-set CFS Difference Improvement(%)
C4.5 9.0 1.05 7.95 88.33
CART 8.73 0.38 8.35 95.65
Random Tree 0.36 0.25 0.11 30.56
Random Forest 2.39 0.21 2.18 91.21
Average 5.12 0.47 4.65 90.82
Table 5.14 – Detection rate and false positive rate of four decision trees
performed on the n-gram subset of the CSIC dataset.
Classifiers Detection Rate (%) False Positive Rate (%)
Full-set CFS mRMR Full-set CFS mRMR
C4.5 84.61 82.45 76.77 16.8 24.4 25.6
CART 85.74 82.54 77.63 17.2 23.9 26.0
Random Tree 81.93 82.34 78.39 19.3 23.7 25.5
Random Forest 86.09 82.39 78.61 17.1 23.4 25.1
Average 84.59 82.43 77.85 17.6 23.85 25.55
5.5.1.3 Combination cases
In this section, the results corresponding to the three combination alternatives
are shown.
• Combine-select. The results of this subset for the ECML/PKDD dataset
are shown in Table 5.16. As expected, it is confirmed that the GeFS
instance chosen (mRMR) gets the best results. It reduces the number
of features from 126 to 11, as can be seen in Fig. 5.13 (a), while the
detection results vary from 96.13% to 91.38%, as Table 5.16 shows. This
GeFS instance gets an average improvement of the processing time of
40%, as can be seen in Table 5.17.
Like for the ECML/PKDD dataset, the appropriate GeFS instance for
the CSIC dataset is mRMR. The detection results obtained before and
after applying this instance are shown in Table 5.18. The number of
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Table 5.15 – Processing time and improvement for the n-gram subset
of the CSIC dataset.
Classifiers Processing Time (ms/req.) Improvement
Full-set CFS Difference Improvement(%)
C4.5 9.26 0.60 8.66 93.52
CART 4.80 0.24 4.56 95
Random Tree 0.29 0.15 0.14 48.28
Random Forest 2.72 1.5 1.22 44.85
Average 4.27 0.62 3.65 85.48
Table 5.16 – Detection rate and false positive rate of four decision trees
performed on the combine-select subset of the ECML/PKDD dataset.
Classifiers Detection Rate (%) False Positive Rate (%)
Full-set CFS mRMR Full-set CFS mRMR
C4.5 97.34 76.06 92.42 4.0 46.4 14.2
CART 97.41 76.10 92.52 4.2 46.2 14.3
Random Tree 92.78 72.52 88.18 10.0 48.9 15.9
Random Forest 96.98 72.32 92.41 5.6 47.3 14.5
Average 96.13 74.25 91.38 5.95 47.2 14.72
features can be seen in Fig. 5.13 (b). In this case, besides reducing the
number of features from 144 to 17, the feature selection algorithm is also
able to increase the detection rate, from 92.69% to 93.61%. Therefore,
in comparison with the full set of features, it improves the resource
consumption and the detection results at the same time. This fact shows
that a lower number of features does not necessary mean to obtain worse
results. Regarding the processing time, Table 5.19 shows that the mRMR
measure is able to reduce it by 28.28%.
• Select-combine. In relation to this alternative, the results of the subsets
mRMR+CFS and mRMR+mRMR corresponding to the ECML/PKDD
dataset are shown in Table 5.20. Recall that the mRMR+CFS subset
(highlighted with bold letters in the table) is created with the features
selected by the appropriate instances of the GeFS measure. The
mRMR+mRMR subset is created for the sake of comparison, choosing
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Table 5.17 – Processing time and improvement for the combine-select
subset of the ECML/PKDD dataset.
Classifiers Processing Time (ms/req.) Improvement
Full-set mRMR Difference Improvement(%)
C4.5 0.87 0.60 0.27 31.03
CART 0.62 0.22 0.40 64.52
Random Tree 0.16 0.10 0.06 37.5
Random Forest 1.56 0.99 0.57 36.54
Average 0.80 0.48 0.32 40
Table 5.18 – Detection rate and false positive rate of four decision trees
performed on the combine-select subset of the CSIC dataset.
Classifiers Detection Rate (%) False Positive Rate (%)
Full-set CFS mRMR Full-set CFS mRMR
C4.5 95.06 63.73 93.89 5.3 39.1 6.5
CART 94.20 63.74 94.05 6.6 39.2 6.4
Random Tree 88.62 63.75 92.61 12.1 39.3 7.9
Random Forest 92.87 63.75 93.89 8.7 39.3 7.1
Average 92.69 63.74 93.61 8.18 39.23 6.98
Table 5.19 – Processing time and improvement for the combine-select
subset of the CSIC dataset.
Classifiers Processing Time (ms/req.) Improvement
Full-set mRMR Difference Improvement(%)
C4.5 1.62 0.70 0.92 56.79
CART 0.57 0.37 0.20 35.09
Random Tree 0.16 0.11 0.05 31.25
Random Forest 1.60 1.07 0.53 33.13
Average 0.99 0.71 0.28 28.28
purposely the opposite GeFS instance to see how this fact influences the
results. In fact, as expected, the results reflect that the mRMR+CFS
subset gets a detection rate of 96.88% while the mRMR+mRMR subset
achieves 93.71%. These subsets contain 21 and 11 features respectively.
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Table 5.20 – Detection rate and false positive rate of four decision trees
performed on the select-combine subsets of the ECML/PKDD dataset.
Classifiers Detection Rate (%) False Positive Rate (%)
mRMR+CFS mRMR+mRMR mRMR+CFS mRMR+mRMR
C4.5 97.09 94.52 4.8 10.2
CART 96.94 94.55 4.9 10.1
Random Tree 95.81 91.45 5.8 11.6
Random Forest 97.56 94.34 4.4 10.3
Average 96.88 93.71 4.98 10.55
In the case of the CSIC dataset, as the instances of the GeFS
measure chosen are different, the subsets created are CFS+CFS and
mRMR+mRMR. The first subset has 23 features and the second one,
created for comparison, contains 22. As can be seen in Table 5.21,
the CFS+CFS subset gets a DR of 94.07%, while mRMR+mRMR gets
82.74%, due to the selection of the opposite GeFS instance.
Table 5.21 – Detection rate and false positive rate of four decision trees
performed on the select-combine subsets of the CSIC dataset.
Classifiers Detection Rate (%) False Positive Rate (%)
CFS+CFS mRMR+mRMR CFS+CFS mRMR+mRMR
C4.5 94.5 84.40 6.0 20.4
CART 94.25 84.55 6.3 20.1
Random Tree 93.23 80.43 7.2 20.8
Random Forest 94.29 81.57 6.7 20.3
Average 94.07 82.74 6.55 20.4
• Select-n-gram-combine. The results for this alternative are shown in
Table 5.22 for the ECML/PKDD dataset and, in Table 5.23, for the CSIC
dataset.
In both cases the subsets created are called expert+CFS and
expert+mRMR. Again, the performance of the last subset is shown for
comparison. In the case of the ECML/PKDD dataset, the subsets
have 45 and 35 features respectively, achieving 97.18% and 96.35%
detection rates. In relation to processing time, as in the case of the
select-combine alternative the features are already selected, it is not
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Table 5.22 – Detection rate and false positive rate of four decision trees
performed on the select-n-gram-combine subsets of the ECML/PKDD
dataset.
Classifiers Detection Rate (%) False Positive Rate (%)
Expert+CFS Expert+mRMR Expert+CFS Expert+mRMR
C4.5 97.63 96.69 3.8 5.3
CART 97.58 96.82 4.0 5.0
Random Tree 95.69 94.74 5.9 7.4
Random Forest 97.84 97.16 3.8 4.8
Average 97.18 96.35 4.38 5.63
Table 5.23 – Detection rate and false positive rate of four decision trees
performed on the select-n-gram-combine subsets of the CSIC dataset.
Classifiers Detection Rate (%) False Positive Rate (%)
Expert+CFS Expert+mRMR Expert+CFS Expert+mRMR
C4.5 95.25 94.36 5.1 5.9
CART 94.78 94.26 5.6 6.0
Random Tree 93.12 92.45 7.4 8.0
Random Forest 94.47 93.91 6.6 7.1
Average 94.41 93.75 6.18 6.75
possible to calculate the percentage of improvement before and after
feature selection. Table 5.24 is presented to show the processing times
of the four decision trees for the three combination alternatives for the
ECML/PKDD dataset.
Results for the CSIC dataset show the same trend, obtaining better
detection results for the expert+CFS subset (94.41% vs. 93.75%). The
processing time corresponding to the three combination alternatives for
the CSIC dataset are shown in Table 5.25.
5.5.2 Study of the influence of the training requests in
the detection results
In this section, the influence of the number of training requests over the
detection results of the system is analyzed. According to the results presented
in the previous section, the select-n-gram-combine subset is the one that reaches
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Table 5.24 – Processing time for the three combination subsets of the
ECML/PKDD dataset.
Classifiers Processing Time (ms/req.)
Combine-select Select-combine Select-n-gram-combine
C4.5 0.60 1.58 3.73
CART 0.22 0.67 1.84
Random Tree 0.10 0.15 0.30
Random Forest 0.99 1.34 2.82
Average 0.48 0.94 2.17
Table 5.25 – Processing time for the three combination subsets of the
CSIC dataset.
Classifiers Processing Time (ms/req.)
Combine-select Select-combine Select-n-gram-combine
C4.5 0.70 1.33 2.63
CART 0.37 0.41 0.84
Random Tree 0.16 0.18 0.24
Random Forest 1.60 0.19 2.24
Average 0.71 0.53 1.49
the highest detection rate. Therefore, this is the subset chosen for studying the
variability of the results depending on the number of training requests.
The results of the experiments are given by calculating the mean and the
standard deviation of the H runs for every decision tree. The mean DR results
for each particular decision tree can be seen in Fig. 5.15, that represents the
influence of the number of training requests on the DR for the ECML/PKDD
dataset.
Similarly, Fig. 5.16 represents the mean DR in relation to the different
number of training requests. It corresponds to the classification of the CSIC
dataset performed by the four decision trees.
Additionally, for each run, the mean of the results produced by the four
applied decision trees are calculated. The results of the system for the
ECML/PKDD dataset are shown in Table 5.26. For each iteration, it contains
the number of training requests, and the mean (µ) and standard deviation (σ)
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Figure 5.15 – Study of the influence of the number of requests on the
detection results of four decision trees. ECML/PKDD dataset. The
detection rate is plotted vs. the number of training requests.
Figure 5.16 – Study of the influence of the number of requests on the
detection results of four decision trees. CSIC dataset. The detection
rate is plotted vs. the number of training requests.
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of the DR, FPR and processing time. The equivalent results for the CSIC
dataset are presented in Table 5.27.
Although other tables have been shown previously in relation to processing
times, we decided to take as reference those contained in Table 5.26 and
Table 5.27, since those values are obtained consideringH runs and are calculated
for different amounts of training requests.
Table 5.26 – Detection results and processing time for the ECML/PKDD
dataset.
Iteration Num. Training DR (%) FPR (%) Processing Time
Requests (ms/request)
µ σ µ σ µ σ
1 1 50.0 0 50.0 0 1000 0
2 3 53.0 2.32 47.0 2.33 333.3 0.16
3 7 57.8 3.45 42.3 3.14 142.8 0.12
4 15 63.9 2.51 36.2 2.50 66.6 0
5 31 66.7 2.67 33.4 2.28 32.2 0
6 63 70.0 2.80 30.0 2.60 15.9 0.35
7 127 74.0 2.60 26.0 2.52 7.9 0.12
8 255 76.0 2.80 24.0 2.85 3.9 0
9 511 79.8 3.02 20.2 2.72 1.9 0
10 1023 83.6 2.88 16.4 2.56 1.0 0
11 2047 86.2 2.76 13.8 2.26 0.5 0.24
12 4095 91.7 1.10 8.6 1.01 0.2 0.35
13 8191 94.4 0.91 5.6 0.91 0.2 0.24
14 16 383 97.8 0.28 2.2 0.27 0.5 0.30
15 32 767 97.7 0 2.3 0 1.0 0.50
These results are discussed in the next section.
5.6 Discussion
This section discusses several aspects about the results previously presented:
first, basic cases are compared to each other. Then, results of basic cases are
compared with those of combination alternatives, to check if the proposed
combinations outperform the basic cases separately. A comparison of the three
alternatives is also shown, to conclude which of them is the most appropriate in
a given scenario. Additionally, decision trees are analyzed and a comparison of
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Table 5.27 – Detection results and processing time for the CSIC dataset.
Iteration Num. Training DR (%) FPR (%) Processing Time
Requests (ms/request)
µ σ µ σ µ σ
1 1 50.0 0 50.0 0 1000 0
2 3 52.9 2.57 47.1 2.57 333.3 0
3 7 56.2 2.33 43.8 2.93 142.8 0
4 15 61.2 3.04 38.8 2.54 66.6 0
5 31 63.5 2.51 36.7 2.86 32.2 0
6 63 66.1 2.94 34.0 2.53 15.9 0
7 127 72.3 2.88 27.7 1.87 7.9 0
8 255 77.8 2.52 22.3 1.53 3.9 0
9 511 80.3 2.68 19.8 1.67 1.9 0
10 1023 82.7 2.56 17.3 1.75 1.0 0.14
11 2047 88.1 1.29 12.0 1.83 0.5 0.35
12 4095 88.7 0.74 11.3 0.44 0.3 0.35
13 8191 90.8 0.56 9.2 0.35 0.3 0.35
14 16 383 91.7 0.37 8.4 0.26 0.4 0.35
15 32 767 95.1 0.22 4.9 0.13 0.7 0.14
both datasets is given. Furthermore, in this section, the results of the stochastic
systems presented in the previous chapter and the results of the ML system
are compared.
In this discussion, the number of features, processing time and detection
performance are considered a criteria for evaluating the results achieved by
each alternative. The mean values of DR, FPR and processing time are used
for comparisons, that is, standard deviation is not considered. For simplicity,
in some comparisons only the detection rate values are cited, but, in general,
the same comments also apply to the false positive rate.
The results for both the ECML/PKDD and CSIC datasets are included
in order to obtain a more solid comparison, i.e., to avoid that conclusions are
biased by the dataset used.
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5.6.1 Comparison between basic cases
In this section, the results obtained with expert knowledge are compared to
those obtained with n-grams. Results are compared in terms of detection
results, number of features and processing time.
Table 5.28 presents the results corresponding to the subsets of the
ECML/PKDD dataset, both before feature selection (full subset) and after
(CFS or mRMR as corresponds). The selected instance of the GeFS measure
is highlighted in bold letters. The table shows that before feature selection,
expert knowledge reaches a higher detection rate and uses a lower number of
features than n-grams. Then, expert knowledge is clearly more reliable than
n-grams before feature selection.
Table 5.28 – Comparison between basic cases. ECML/PKDD dataset.
Subset/ Expert Knowledge N -gram
Alternatives
DR (%) NF P. Time DR (%) NF P. Time
Full subset 94.79 30 1.01 92.99 96 5.12
CFS 89.10 2 0.15 93.47 15 0.47
mRMR 91.22 6 0.33 89.45 5 0.33
DR stands for detection rate, NF for number of features and P. Time for processing
time. Processing time is measured in ms/request. The selected instance of the GeFS
measure is highlighted in bold letters.
The results after feature selection are compared according to the selected
instance in each case, i.e., mRMR for expert knowledge and CFS for n-grams.
Regarding the detection rate, n-grams get better results than expert knowledge
(91.22% vs. 93.47%). Additionally, n-grams use a higher number of features.
When the number of features is higher the processing time increases as well.
In this case, it is not clear which feature extraction method is better. Thus it
depends on which criterion is the most important for the given scenario, either
increasing detection results or reducing the resource consumption.
The results for the CSIC dataset are analyzed in Table 5.29. In this case,
it is clear that expert knowledge is better than n-grams, given that before and
after feature selection expert knowledge reaches higher detection rates with a
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lower number of features. Additionally, the processing time is lower. Given the
results, it can be said that, in general, expert knowledge is able to distinguish
better between attacks and normal traffic than n-grams.
Table 5.29 – Comparison between basic cases. CSIC dataset.
Subset/ Expert Knowledge N -gram
Alternatives
DR (%) NF P. Time DR (%) NF P. Time
Full subset 93.99 30 0.88 89.59 114 4.27
CFS 93.55 11 0.50 82.43 12 0.62
mRMR 75.50 14 0.97 77.85 8 0.56
5.6.2 Combination alternatives vs. basic cases
In this section, every combination alternative is compared to both basic cases.
• Combine-select. Table 5.30 presents the results for the combine-select
subset for the ECML/PKDD dataset. Results for the basic cases are also
shown in order to facilitate the comparison.
Table 5.30 – Comparison of combine-select with basic cases.
ECML/PKDD dataset.
Subset/ Expert Knowledge N -gram Combine-select
Alternatives
DR (%) NF P. Time DR (%) NF P. Time DR (%) NF P. Time
Full subset 94.79 30 1.01 92.99 96 5.12 96.13 126 0.80
CFS 89.10 2 0.15 93.47 15 0.47 74.25 4 0.30
mRMR 91.22 6 0.33 89.45 5 0.33 91.38 11 0.48
Before feature selection, combine-select achieves better results than both
basic cases (96.13% vs. 94.79% and 92.99%) by using a higher number
of features (126 features vs. 30 and 96). After feature selection, it
gets better results than expert knowledge (91.38% vs. 91.22%), but not
than n-grams (91.38% vs. 93.47%). Note that the results are compared
according to the selected instance of the GeFS measure for each case.
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The combination uses more features than expert knowledge (11 vs. 6)
and it requires more processing time, while it uses less features than
n-grams (11 vs. 15) and spends almost the same processing time than
n-grams. The results show that the trend is: the higher the number of
features, the better the detection results. This is not necessarily obvious
given that, if the features added are highly correlated to the existing
ones, they might not provide new information and their results might
not improve. This fact indicates that the methods proposed in this thesis
extract features that are quite independent from each other and they
provide useful information to distinguish normal requests from attacks.
In general, the higher the number of requests, the higher the processing
time, although not always there is a linear relation between them.
In the case of the CSIC dataset, Table 5.31 shows that in this case the
combination does not improve the results of both basic subsets before
feature selection (92.69% vs. 93.99% and 84.59%), but it does after
applying GeFS (93.61% vs. 93.55% and 82.43%). For the full subset, the
combination significantly improves the performance of n-grams by using
more features. The number of features after feature selection is 17 for the
combination vs. 11 for expert knowledge and 12 for n-grams. Although
the combination uses more features, its processing time is lower than in
the case of n-grams.
Table 5.31 – Comparison of combine-select with basic cases. CSIC
dataset.
Subset/ Expert Knowledge N -gram Combine-select
Alternatives
DR (%) NF P. Time DR (%) NF P. Time DR (%) NF P. Time
Full subset 93.99 30 0.88 84.59 114 4.27 92.69 144 0.99
CFS 93.55 11 0.50 82.43 12 0.62 63.74 3 0.16
mRMR 75.50 14 0.97 77.85 8 0.56 93.61 17 0.56
• Select-combine. The results corresponding to the ECML/PKDD dataset
for the two subsets of this alternative are summarized in Table 5.32. Note
that in this alternative the full subset (before selection) is not presented,
since select-combine includes feature selection. Because of that, it is not
compared with basic cases before selecting features.
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Table 5.32 – Comparison of select-combine with basic cases.
ECML/PKDD dataset.
Subset/ Expert Knowledge N -gram Select-combine
Alternatives
DR (%) NF P. Time DR (%) NF P. Time DR (%) NF P. Time
CFS 89.10 2 0.15 93.47 15 0.47 - - -
mRMR 91.22 6 0.33 89.45 5 0.33 - - -
mRMR+CFS - - - - - - 96.88 21 0.94
mRMR+mRMR - - - - - - 93.71 11 0.55
The results of the selected mRMR+CFS subset notably improve the rates
of the two basic cases separately (96.88% vs. 91.22% and 93.47%), while
using more features (21 in contrast to 6 and 15). The processing time
is higher than the times of basic cases. Besides the number of features,
in feature selection, the detection results achieved is also an important
factor to be considered. In our case, it can be seen that the criterion
employed to choose the GeFS instance leads to select the one that reaches
higher results, although it neither guarantees the minimum number of
features in all cases nor the minimum processing time. However, in the
ECML/PKDD dataset it is noticeable that even the subset with the
non-selected instance (mRMR+mRMR) improves the detection of both
basic cases, and not necessarily using a higher number of features. This
reinforces the idea that creating a combined subset conducts to achieving
better detection results. For the mRMR+mRMR subset, the processing
time is lower than for the mRMR+CFS subset, although it is higher than
for both basic cases.
The results for the CSIC dataset are presented in Table 5.33, together
with the basic cases to make easier the analysis of the results. In this case,
the selected subset (called CFS+CFS) achieves better detection results
than both basic cases (94.07% vs. 93.55% and 82.43%). The number of
features is also higher (23 vs. 11 and 12), while the processing time is
lower (0.53 vs. 0.88 and 0.62).
In conclusion, this combination is able to improve the detection results of
the basic cases individually, at the expense of employing a higher number
of features. Anyway, in intrusion detection, using 21 and 23 features, as
in our case, is not considered a high number of features and it is quickly
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Table 5.33 – Comparison of select-combine with basic cases. CSIC
dataset.
Subset/ Expert Knowledge N -gram Select-combine
Alternatives
DR (%) NF P. Time DR (%) NF P. Time DR (%) NF P. Time
CFS 93.55 11 0.88 82.43 12 0.62 - - -
mRMR 75.50 14 0.97 77.85 8 0.56 - - -
CFS+CFS - - - - - - 94.07 23 0.53
mRMR+mRMR - - - - - - 82.74 22 1.06
processable by most detection systems. Although the number of features
is higher, in this case the processing time of the combination outperforms
both basic cases.
• Select-n-gram-combine. To facilitate the discussion, a summary for the
results of this alternative for the ECML/PKDD dataset is presented in
Table 5.34.
Table 5.34 – Comparison of select-n-gram-combine with basic cases.
ECML/PKDD dataset.
Subset/ Expert Knowledge N -gram Select-n-gram-combine
Alternatives
DR (%) NF P. Time DR (%) NF P. Time DR (%) NF P. Time
CFS 89.10 2 0.15 93.47 15 0.47 - - -
mRMR 91.22 6 0.33 89.45 5 0.33 - - -
Expert+CFS - - - - - - 97.18 45 2.17
Expert+mRMR - - - - - - 96.35 35 1.4
The selected subset of this combination alternative (expert+CFS)
improves the results of both basic cases separately (97.18% vs. 91.22%
and 93.47%) by using a higher number of features (45 vs. 6 and 15). In
this case, the increment in the number of features is translated into a
rise in the processing time. The expert+mRMR subset, although not
being optimal in feature selection, improves the detection of basic cases
with a higher number of features. This fact shows that the combination
can improve the detection results, and that the criterion used for the
GeFS measure leads to the selection of the instance that reaches higher
detection results.
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Regarding the CSIC dataset, its results can be studied by looking at
Table 5.35. In this case, the behavior is the same than in the previous
dataset: the combination improves the detection results of the two basic
cases individually, by selecting a higher number of features and increasing
the processing time.
Table 5.35 – Comparison of select-n-gram-combine with basic cases.
CSIC dataset.
Subset/ Expert Knowledge N -gram Select-n-gram-combine
Alternatives
DR (%) NF P. Time DR (%) NF P. Time DR (%) NF P. Time
CFS 93.55 11 0.50 82.43 12 0.62 - - -
mRMR 75.50 14 0.97 77.85 8 0.56 - - -
Expert+CFS - - - - - - 94.41 42 1.49
Expert+mRMR - - - - - - 93.75 38 1.25
In summary, except in the combine-select case of the ECML/PKDD dataset,
the combination alternatives reach higher results than basic cases separately.
In all analyzed cases, the detection results are better when the number of
features is higher. And when this happens, generally, the processing time is
also higher. However, it was shown that this implication is not necessarily true
in all cases and that their correlation is not necessarily linear. The subset with
lower processing time is expert knowledge. As the conclusions drawn above
hold true for both CSIC and ECML/PKDD datasets, they lead to think that
this behavior is independent of the dataset used. The improvement of detection
results is usually not in line to reducing the number of features, i.e., the more
one objective is fulfilled, the lest fulfilled is the other one. Because of that, the
best solution depends on the scenario to be protected and on which factors
are more critical for it. When the detection results are important, then the
combination alternatives are recommended. In environments with restricted
resources, combination alternatives that do not increase the processing time
could be used, that is, combine-select or select-combine might be potentially
employed. Another alternative for restricted resource scenarios is applying
basic cases, that could result more appropriate due to their reduced usage of
features.
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5.6.3 Comparison between combination alternatives
In this subsection, the combination alternatives are compared to each other. The
results for the ECML/PKDD dataset of the three alternatives are summarized
in Table 5.36 for facilitating the comparison. Recall that in the case of
combine-select alternative, results before and after feature selection have
been calculated. However, for the select-combine and select-n-gram-combine
alternatives, results can only be obtained including feature selection. In
order to properly compare these three alternatives, the results shown for
the combine-select alternative are exclusively calculated after feature selection.
Table 5.36 – Detection results, number of features and processing time
for the three combination alternatives. ECML/PKDD dataset.
Subset DR (%) NF (%) P. Time (ms/req.)
Combine-select 91.38 11 0.48
Select-combine 96.88 21 0.94
Select-n-gram-combine 97.18 45 2.17
Table 5.36 shows that the best detection results are reached by the
select-n-gram-combine alternative. However, it is also the alternative using a
higher number of features and requiring a higher processing time. Again, the
trend is that the detection results are better as long as the number of features
increases. This is not necessarily obvious as it depends on the information
provided by each feature. The processing time rises as long as the number of
features does.
For the CSIC dataset, the summary can be found in Table 5.37. The
behavior regarding the detection results and number of features is the same as
for the ECML/PKDD dataset: the best detection for the select-n-gram-combine
alternative, that uses more features. However, the processing time does not
necessarily increase as long as the number of features grows, which has positive
implications for the performance of the system.
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Table 5.37 – Detection results, number of features and processing time
for the three combination alternatives. CSIC dataset.
Subset DR (%) NF (%) P. Time (ms/req.)
Combine-select 93.61 17 0.71
Select-combine 94.07 23 0.53
Select-n-gram-combine 94.41 42 1.49
5.6.4 Comparison between decision trees
In this section, the results of the different classifiers applied to solve the current
intrusion detection problem, over the particular studied datasets, are analyzed.
From the results in Sec. 5.5, it seems that, in general, the C4.5, CART and
Random Forest obtain similar results, while the performance of Random Tree
is slightly lower.
If the analysis is performed per dataset, the trend is that for ECML/PKDD,
Random Forest and CART reach slightly better results, while for the CSIC
dataset, CART and C4.5 are faintly more effective.
Regarding the analysis of processing time, in general Random Tree is the
most efficient one (it reaches the lowest processing time), while Random Forest
and C4.5 require more milliseconds for processing each request. This conclusions
are aligned with the nature of each algorithm.
In average, there are no big differences between the classifiers. This tends
to satisfy the No-Free-Lunch Theorem, that states that there are no a priori
distinctions between learning algorithms [Wolpert, 1996] and that “any two
optimization algorithms are equivalent when their performance is averaged
across all possible problems” [Wolpert and Macready, 2005].
5.6.5 Comparison between datasets
In this section, results of both datasets are compared. Regarding expert
knowledge, features have different relationships among them: for the CSIC
dataset they are linear, while for the ECML/PKDD dataset they are not linear.
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Differently, in the n-gram subset, both datasets have linear relationships.
In this case the detection results for the CSIC dataset are not as high as those
for the ECML/PKDD dataset.
About the combinations, the detection results for the ECML/PKDD are
slightly higher than for the CSIC dataset. It could be said then that the CSIC
dataset is more challenging for the detection algorithms than ECML/PKDD.
Anyway, both datasets follow a similar trend.
For both basic cases and combine-select, the processing times of the
ECML/PKDD dataset are lightly lower than those corresponding to CSIC. For
select-combine and select-n-gram-combine the situation is the opposite.
5.6.6 General comparison
In this section, several graphs are shown as a summary for facilitating the
comparison of the different subsets in terms of the detection results and the
number of features. Figure 5.17 represents the DR and FPR of all the subsets
for the ECML/PKDD dataset. In the figure, the size of the circles is used to
represent the number of features, being the coordinates of the alternative the
point in the center of the circles. The best solution would be the one closer to
the (0,1) point with the minimum circle size, that is, better detection results
and lower number of features. Figure 5.18 shows in detail the left-upper area
of Fig. 5.17, in order to facilitate the observation of the results.
As can be seen in Fig. 5.17 and Fig. 5.18, the best results are reached by
the three combination alternatives, that are closer to the (0,1) point and some
of them do not use a high number of features.
The summary for the CSIC dataset is represented in Fig. 5.19. Figure 5.20
and Fig. 5.21 show the previous figure in more detail for better appreciation
(the last figure augments the dotted squared area in Fig. 5.20). These graphs
show that the best solutions are again the combinations, and some expert
knowledge options.
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Figure 5.17 – DR and FPR for all the subsets of the ECML/PKDD
dataset. The size of the symbols represents the number of features.
Figure 5.18 – Detail of DR and FPR for the subsets of the ECML/PKDD
dataset. C-S stands for combine-select, S-C for select-combine and S-N-C
for select-n-gram-combine.
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Figure 5.19 – DR and FPR for all the subsets of the CSIC dataset.
The size of the symbols represents the number of features.
Figure 5.20 – Detail of Fig. 5.19 regarding DR and FPR for the
subsets for the CSIC dataset. C-S stands for combine-select, S-C for
select-combine and S-N-C for select-n-gram-combine.
5.6.7 Influence of the number of training requests
Table 5.26 reveals that for the ECML/PKDD dataset, the average of the four
decision trees can obtain a mean DR of 97.8% and a mean FPR of 2.2%, by
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Figure 5.21 – Detail of Fig. 5.20 regarding DR and FPR for the
subsets for the CSIC dataset. C-S stands for combine-select, S-C for
select-combine and S-N-C for select-n-gram-combine.
using 16 383 training requests. The standard deviation of DR is 0.28% and that
of FPR is 0.27%. Regarding processing time, the mean value is 0.5 ms/request
with σ = 0.30%.
The table shows that the general trend followed by the results when
the number of training requests increments is the following: DR augments
progressively while FPR decreases. For both measures, σ fluctuates until 511
requests, where it decreases until it reaches the 0 value. The processing time
keeps falling until 8191 requests, where it starts growing again.
This trend can be also seen graphically in Fig. 5.22 for the ECML/PKDD
dataset. It shows the mean DR and FPR (regarding the H runs) for the mean
of the four employed decision trees.
Several runs are carried out to guarantee that the behavior of the system
is captured. Observing the figure it can be seen how, at the beginning, the
algorithms do not have enough knowledge and then, both mean DR and FPR
are near 50%. This means that half of the attacks are detected and half of
the alarms are false alarms. This behavior is similar to a random classification
system with the same probability of classifying requests into each class (normal
or anomalous). As long as the system is trained with more requests DR
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Figure 5.22 – Study of the influence of the number of requests on
the detection results of the mean of four decision trees. ECML/PKDD
dataset.
progressively increases while FPR does the opposite, achieving results more
aligned to our objective.
For the CSIC dataset, Table 5.27 shows that mean results rise up to
95.1% DR (with σ = 0.22%) and 4.9% FPR (σ = 0.13%) when training
the system with 32 767 requests. In this case, the mean processing time is
0.7 ms/request and the standard deviation is 0.14%.
The influence of the increase in the number of training requests in the results
of the WAF is summarized next: the mean DR gradually rises, in contrast to
the mean FPR, that decreases progressively. This is represented graphically
in Fig. 5.23. Analyzing the deviation of these measures in Table 5.27, it can
be seen that it fluctuates until it stabilizes and takes a decreasing trend. The
required processing time is more and more reduced until 8191 requests, where
it starts growing. The standard deviation for the processing time keeps 0 until
511 requests.
Since in both datasets σ takes small values, when this document talks about
the results, it refers to the mean value. At this point it should be mentioned
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Figure 5.23 – Study of the influence of the number of requests on the
detection results of the mean of four decision trees. CSIC dataset.
that the fact that the mean FPR is higher than 0.01 (threshold frequently
used in the IDS field) is not a problem when it is considered that, nowadays,
the output of current IDSs is processed by Security Information and Event
Management (SIEM) systems, that correlate data and discard false positives.
The results shown correspond to H = 10 runs. Given the results obtained
for the mean and standard deviation, it was considered that performing H runs
was representative enough for our purposes. It is expected that the standard
deviation would be smaller when more experiments are conducted.
The processing times in these tables are taken as reference since they are
obtained out of H runs and they are calculated for the different values of
training requests.
Note that Fig. 5.15 and Fig. 5.16 previously presented, that show the results
for each of the decision trees individually, present a similar behavior to Fig. 5.22
and Fig. 5.23 respectively, that show the results of the four decision trees in
average.
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5.6.8 Comparison with stochastic systems
The aim of this section is comparing the detection algorithms presented in
this chapter and in Chapter 4, that is, comparing the behavior of statistical
techniques, Markov chains and decision trees.
In order to compare different systems, a common dataset is needed. Since
the experiments of all the studied systems are conducted using the CSIC
dataset, the comparison is possible.
The systems are compared in regard to the following criteria: detection
results, processing time and number of training requests needed. It should be
considered that the implementations of the systems have some differences that
could affect the results. Furthermore, the selection of the training requests is a
random process, therefore, it could also influence the results and comparisons.
It is important to mention that comparisons and conclusions are circumscribed
to the CSIC dataset. Conclusions might be different when a different dataset
is analyzed.
5.6.8.1 Comparison of the characteristics of the systems
This section shows a comparison between some characteristics of the systems
that might influence their results:
• Feature extraction for both stochastic systems is done manually (expert
knowledge). However, in the ML system feature extraction methods that
combine both manual and automatic techniques are proposed.
• Given the characteristics of each algorithm, stochastic systems are
trained with only normal traffic and decision trees with both normal
and anomalous traffic. This fact is reflected in Fig. 4.17 and Fig. 5.23. As
a consequence, stochastic systems deny everything when they are trained
with few requests, i.e., DR is high but FPR too. This behavior reflects
the “denying everything unless explicitly allowed” approach of the system.
Differently, decision trees are trained with both normal and anomalous
requests. Then, when decision trees are trained with few requests, the
system behaves almost randomly. In other words, DR and FPR are 50%.
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• In the stochastic approach the features are constructed at the token
level. However, the machine learning system works at both the token and
request levels.
• Stochastic systems distinguish three types of characters: letters, digits
and non-alphanumeric characters. Decision trees distinguish whether the
non-alphanumeric characters have a meaning in certain programming
languages or not. Moreover, the character distribution of headers is
considered in stochastic systems but not in the ML one.
• In the case of the statistical algorithms, the length limits are determined
by the minimum and the maximum values seen in the training data.
However, in the Markov chains the lower limit is set to 0 and the upper
limit is the parameter of the WAF for the Gaussian distribution.
• The ML system applies feature selection. However, it was not considered
necessary to apply it in stochastic systems because the number of extracted
features is low.
5.6.8.2 Comparison of the results
In this subsection, the proposed detection systems are compared according
to several criteria: detection results, number of needed training requests
and processing time. For the comparison, the mean values are used and
standard deviation values have been omitted. Recall that small differences
in the results should not be considered very decisive, due to the previously
mentioned differences in the design of the systems and the influence of random
aspects of the systems, that may affect their results. Moreover, the fact that
training requests are chosen randomly also has an influence.
• Detection results. The detection results of the three systems are
presented in Table 5.38, in the ‘DR’ and ‘FPR’ columns. Recall that
comparisons are performed using the CSIC dataset. When comparing
the results, it can be observed that, for the number of training requests
used, stochastic algorithms perform better than decision trees (higher
DR and lower FPR). However, between statistical techniques and Markov
chains the difference is not much.
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Table 5.38 – Number of training requests, processing time and results
achieved by each detection algorithm. DR: Detection Rate, FPR: False
Positive Rate, NTrR: Number of Training Requests, NTR: Number of
Test Requests, PT: Processing Time (ms/request), MPT: Minimum
Processing Time (ms/request). CSIC dataset.
Technique DR(%) FPR(%) NTrR NTR PT MPT
Statistical 99.4 0.9 16 383 2000 0.63 0.59
Markov chain 98.1 1.0 32 767 2000 7.9 7.9
Decision Trees 95.1 4.9 32 767 2000 0.7 0.3
• Number of training requests. Table 5.38 reflects that statistical
techniques use half of the requests required by Markov chains in order
to get almost the same detection results. Whereas decision trees are
trained with the same number of training requests than Markov chains
and detection results are a bit lower.
Therefore, statistical techniques are those that require the lowest number
of training request to achieve 0.9% FPR. Markov chains and decision
trees are less recommendable in environments where obtaining traffic is
difficult or where the amount of traffic is limited.
As mentioned, in all cases, the systems are tested with 1000 normal plus
1000 abnormal requests.
• Processing Time. Since the processing time of the system makes
reference to the milliseconds consumed to process a single request, the
lower the processing time, the more efficient the system is. Processing
time is shown in Table 5.38 in two columns. On the one hand, column
‘PT’ shows the processing time corresponding to the number of requests
used to train the system, that is represented in the ‘NTrR’ column. On
the other hand, column ‘MPT’ refers to the minimum processing time
that the algorithm reached, regardless of the number of training requests.
Results reveal that the slowest algorithm is the one that uses Markov
chains. Column ‘MPT’ shows that decision trees can reach the fastest
processing time, hence, they are recommended when the processing time
of the system is an important factor in the detection system.
160 5. Machine learning techniques for web intrusion detection
In summary, it can be stated that stochastic systems reach the best detection
results and decision trees achieve the best processing time. The most adequate
technique for each target scenario depends on which of the previous aspects
has a higher importance in each particular case.
5.7 Conclusions
The conclusions drawn in this chapter are summarized next:
• Decision trees can be successfully applied to the classification of web
traffic. They are effective in the classification of this type of traffic besides
in network traffic. Four decision trees have been used for the experiments:
C4.5, CART, Random Tree and Random Forest.
• The decision trees employed for detection reach high detection results.
For the ECML/PKDD dataset, the average results of the four decision
trees reach 97.8% DR and 2.2% FPR. These results correspond to the
mean of the results for 16 383 training requests and for the H = 10 runs
of the experiments using the select-n-gram-combine subset. For the CSIC
dataset, the results are 95.1% DR and 4.9% FPR in average for the same
subset with 32 767 training requests and H = 10. In the experiments,
decision trees are able to detect the different attacks included in both the
CSIC and ECML/PKDD datasets, even zero-day attacks.
• The algorithms are high-speed. For the ECML/PKDD dataset, when
decision trees are trained with 16 383 requests, the processing time is
0.5 ms/request, with 0.3% standard deviation. However, the algorithms
can process requests up to 0.2 ms/request and 0.24% standard deviation,
when trained with 8191 requests. In the case of the CSIC dataset,
the processing time is 0.7 ms/request for 32 767 training requests, with
0.14% standard deviation. The algorithms can reach higher speeds when
trained with 4095 and 8191 requests. In those cases the processing time is
0.3 ms/request, with 0.35% standard deviation.
• The GeFS measure successfully selects features in web traffic (in addition
to network traffic). This measure reduces the number of irrelevant and
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redundant features and decreases the processing time. Besides that, it
is able to improve the detection results in two cases: firstly, in the case
of combine-select subset of the CSIC dataset, where the reduction was
88.2% (from 144 to 17 features) and the DR improvement of 0.92% (from
92.69% to 93.61%). Secondly, in the case of n-grams of the ECML/PKDD
dataset, that reaches an improvement of 0.48% in DR (from 92.99% to
93.47%) with a reduction of 84.38% in the number of features (from 96
to 15).
• New feature extraction methods are proposed. They combine expert
knowledge and n-gram features. Concretely, three combination
alternatives are proposed:
– Combine-select. The first alternative mixes all the features extracted
by n-grams and expert knowledge and applies feature selection
afterwards.
– Select-combine. In contrast, this alternative mixes the features
already selected from expert knowledge and n-grams.
– Select-n-gram-combine. This alternative is a variation of the second
one. It combines expert knowledge features (not selected) with the
selected ones from n-grams.
The resource consumption of the proposed extraction methods is reduced
by the application of feature selection. However, for both datasets,
the three combination alternatives improve the detection results of the
methods individually, satisfying the proposed objectives.
Regarding the number of features, the combination alternatives use a
higher number of features than individual techniques. In general, when
the number of features grows higher, the processing time also does.
However, it is not always the case (like for example, with the case of
the select-combine alternative for the CSIC dataset). From the three
combination alternatives, the select-n-gram-combine is the one that uses
more features (45 features for the ECML/PKDD dataset and 42 for
the CSIC dataset) and also the one that reaches the highest results.
Combine-select is the option that uses the lowest number of features (11
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for ECML/PKDD and 17 for the CSIC dataset) and the one that achieves
lower mean detection results (91.38% and 93.61% for the ECML/PKDD
and CSIC datasets respectively).
In general, in intrusion detection, the number of features used in this
thesis is considered low and, considering the capacity of modern systems,
it is acceptable. However, in scenarios with high resource limitations,
alternatives using a lower number of features (for example combine-select)
could result more suitable. These conclusions apply to both datasets
studied in this thesis.
• The study of how the number of training requests influences the
performance of the system reveals a funnel-shape trend of the system
(the higher the number of training requests, the best detection results).
For the ECML/PKDD dataset, 16 383 requests are enough to achieve a
mean FPR of 2.2%. For the CSIC dataset 32 767 requests are used to
achieve a mean FPR of 4.9%.
• The comparison of statistical techniques, Markov chains and decision
trees concludes that stochastic systems reach the best detection results
and decision trees can potentially achieve the best processing time. The
statistical system is the one that needs the least training request for
reaching those results.
Chapter 6
Conclusions, contributions and
future work
“Tell me and I forget, teach me and I may
remember, involve me and I learn."
— Benjamin Franklin
This chapter firstly shows a brief summary of the present thesis.
Then, the conclusions extracted from the research are described.
The contributions of the thesis, as well as the publications derived,
are shown. Finally, future research lines are drawn.
6.1 Summary
Web applications take more and more part in our daily lives. They are
becoming increasingly popular and complex in all sorts of environments, ranging
from e-commerce applications to banking. This fact makes web applications
very attractive for attackers, who intend to exploit web vulnerabilities. Web
applications are threatened, therefore, it is necessary to protect them. In order
to detect web-specific attacks, detection mechanisms need to be placed at the
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application layer. This is the objective of WAFs: analyzing HTTP traffic with
the aim of detecting web intrusions. These systems are a particular case of IDSs,
with the particularity of being specialized on the analysis of web traffic. One
of the benefits of IDSs and WAFs is that they protect a target web application
without the necessity of modifying its source code.
The main objective of this thesis is developing intrusion detection systems
that are able to accurately detect web attacks with a low resource consumption,
high speed and a simple design. In order to achieve this goal, various techniques
have been used for detection: stochastic-based techniques and machine learning.
The proposed systems follow an anomaly-based approach. Regarding stochastic
techniques, two methods have been applied: statistical-based algorithms and
Markov chains. Regarding machine learning, four decision trees have been used
to detect web attacks, namely C4.5, CART, Random Tree and Random Forest.
Additional aspects of the web attack detection have been addressed in
this thesis. On the one hand, it studies the influence that the number of
requests used in the training phase produces over the detection capacity of the
system. On the other hand, it carries out a study about which features are
more efficient and effective for web intrusion detection. For that purpose, firstly,
three feature extraction methods have been studied: expert knowledge, n-grams
and a combination of the two previous options. They have been analyzed in
order to determine which one leads to the best detection results and the lowest
resource consumption. Secondly, the extracted features have been selected by
means of the GeFS measure.
The proposed detection systems have been experimentally tested. For that,
HTTP traffic is needed. Counting with appropriate datasets for training and
testing detection methods is critical. However, in the web intrusion detection
field, gathering labeled and proper traffic faces several difficulties. The main
problem identified is the scarcity of labeled HTTP datasets [Sommer and
Paxson, 2010], [Tavallaee et al., 2010]. In this thesis, the ECML/PKDD
dataset, generated for the ECML/PKDD Discovery Challenge, has been used.
However, the disadvantage of this dataset is that most parts of the requests
are anonymized, which complicates the thorough evaluation of the detection
algorithm’s performance. Therefore, a common and public dataset would
be necessary to adequately evaluate the systems. It would also allow the
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comparison of different schemes and techniques. This has been the motivation
for generating the CSIC dataset. It is a new and publicly available HTTP
dataset that is being used by the web intrusion detection community to evaluate
their detection systems. It consists of labeled normal and anomalous requests,
including multiple modern attacks. Furthermore, it is not anonymized.
After this summary, the conclusions obtained during the development of
this work are given.
6.2 Conclusions
The most relevant conclusions derived from this thesis are:
• Stochastic and machine learning algorithms can be successfully
used in anomaly-based web attack detection.
They are able to distinguish between normal and anomalous traffic with
low time and resource consumption. Both approaches have been able to
detect zero-day attacks.
• The goal of building high-detection WAFs has been achieved.
Results show that the best detection results are reached by the statistical
system.
The performance of the systems is measured as the mean of the detection
rate and the false positive rate. The values obtained from the experiments
are the following:
– In relation to the statistical based system, it is able to reach a
detection rate of 99.4% and a false positive rate of 0.9%.
– The Markovian system achieves a detection rate of 98.1% and 1%
false positive rate. These results have been reached with the following
parameter values for the Markov chain: τ = 50,  = 10−15 and
p = 0.99.
– Regarding ML techniques, the results have been calculated as the
average of the detection rate of four decision trees (C4.5, CART,
Random Tree and Random Forest). Results have been shown for
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two datasets: in the case of the CSIC dataset the detection rate
rises up to 95.1% when the false positive rate is 4.9%. For the
ECML/PKDD dataset, the DR reaches 97.8% with 2.2% FPR. Note
that FPRs higher than 0.01 are not problematic, given that SIEM
systems analyze the output of IDSs and correlate data, being able
to reduce the amount of false positives.
• The influence of the number of training requests on the
detection results has been studied.
For that, M = 15 experiments that use an increasing number of training
requests, from 1 to 32 767 have been performed. They have been run
H = 10 times, choosing different samples of training requests.
Contrarily to what would be expected, the behavior of the systems is not
always linear, consequently, using more training requests does not always
imply better results.
Experiments have revealed the following:
– In the case of the statistical WAF, when using 16 383 requests to
train the system, a false positive rate of 0.9% is reached. When the
training is done with higher amounts of requests, it is possible to
progressively reduce the false positive rate, until reaching a FPR of
0.4%. The detection rate remains almost invariable: from 99.4% to
99.3%. This is achieved with 32 767 training requests.
– In the case of Markov chains, 32 767 requests are necessary to obtain
1% FPR. It is noticeable that when 8191 requests are employed, the
FPR is already 1.7%.
– In relation to ML, the experiments show that with 32 767 requests
from the CSIC dataset, the system reaches a FPR of 4.9%. The rate
decreases to 2.2% in the case of the ECML/PKDD dataset when
16 383 requests are employed.
In summary, the statistical method and the ML system (in the case of
the ECML/PKDD dataset) are the ones that need the lowest number
of requests for training the system (16 383), while not decrementing its
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detection capacity. Markov chains and the ML system for the CSIC
dataset use a double amount of requests.
• The goal of building high-speed detection systems has been
achieved.
The experiments reveal the following processing time, depending on the
detection technique used:
– The statistical algorithm is able to process requests up to a rate of
0.59 ms/request (i.e., processing a single request takes 0.00059 s).
– The processing time is 7.9 ms/request for Markov chains.
– In the case of ML, a mean of the processing time of the four
decision trees is taken. The experiments show that ML can reach
a processing time of 0.3 ms/request for the CSIC dataset. In the
case of the ECML/PKDD dataset, the processing time decreases to
0.2 ms/request. Note that as the mean of the algorithms is taken,
using a specific algorithm results could even improve. In particular,
Random Tree is the fastest decision tree (it can be 7 times faster
than C4.5).
All processing time measurements have been obtained with an Intel core
i7 CPU at 2.40 GHz and 8GB RAM, SO Windows 8, 64 bits.
In conclusion, from the detection techniques studied, ML algorithms are
those that get the minimum processing time. Thus, from the experiments
it has been concluded that even in the case where ML requires a higher
number of training requests, it is faster.
• The proposed feature extraction methods, that combine expert
knowledge and n-grams, have improved the detection results of
both techniques separately.
Furthermore, feature selection has been applied to reduce irrelevant and
redundant features. Using a low number of features results in low resource
consumption.
Comparing the results of the three combination alternatives proposed,
namely combine-select, select-combine and select-n-gram-combine, it can
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be concluded that the first one is the option that reduces the most
the number of features, but it also gets the lowest results. Contrarily,
select-n-gram-combine reaches the best detection results but it needs
the highest number of features. Select-combine is an intermediate case
between the other two alternatives.
In general, a lower number of features implies lower processing times.
However, it was shown that in some cases, like for the select-combine
subset of the CSIC dataset, the combination was even able to reduce the
processing time.
• The systems consume low resources. Experiments have shown
that not only for network traffic, but also for web traffic, the
GeFS measure is able to reduce the number of redundant and
irrelevant features, while keeping the detection results.
The resource consumption is measured according to the number of features.
Besides reducing the number of features, GeFS can even make the results
improve, like in the case of n-grams and combine-select.
The experiments have been carried out using two datasets (CSIC and
ECML/PKDD) for expert knowledge, n-grams and the three combination
alternatives. Expert knowledge and n-grams are called basic cases and the
rest, combination ones. The study about the type of relationship between
features has revealed that in most of the cases there are linear relationships
between the features, considering basic cases and combination. When
there are linear relations, the CFS has been used for reducing the number
of features. The experiments show that, in most of the cases, for the
two datasets studied, there are more linear relations between the features
than non-linear ones.
• A new publicly available and labeled dataset, the CSIC dataset,
has been created.
The dataset contains exclusively HTTP traffic, and its requests are
labeled as normal or anomalous. The fact that the dataset is labeled
makes possible to evaluate the detection abilities of the web detection
system. Specifically, the dataset contains around 36 000 normal requests
and 25 000 anomalous ones. Furthermore, the CSIC dataset includes
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modern web attacks such as SQL injection, buffer overflow, XSS, server
side include and so on, satisfying the necessity of evaluating the behavior
of the systems towards modern attacks. Considering the quick speed
of the evolution of web attacks nowadays, it is very important that the
protection mechanisms are ready to respond adequately to those threats.
Other advantage of the dataset is that it includes realistic values and
that it is not anonymized.
This dataset is more challenging than the ECML/PKDD dataset for the
evaluation of decision tree algorithms.
Given that the dataset is publicly available, it provides a common
framework to the scientific community for evaluating WAFs, facilitating
the comparison of different web intrusion systems. In fact, the dataset is
currently being used by the scientific community to evaluate their web
attack detection systems [Kozik et al., 2014a], [Kozik et al., 2014b]. Even,
versions with other formats of the dataset have been created by other
researchers [Scully, 2015].
In summary, it can be seen that the objectives established in Sec. 1.4
have been satisfied.
• The behavior of the proposed detection techniques (statistical
methods, Markov chains and decision trees) has been compared
using the CSIC dataset to study which of them is the most
recommendable in each scenario.
This study reveals that, depending on the scenario and on the pursued
goal, the recommendable system should be chosen as follows: when the
goal is to achieve high detection results, then the statistical-based system
is the most appropriate one. This is also the most suitable option when
a low amount of requests is available. However, if the primordial interest
is a low processing time of the system, then decision trees are optimal.
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6.3 Contributions
In this section, the main contributions of this thesis are presented:
1. Two new high-speed, high-detection, low resource consumption
and simple designed stochastic-based anomaly web application
firewalls have been developed.
One of the systems applies statistical techniques for the detection and
the other is based on Markov chains.
Several relevant aspects of the algorithms to be highlighted are:
• In general, the statistical-based anomaly WAFs in the literature make
use of several models to decide about the normality/abnormality
of the requests, like [Kruegel et al., 2005b], [Criscione and Zanero,
2009]. These models range from low to high complexity. In order to
calculate the total anomaly rate of a request, these systems need to
evaluate every model. Contrarily, the systems proposed in this thesis
are designed to consider each model as autonomous. That is, the
models contribute to the final decision but each one also has decision
autonomy, not being merely another part of the general abnormality
decision. This implies that, in some cases, the approach proposed
does not need to evaluate all models before making a decision about
the abnormality of the request. This happens when a model decides
that the request is not normal. In that case, it is not necessary to
continue with the detection process. As soon as the request does
not satisfy any of the model requirements for normality, the request
is tagged as anomalous. The request is only marked as normal when
it satisfies the requirements of all models. This design makes the
algorithm simpler, faster and low resource consumer than when the
whole detection process needs to be completed in all cases.
• Regarding the number of models, the proposed stochastic approach
makes use of two simple models, while the detection performance
of the system is not deflated. Therefore, this approach reduces the
complexity of web anomaly detection systems, showing that few and
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simple models can be effective for detecting web attacks without a
negative impact in the detection results. Additionally, it reduces
time, resource consumption and processing time.
• While most of the systems analyze some parts of the request, these
WAFs analyze the whole request, including headers. This makes
possible to detect attacks embedded in any part of the request.
• Additionally, the stochastic approach has been applied at the
argument level, that is, the system learns the structure of a particular
argument. This allows to model the argument more precisely than
considering a bigger portion of the request, making the detection
more accurate.
• Instead of associating the states of the Markov chains to the 256
ASCII characters, as it is usually done in intrusion detection, in this
dissertation the characters have been grouped as letters, digits or
non-alphanumeric characters. Sriraghavan and Lucchese proved that
such grouping of characters does not reduce the performance in the
detection of web attacks [Sriraghavan and Lucchese, 2008] and, at
the same time, it makes possible to reduce the number of the states
in the Markov chain. The smaller the size of Markov matrices is, the
lower the time and resource consumption is. The processing time
reached by the Markovian system is 7.9 ms/request.
• These systems have been evaluated by using the public and labelled
CSIC dataset.
• These characteristics make the systems high-speed, high-detection,
low resource consumer and simple, satisfying the objectives of this
thesis.
2. Successful application of C4.5, CART, Random Tree and
Random Forest decision trees to web intrusion detection for
the first time.
Decision trees have been proven to be very effective in solving the general
intrusion detection problem, however, they have been hardly used in the
web attack field. Although the ID3 decision tree has been previously
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applied to web traffic, as far as we know, it is the first time that C4.5,
CART, Random Tree, Random Forest are applied to this type of traffic.
The study about the behavior of these decision trees over HTTP traffic
reveals that they can be successfully used to solve the web attack detection
problem.
3. Study of how the number of requests used in the training phase
influences the detection accuracy of the system.
Several experiments have been carried out by incrementally increasing
the number of training requests, in order to study how their variation
affects the detection results of the stochastic and ML detection systems.
Additionally, this study allows to establish how many requests are
necessary to achieve a particularly desired result concerning the detection
capability of the system. These aspects have been scarcely studied in
the intrusion detection state of the art. The experiments show that the
number of training requests to be used depends on the algorithm analyzed.
The research developed reveals that for statistical techniques it is not
necessary to employ the whole training dataset to train the system. In
fact, for the CSIC dataset, with approximately a quarter (16 383) of the
requests that compose the dataset, a false positive rate of 1% is reached.
This number of requests also reaches the lowest FPR for the ML system
when the ECML/PKDD dataset is used. The need of a low number
of training requests, without negatively affecting the detection results,
enjoys several advantages: on the one hand, the traffic is easier to gather;
on the other hand, the training phase is shorter. The second point is also
important in case the system needs periodical retraining.
4. Proposal of new methods for combining manual and automatic
features for machine learning that achieve better detection
results than both techniques separately and consume low
resources.
The proposed methods mix expert knowledge (manual extraction)
and n-grams (automatic extraction). In the few cases where such a
combination is applied in the literature, it is done by first combining
the features and selecting them afterwards. Within the combined
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feature extraction methods, as a novelty, this thesis proposes different
alternatives to implement the combination. Besides the combination
method previously mentioned, other new methods have been introduced:
one of them consists in selecting the features of the manual and
automatic approaches and, later, combining them. The other proposal is
similar to the previously mentioned one, but it only takes the selected
values of n-grams. The combination alternatives improve the detection
results of the manual or automatic techniques separately. Additionally,
feature selection has been applied to reduce the number of features and,
consequently, to decrease the resource consumption. In some cases, the
combination methods have been even able to reduce the processing time.
5. Successful application of the GeFS measure to web traffic for
the first time.
Although this feature selection measure has been successfully tested for
network traffic [Nguyen et al., 2010b], [Nguyen et al., 2010a], it has not
been applied before to HTTP traffic. The experiments conducted obtain
evidence of its successful capability of selecting features that allow to
distinguish between web attacks and normal traffic.
6. Comparison of the statistical, Markovian and decision tree
algorithms in the detection of web attacks.
These three detection techniques have been compared using the same
reference dataset (CSIC ), what allows to make comparisons between the
algorithms and extract conclusions about their performance. Different
properties, such as detection results, processing time and number of
needed training requests have been compared, making possible to conclude
which algorithm is the most appropriate for a given scenario.
7. Generation of the CSIC dataset: a new public and labeled
dataset that provides a common framework to evaluate and
compare WAFs.
In order to avoid the problems of some other existing datasets, the CSIC
dataset provides public-access and labeled HTTP traffic that contains
modern attacks and that is not anonymized. The dataset is currently
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being used by the IDS community for the evaluation of their web attack
detection systems. Even other formats of the dataset have been created
by the scientific community in order to enlarge its possibilities of use.
A number of papers has been published as a result of this research:
1. C. Torrano-Gimenez, A. Perez-Villegas, G. Alvarez. An
anomaly-based web application firewall. In Conference on
Security and Cryptography (SECRYPT 2009), pages 23–38, 2009.
http://jigpal.oxfordjournals.org/content/21/4/560.abstract (last accessed
August 2015).
2. C. Torrano-Gimenez, A. Perez-Villegas, G. Alvarez. A
self-learning anomaly-based web application firewall. Advances
in Intelligent and Soft Computing, 63: 85–92, 2009.
http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-642-04091-7_11
(last accessed August 2015).
3. C. Torrano-Gimenez, A. Perez-Villegas, G. Alvarez. An anomaly-based
approach for intrusion detection in web traffic. Journal of
Information Assurance and Security, 5(4): 446–454, 2010.
http://digital.csic.es/bitstream/10261/40544/1/ARTICULOS315428
%5B1%5D.pdf (last accessed August 2015).
4. A. Perez-Villegas, C. Torrano-Gimenez, G. Alvarez. Applying Markov
chains to web intrusion detection. In Reunión Española sobre Criptología
y Seguridad de la Información (RECSI 2010), pages 361–366, 2010.
5. H. T. Nguyen, C. Torrano-Gimenez, G. Alvarez, S. Petrovic, K.
Franke. Application of the generic feature selection measure in
detection of web attacks. In International Workshop in Computational
Intelligence in Security for Information Systems (CISIS 11), pages 25–32,
2011. http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Hai_Nguyen14/publication/
221271490_Application_of_the_Generic_Feature_Selection_Measure
_in_Detection_of_Web_Attacks/links/09e41512b868ff2954000000.pdf
(last accessed August 2015).
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6. C. Torrano-Gimenez, H. T. Nguyen, G. Alvarez, S. Petrovic,
K. Franke. Applying feature selection to payload-based web
application firewalls. In International Workshop on Security
and Communication Networks (IWSCN 11), pages 75–81, 2011.
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6827720 (last
accessed August 2015).
7. C. Torrano-Gimenez, H. T. Nguyen, G. Alvarez, and K. Franke.
Combining expert knowledge with automatic feature extraction for
reliable web attack detection. Security and Communication Networks,
2012. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/sec.603/abstract (last
accessed August 2015).
8. H. T. Nguyen, C. Torrano-Gimenez, G. Alvarez, K. Franke, S. Petrovic.
Enhancing the effectiveness of web application firewalls by generic
feature selection. Logic Journal of the IGPL, 21(4): 560–570, 2013.
http://jigpal.oxfordjournals.org/content/21/4/560.abstract (last accessed
August 2015).
This thesis has also been presented in the Security Conference RootedCon
2015 [Rooted, 2015]. C. Torrano-Gimenez. Doing research about web application
firewalls. RootedCon 2015. http://es.slideshare.net/ctorranog.
Additional publications related to web security have been done during
the thesis period:
1. C. Torrano-Gimenez, A. Perez-Villegas, G. Alvarez. WASAT-
a new authorization security analysis tool. In Web
Application Security conference (IBWAS09), pages 39–49, 2009.
http://elibrary.palcomtech.ac.id/wp-content/uploads/Web-Application-
Security.pdf#page=50 (last accessed August 2015).
2. M. Balduzzi, C. Torrano-Gimenez, D. Balzarotti, E. Kirda.
Automated discovery of parameter pollution vulnerabilities in
web applications. In Network and Distributed System Security
Symposium (NDSS), 2011. BEST PAPER AWARD.
http://www.iseclab.org/people/embyte/papers/hpp.pdf (last accessed
August 2015).
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3. C. Torrano-Gimenez, A. Perez-Villegas, G. Alvarez. TORPEDA:
Un conjunto de datos ampliable para la evaluación de cortafuegos
de aplicaciones web. In Reunión Española sobre Criptología y
Seguridad de la Información (RECSI 2012), pages 77–82, 2012.
http://recsi2012.mondragon.edu/es/programa/recsi2012_submission
_73.pdf (last accessed August 2015).
4. S. Pastrana, C. Torrano-Gimenez, H. T. Nguyen, A. Orfila.
Anomalous web payload detection: Evaluating the resilience of
1-gram based classifiers. In Proceedings of the 8th Conference
on Intelligent Distributed Computing (IDC), pages 195–201, 2014.
http://www.seg.inf.uc3m.es/papers/2014IDC.pdf (last accessed August
2015).
Various research stays abroad have been completed during the thesis
period:
1. University of Nottingham (U.K.), from June to August 2008. The stay,
hosted by Dr. Uwe Aickelin, was dedicated to the application of an
immune-inpired algorithm to web attack detection.
2. Technique University of Munich (Germany), from May to July 2009.
With the guidance of Dr. Gerhard Münz, the study of the application of
statistic techniques and information theory to the detection of automated
web attacks was carried out.
3. Research Center Eurecom (Sophia Antipolis, France), that is part of
the International Secure Systems Lab (ISECLAB), from March to May
2010. In collaboration with Dr. Engin Kirda, a tool that discovers HTTP
parameter pollution vulnerabilities (PAPAS) was developed.
6.4 Future work
Different detection systems against web attacks have been presented in this
work. The contributions derived from this research still leave place for extended
work and related open research lines. In the following, the possible future work
is presented:
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• Statistical characterization of other parts of the request. The
stochastic detection systems proposed have been designed such that not
all parts of the systems are ready to dynamically adjust to the addition
of new web pages. Then, when new pages are included to the protected
web application, the system needs to be retrained in order to update the
normal behavior to the new definition of the application. To overcome this
drawback, the idea is to change the ongoing definition of the resources
in the XML file. Instead of using the current static definition of the
resources, writing exactly in the NBD file the string corresponding to the
resource name, the proposal is to statistically characterize the name of
the resources. This is what is done with the values of the arguments. It
allows to capture the structure of the resources in a more general way,
what facilitates their matching when they experiment dynamic changes.
The same idea can be applied to names of arguments and headers.
• Feature extraction with high order n-grams. For the experiments
performed, monograms have been used. Although in Sec. 5.4.2.2 it
was explained why this decision was made, it would be interesting to
investigate how the selection of higher order n-grams (n > 1) affects the
detection results of the systems.
• Considering the presence of noise in the training data. The
presented stochastic systems have been trained with only normal traffic
(without noise in data). However, only normal traffic might be difficult
to obtain, therefore in some works, like [Criscione and Zanero, 2009]
and [Corona et al., 2009], their authors have tested how resistent the
systems are to certain amount of noise in the training traffic (usually
around 1%).
In case of noise, the proposed stochastic systems would register
illegal characters in the NBD file. Since argument/header values are
characterized by statistical intervals or Markov chains, a certain amount of
noise in the training traffic could be tolerated. However, as the remaining
part of the NBD file includes strings literally, attacks containing illegal
strings would not be detected. In order to avoid that, we are already
working in the development of a kind of filtering process, which is based on
the assumption that noise within traffic is less frequent than normal traffic.
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The proposed process should be applied to different items: methods,
header name, directories, files and argument names. The idea of the filter
method is deleting from the NBD file those elements that are considered
noise in the traffic. This provokes that noise in certain parts of the
requests is not learned and therefore, it does not affect the detection
results. A study of how much noise the algorithms can tolerate will be
further investigated as future work.
• Detecting multi-request web attacks. The systems presented have
been designed to detect attacks that involve a single request. An extension
of the systems would require detecting web attacks that involve several
requests, such as fuzzing or password cracking. In the detection of these
attacks, it is probable that independently analyzing the requests does not
give an indication of attack. Nevertheless, analyzing the requests as a
group, the attack is revealed. This idea can also be extended to detect
APTs, that operate in low-and-slow mode. Besides how to defend against
these attacks, this research topic also involves obtaining traffic to test
how well the detection algorithms are able to distinguish this kind of
attacks from normal traffic.
• Sampling training requests. The contribution on the influence of
training requests in the detection results opens interesting research lines
related to the optimization of the training phase of detection systems.
The shorter the training phase, the better, as less computational time and
resources are necessary. However if the system is not trained with enough
requests, it will not be effective in the detection. Thus, the proposal for
future work is optimizing the training period, by minimizing the training
requests while the system obtains enough information for an effective
detection. In order to do that, the requests that supply more information
to the system should be selected. Although this topic has been studied
in regard to network traffic ([Androulidakis and Papavassiliou, 2008],
[Androulidakis et al., 2009],[Bakhoum, 2011b], [Bartos and Rehak, 2012]),
it has not received much attention in relation to web traffic yet.
Studying the requests that optimize the training process is also highly
related to adequate ways of creating datasets, which is a key issue in
evaluating IDSs.
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• Adaptive systems. As mentioned, the systems presented have been
designed so that when the protected web application suffers changes, the
algorithms need to be retrained. Furthermore, the environment or the
traffic might also change. In that case, the current solution would also
require retraining. To overcome this drawback, adaptive IDSs readjust
automatically to these changes. For that, the idea is that instead of
stopping learning immediately after the training phase, the algorithms
continue acquiring knowledge during the operation of the system. That
is, the system learns from the incorrectly classified instances.
This approach copes with several problems related to IDSs: it reduces
high false positives rates, avoids retraining and the systems adapt to
changing environments. It is an interesting future research line.
• Application to other contexts. The algorithms presented can be
applied to detect anomalies in other types of traffic, like FTP or Domain
Name System (DNS). They can also be applied to detect different kinds
of threats, such as APT, insiders or information leakage. In order to do
that, the systems should be fed with the appropriate traffic.
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